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Tara Leigh Grove*
The federal judiciary today takes certain things for granted.
Political actors will not attempt to remove Article III judges outside the
impeachment process; they will not obstruct federal court orders; and
they will not tinker with the Supreme Court’s size in order to pack it with
like-minded Justices. And yet a closer look reveals that these “selfevident truths” of judicial independence are neither self-evident nor
necessary implications of our constitutional text, structure, and history.
This Article demonstrates that many government officials once viewed
these court-curbing measures as not only constitutionally permissible
but also desirable (and politically viable) methods of “checking” the
judiciary. The Article tells the story of how political actors came to treat
each measure as “out of bounds” and thus built what the Article calls
“conventions of judicial independence.” But implicit in this story is a
cautionary tale about the fragility of judicial independence. Indeed, this
account underscores the extent to which judicial independence is
politically constructed and historically contingent. Particularly at a
time when government officials seem willing to depart from other longstanding norms, federal judges should take none of their current
protections for granted.
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INTRODUCTION
We hold certain truths of the federal judiciary to be self-evident.
Article III judges are entitled to life tenure and salary protections, and
cannot be removed outside the impeachment process. 1 Political actors
must comply with federal court orders. 2 And “packing” the Supreme
Court is wrong. 3 These assumptions are so deeply ingrained in our
public consciousness that it rarely occurs to anyone to question them.
But a closer look reveals that these “truths” are neither selfevident nor necessary implications of our constitutional text, structure,
1.
See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 16 (1955) (“[Article III] courts are
presided over by judges appointed for life, subject only to removal by impeachment.”); Vicki C.
Jackson, Packages of Judicial Independence: The Selection and Tenure of Article III Judges, 95
GEO. L.J. 965, 987 (2007) (describing this rule as the “traditional understanding”).
2.
See Daniel J. Meltzer, Lecture, Executive Defense of Congressional Acts, 61 DUKE L.J.
1183, 1191 (2012) (“[M]ost commentators . . . concede that the president may not defy a judicial
order . . . .”); David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 34 (2014)
(“When modern Presidents believe the Supreme Court has misconstrued the Constitution, they
nonetheless acquiesce in its judgments . . . .”); see also Nicholas R. Parrillo, The Endgame of
Administrative Law: Governmental Disobedience and the Judicial Contempt Power, 131 HARV. L.
REV. 685, 688, 700, 702 (2018) (noting norms of compliance by state and federal agencies, but
urging that agencies may struggle to comply with orders compelling action).
3.
By “court packing,” I refer to the practice of modifying the Court’s size to change the
future course of its decisions. Other scholars have recognized that this practice is “out of bounds”
politically, even though there are good textual and historical reasons to assume it is valid. See
Michael C. Dorf, How the Written Constitution Crowds Out the Extraconstitutional Rule of
Recognition, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 69, 74 (Matthew D. Adler
& Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 2009); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Unitary Executive and the
Plural Judiciary: On the Potential Virtues of Decentralized Judicial Power, 89 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1021, 1063–64 (2014). My goal here is to trace how court packing came to be seen as “out of
bounds.” See infra Part III.
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and history. Instead, these rules of our federal judiciary have emerged
over time through the rough and tumble of the political process. At one
time, prominent government officials insisted that Article III judges
could be terminated outside the impeachment process; that political
actors could violate federal court orders; and that court packing was an
appropriate and even desirable method of dealing with a recalcitrant
Supreme Court. Yet over time, these practices became not only
disfavored but utterly out of bounds. By firmly rejecting these methods
of attacking the federal judiciary, political actors have built what I call
conventions of judicial independence. 4
Although the concept of “conventions” was first developed in
British constitutional thought, 5 American scholars have recently begun
to appreciate that our legal system also contains many such norms. 6 At
a basic level, “conventions” are “unwritten rules of political behavior”
that constrain the discretion of government officials. 7 Notably, when
scholars label a practice as a convention, they do not simply mean that
government actors are in the habit of doing (or not doing) something. A
practice is a convention when officials widely believe that it would be
fundamentally wrong to do otherwise. 8
How can we recognize a practice as a convention? For purposes
of this Article, a “convention” protecting judicial independence depends
on two major factors. 9 First, the constitutional text and structure can

4.
In this Article, the term “judicial independence” refers to what Vicki Jackson has
helpfully called “decisional independence”—that is, an individual judge’s ability to issue a ruling
without fear of sanctions. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 967–68.
5.
A.V. Dicey introduced the concept over a century ago. See ALBERT VENN DICEY, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION, at cxl–cxlvi (8th ed. 1915).
6.
See Pozen, supra note 2, at 9, 27–48; Adrian Vermeule, Conventions in Court, 38 DUBLIN
U. L.J. 283 (2015) [hereinafter Vermeule, Conventions in Court]; Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of
Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163 (2013) [hereinafter Vermeule, Agency
Independence]; Keith E. Whittington, The Status of Unwritten Constitutional Conventions in the
United States, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1847; see also Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article
II, 131 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (discussing norms that govern presidential power).
7.
Vermeule, Conventions in Court, supra note 6, at 288.
8.
See GEOFFREY MARSHALL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THE RULES AND FORMS OF
POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY 214 (1984) (“Conventions . . . are rules that not only are followed
but . . . have to be followed.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Joseph Jaconelli, The Nature of
Constitutional Convention, 19 LEGAL STUD. 24, 30 (1999) (“A constitutional convention is no mere
habit,” but is instead “a rule . . . which looks on the outward pattern of behaviour as a standard to
be followed.”).
9.
Even though “convention” is a well-established concept in British constitutional thought,
there is a good deal of disagreement over the precise definition—and over which government
practices qualify as “conventions.” See MARSHALL, supra note 8, at 10 (noting that the “unresolved
problems about conventions . . . arise partly from the existence of rival tests for their
establishment and partly from the disputed connections between convention and law”). Therefore,
to make the concept analytically useful, it is important to specify how the term is used in this
Article. That is particularly true given that one of my primary goals is to distinguish court-curbing
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plausibly be read to allow a given court-curbing measure. 10 Second, a
firm bipartisan norm has nevertheless developed, barring the
practice. 11 For that reason, political actors rarely even consider the
practice; and if a government official does propose the court-curbing
measure, she will be publicly condemned not only by political opponents
but also by political supporters. 12
This Article offers a (largely untold) historical account of how
political actors built the conventions that today protect judicial tenure,
ensure compliance with federal court orders, and bar court packing. 13
None of these bipartisan norms developed until the mid-twentieth
century. Perhaps most surprisingly to modern readers, in the
measures that are “off the table” from those that are relatively acceptable—and to explore why our
legal culture makes such distinctions.
10. As other scholars have recognized, constitutional conventions can fill gaps in the written
constitutional text. They are less likely to be relevant in those areas where the text is clear. See
Whittington, supra note 6, at 1855 (describing constitutional conventions as a mode of
constitutional construction whereby the “indeterminate text is rendered determinate”).
11. See Jaconelli, supra note 8, at 35 (“[C]onstitutional conventions impose a framework of
rules the observance of which transcends the sectional interest of political party.”). In this Article,
the term “bipartisan” means that the court-curbing measure is rejected even by political actors
who are otherwise critical of the judiciary. This part of the definition of convention helps to
overcome the possibility that political actors are acting strategically. Political actors who dislike
the general trend of judicial decisions have every reason to support court-curbing measures; if
those actors nonetheless oppose a given court-curbing measure, that opposition strongly suggests
that there is a convention against the court-curbing measure. One more point on the term
“bipartisan” as used in this Article: support for and opposition to the judiciary has not always
fallen neatly along party lines in our history. For example, in the mid-twentieth century,
conservative Republicans and Southern Democrats attacked the judiciary’s civil rights rulings,
while progressives from both parties defended the courts. See infra note 177. In such a scenario,
there would only be “bipartisan” opposition to a given court-curbing measure if both factions
(progressive supporters of the judiciary and conservative opponents of the judiciary) spoke against
the measure.
12. See Vermeule, Agency Independence, supra note 6, at 1185 (“[T]he most prominent
sanctions for breach of the convention are the threat of political retaliation . . . .”). There is a
growing literature on whether courts can also enforce conventions. See, e.g., N.W. BARBER, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 90–95 (2011) (exploring the issue); Vermeule, Conventions in Court, supra
note 6. That issue is not the focus of this Article, although I hope to address it in future work.
13. This Article thus differs from a recent piece by Curtis Bradley and Neil Siegel that
explores how government officials have invoked past political branch practice (which they refer to
as either “historical gloss” or “constitutional conventions”) in specific debates over judicial reform.
See Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional Conventions, and the
Judicial Separation of Powers, 105 GEO. L.J. 255, 258 (2017). As illustrations, the authors discuss
the 1937 debates over President Franklin Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan and two debates over
the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction. See id. at 269–83, 295–311. By contrast, my goal is to
explore how conventions against certain court-curbing measures developed (or failed to develop)
over time. Accordingly, with respect to court packing, my primary focus is the post-1937 period,
when political actors increasingly used the Roosevelt plan as a negative precedent. See infra Part
III. And I argue that there is no convention against jurisdiction stripping. See infra Part IV. In
prior work, I explored the topic that interests Bradley and Siegel: how political actors rely on their
own precedents in debates over the judiciary. See Tara Leigh Grove, Article III in the Political
Branches, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1835 (2015).
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nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many government officials
believed that it was constitutionally permissible to remove inferior
federal court judges by abolishing their courts; in fact, Congress used
this method in 1802 and 1863, and came very close to doing so again in
1913. But beginning around the 1930s, a bipartisan consensus
developed that Congress could remove federal judges only through the
impeachment process. The bipartisan norm requiring compliance with
federal court orders emerged only in the wake of the civil rights
movement of the 1950s and 1960s. And although some scholars assume
that President Franklin Roosevelt violated an already-existing norm
when he proposed to “pack” the Supreme Court in 1937, a closer look
reveals that Roosevelt’s plan had considerable support—and came close
to passage. This Article demonstrates that the current norm against
court packing gained steam only around the 1950s, largely due to the
rhetoric of politicians. Since that time, legislators of both parties have
treated the 1937 plan as a negative precedent—by condemning other
judicial reforms as reminiscent of Roosevelt’s “mortal error.” 14
Today, government officials virtually never suggest any of these
court-curbing practices. And if anyone does advocate firing Article III
judges, disobeying federal court orders, or court packing, she faces
widespread and bipartisan criticism. That is, even fellow partisans will
likely denounce these ideas as “ridiculous” and “off the wall.” 15
My goal in examining these conventions is threefold. First, I seek
to offer a richer (and more nuanced) understanding of the protections
enjoyed by our federal courts today. Much of the judicial independence
that we take for granted is not clearly etched into our constitutional
text and structure but has been constructed by political institutions
over time. 16
Second, I also want to highlight the limits of these protections.
There is, I argue, no convention against other court-curbing measures
that equally threaten judicial independence. Most importantly,
building on prior work, I contend that there is no bipartisan norm
against congressional restrictions on federal jurisdiction. 17 When
government officials advocate jurisdiction-stripping bills, they are
14. See, e.g., 104 CONG. REC. 18,682 (1958) (statement of Sen. Alexander Wiley, R-Wis.).
15. See infra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.
16. Judith Resnik has thoughtfully recognized this point—although her work focuses on
different aspects of the federal judiciary than those addressed here. See Judith Resnik,
Interdependent Federal Judiciaries: Puzzling About Why and How to Value the Independence of
Which Judges, DAEDALUS, Fall 2008, at 28, 28–29, 45 (noting, for example, the growth of non–
Article III courts and asserting that “history, practices, and cultural understandings” affect
judicial independence).
17. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 869 (2011); infra Section IV.A.
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supported by fellow partisans; in recent decades, for example, social
conservatives have come together to restrict review in abortion and
religion cases. And although most jurisdiction-stripping efforts still
ultimately fail in the legislative process, some measures have been
enacted (as recently as 2006) and many others have received serious
consideration—passing one chamber of Congress. 18
Accordingly, a jurisdiction-stripping bill is not dismissed as
“ridiculous” or “off the wall.” This difference, I argue, is highly
consequential for the judiciary. As political scientists have shown,
judicial independence may be threatened simply when a court-curbing
measure is seriously considered by Congress, even if the measure
ultimately fails. 19 Indeed, scholars have documented how jurisdictionstripping proposals have led the Supreme Court to pull back on
protections for individual rights—even after the effort is defeated in
Congress. Likewise, in 1937, before there was a firm convention against
court packing, Roosevelt’s plan was a serious threat—and, many
scholars argue, led the Supreme Court to dramatically change its
constitutional jurisprudence. 20 Conventions, I argue, are important
because they provide a higher level of protection for the judiciary, and
better enable courts to decide legal questions without fear of political
backlash.
That leads to my third goal: exploring why some court-curbing
measures are “off the wall,” while others are relatively acceptable.
Indeed, a more general aim of this Article is to encourage scholars to
explore the factors that influence the development of conventions.
Although I cannot exhaust this subject in a single Article, I argue here
that the conventions of judicial independence depend in part on
narratives crafted by our legal and political culture. 21 These narratives
have led us to view as illegitimate any proposal to pack the Supreme
Court, disobey a federal court order, or remove federal judges outside
the impeachment process. By contrast (drawing on a survey of law
school casebooks from 1895 to 1980), I demonstrate that legal scholars
in the mid-twentieth century articulated a narrative as to why broad
congressional control over federal jurisdiction could be a good thing in
18. Thus, I disagree with scholars who have suggested that the political norm against
jurisdiction stripping is as strong as the norm against, for example, court packing. See, e.g.,
Charles G. Geyh, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and the Role of Constitutional
Norms in Congressional Regulation of the Courts, 78 IND. L.J. 153, 156 (2003) (arguing that these
different court-curbing efforts would likely evoke the same “ ‘oh, come now’ response”).
19. See infra Section IV.A.2.
20. See infra note 241.
21. See infra Sections IV.C, IV.D.
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our constitutional democracy. This narrative, I argue, is one reason that
jurisdiction stripping remains an acceptable method of attacking the
federal courts. This account thus also suggests that legal narratives
could influence what future generations deem to be “self-evident truths”
about the federal judiciary.
At the outset, a few more points of clarification on terminology.
First, in this Article, the term “judicial independence” refers to
“decisional independence”—that is, a federal judge’s ability to issue a
ruling without fear of sanctions. 22 Second, although legal scholars in
the United States have begun to examine “conventions,” there is no yet
generally agreed-upon definition of the term. 23 To make the concept
analytically useful for this historical survey, this Article defines
“convention” as a widespread bipartisan norm. 24 This definition makes
it possible both to identify when a convention emerges, and to compare
a convention protecting judicial independence (such as the strong norm
against court packing) with weaker norms (such as the norm that
makes jurisdiction-stripping proposals controversial but not “off the
wall”). This comparison among norms underscores the contingency—
and, thus, the fragility—of the safeguards for judicial independence. 25
This study of conventions is particularly important today—a
time when political actors seem willing to reject certain long-standing
practices, including those relating to the judiciary. For example, in 2013
and 2017, the Senate abolished the filibuster for all judicial
nominations, including those to the Supreme Court. 26 Perhaps even
more striking, in 2016, the Senate refused to hold hearings on a
Supreme Court nominee. 27 Such departures from tradition underscore
the importance of exploring both how the current protections for the
federal judiciary developed and what, if anything, gives them staying
power.
The Article proceeds as follows. Parts I through III provide a
detailed historical account of the development of our current
22. I borrow this term from Vicki Jackson’s excellent work. See supra note 4.
23. Indeed, there is also no agreed-upon definition in British scholarship. See supra note 9.
24. See supra note 11 (explaining the term “bipartisan” as used in this Article).
25. Nothing turns on this specific nomenclature. The Article could instead define
“convention” more expansively—and then distinguish “strong conventions” from “weak
conventions.” Notably, other scholars, such as Curtis Bradley and Neil Siegel, seem to adopt a
more capacious definition of “convention.” See Bradley & Siegel, supra note 13. That scholarship
does not, however, aim to identify when a convention emerges, or to examine the (relative) strength
of the norms protecting judicial independence, as this Article seeks to do.
26. See infra notes 294–300 and accompanying text.
27. See Jon Schuppe, Merrick Garland Now Holds the Record for Longest Supreme Court
Wait, NBC NEWS (July 20, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/merrick-garland-nowholds-record-longest-supreme-court-wait-n612541 [https://perma.cc/7TUY-UQCU]; see also infra
notes 294–297 and accompanying text.
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conventions against abolishing Article III judgeships, violating federal
court orders, and court packing. Part IV shows that there is no similar
convention against congressional restrictions on federal jurisdiction. I
use that example as a jumping-off point to explore how our legal and
political culture has crafted narratives that affect the scope and nature
of the independence currently enjoyed by federal judges. I also offer
tentative thoughts on the relationship between “conventions” and “legal
rules,” and the extent to which our current conventions of judicial
independence may be susceptible to future change.
I. PROTECTING JUDICIAL TENURE
In 2011, Republican presidential candidate (and former House
Speaker) Newt Gingrich announced a judicial reform that startled
many observers. As president, he would “abolish whole courts to be rid
of judges whose decisions” were “out of step with the country.” 28
Gingrich’s primary target was the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. He
pointed to a 2003 decision, in which a panel of that court held that use
of the phrase “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance violated the
Establishment Clause. 29 Gingrich declared: “If you have judges that are
so radically anti-American that they thought ‘One Nation Under God’
was wrong, then they shouldn’t be on the court.” 30
This proposal to terminate Article III judges drew a firestorm of
criticism from both progressives and conservatives. Former George W.
Bush Attorney General Michael Mukasey described the idea as
“dangerous, ridiculous, totally irresponsible, outrageous, [and] off-thewall.” 31 Two columnists for the conservative National Review wrote a
five-part series to respond to what they dubbed “Gingrich’s Awful
Proposal to Abolish Judgeships,” declaring the idea “constitutionally
unsound and politically foolish.” 32 Fellow Republican presidential
28. See Amy Gardner, As Gingrich Ramps up Rhetoric on Judges, Some on Right Wince,
WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 2011, at A05 (describing a half-hour phone call between Gingrich and
reporters).
29. See Jeff Zeleny & Jim Rutenberg, As Romney Steps Cautiously, Gingrich Duels with
Others, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/16/us/politics/gingrichparries-with-challengers-at-iowa-debate.html [https://perma.cc/K4AW-TWTH]; see also Newdow
v. U.S. Cong., 292 F.3d 597, 612 (9th Cir. 2002) (invalidating the use of “under God” in the Pledge).
30. Zeleny & Rutenberg, supra note 29.
31. Former Bush Attorneys General Call Gingrich Position on Courts ‘Dangerous,’ FOX NEWS
(Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/12/15/former-bush-attorneys-general-callgingrich-position-on-courts-dangerous.html [https://perma.cc/3QP2-VWNC].
32. Ed Whelan, Gingrich’s Awful Proposal to Abolish Judgeships—Part 1, NAT’L REV. (Dec.
16, 2011, 12:54 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/286013/gingrichs-awfulproposal-abolish-judgeships-part-1-ed-whelan [https://perma.cc/7Y3R-KHU9].
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candidates Ron Paul and Mitt Romney argued that the Gingrich plan
would open a “can of worms,” because it would enable future Congresses
to terminate federal judges, including those who were sympathetic to
conservative values. 33 Representative Paul summed up the general
sentiment when he suggested that there is only one way to remove a
federal judge: “[I]f a judge misbehaves or is unethical . . . the proper
procedure is impeachment.” 34
Notably, there was no similar bipartisan condemnation of other
proposals to rein in the federal courts. During the 2012 presidential
race, Gingrich also challenged judicial supremacy (the idea that
political actors must act in accordance with the Supreme Court’s
constitutional views in all contexts). 35 And several Republican
presidential candidates—including Gingrich as well as Representatives
Ron Paul and Michele Bachmann—wanted to strip federal jurisdiction
over constitutional issues like abortion and same-sex marriage. 36 Yet
those proposals were not dismissed as “ridiculous.” Instead, many
conservatives praised the challenge to judicial supremacy, 37 and the
New York Times noted that, according to prominent legal scholars, it is
“hard to assess” whether Congress could strip federal jurisdiction over
constitutional claims. 38 The proposal to remove Article III judges by
abolishing courts was not simply controversial; it was of a different
kind—“off the wall” and “dangerous.”
The reaction to Gingrich’s proposal reflects the broad and
bipartisan consensus today that Article III judges have life tenure and
33. GOP Debate, Sioux City, Iowa (Fox News television broadcast Dec. 15, 2011) (statement
of Rep. Ron Paul, R-Tex.), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yEhpLhCYohM
[https://perma.cc/MRW5-VHRH]; Shira Schoenberg, Romney Slams Gingrich on ‘Activist Judges’
Stance, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 27, 2011), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2011/12/27/mittromney-criticizes-newt-gingrich-proposal-for-reining-federal-judges/srVyi5gLzC2yfC6WOqQ0pK/
story.html [https://perma.cc/C649-643S].
34. GOP Debate, supra note 33 (video at 4:50).
35. See Newt Gingrich, Bringing the Courts Back Under the Constitution 16–19, 22 (Oct. 7,
2011) (position paper) (copy on file with author). Notably, although some political actors are
skeptical of judicial supremacy, there is a convention that political actors must abide by a federal
court order in a specific case. See infra Part II.
36. See Bob Egelko, Gingrich’s Plan on Courts Would Face Resistance, SFGATE (Dec. 29,
2011, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/Gingrich-s-plan-on-courts-would-faceresistance-2430131.php [https://perma.cc/5YHF-GPNW]; Adam Liptak & Michael D. Shear,
Republicans Turn Judicial Power into a Campaign Issue, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/24/us/politics/republicans-turn-judicial-power-into-a-campaignissue.html [http://perma.cc/5HLG-UPTW].
37. Indeed, the columnists for the National Review did so in the articles condemning
Gingrich’s proposal to abolish judgeships. See Ed Whelan, Gingrich’s Awful Proposal to Abolish
Judgeships—Part 3, NAT’L REV. (Dec. 16, 2011, 4:27 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/benchmemos/286062/gingrichs-awful-proposal-abolish-judgeships-part-3-ed-whelan [https://perma.cc/
EKF4-PSL4].
38. Liptak & Shear, supra note 36.
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cannot be removed outside the impeachment process. Although most
academics assume that this view is long-standing, this Article
demonstrates that for much of American history, prominent political
actors insisted that Congress could remove inferior federal court judges
by abolishing their courts. The convention barring the practice did not
take root until the mid-twentieth century.
A. The Uncertain Teachings of Text and History
Many jurists and scholars have asserted that the political
branches cannot remove an Article III judge except through
impeachment. 39 But the textual basis for impeachment exclusivity is
less obvious than most commentators assume. Article III provides that
federal judges “shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour.” 40 But
Article III neither defines “good Behaviour” nor says anything about
removal—by impeachment or any other means. Instead, the
impeachment provision is found in Article II, which provides that “[t]he
President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States,
shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of,
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” 41 To the
extent scholars consider the issue, they reason that Article III judges
must be “civil Officers” within the meaning of Article II and thus subject
to impeachment. 42
Still, it takes a further textual step to conclude that
impeachment is the only way to remove a federal judge. The
Constitution does not say as much. And impeachment is not the
exclusive method for removing other “civil Officers of the United
States”; many executive officials, after all, can be removed by the
president or other superiors. 43 The historical evidence is also mixed.
39. See James E. Pfander, Removing Federal Judges, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1227, 1249 (2007);
Martin H. Redish, Response: Good Behavior, Judicial Independence, and the Foundations of
American Constitutionalism, 116 YALE L.J. 139, 157–58 (2006); sources cited supra note 1. Some
scholars have argued that federal judges can remove other judges for “bad behavior,” but they
readily concede that the political branches are confined to impeachment. See RAOUL BERGER,
IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 173–74, 179–80 (1973); Saikrishna Prakash &
Steven D. Smith, How to Remove a Federal Judge, 116 YALE L.J. 72, 77, 125 (2006). For a rare
dissenting view, see Roger C. Cramton, Reforming the Supreme Court, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1313,
1329–30 (2007), which suggests that “Congress may essentially remove lifetime tenure judges by
abolishing the court they serve on.”
40. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
41. Id. art. II, § 4.
42. See Pfander, supra note 39, at 1229.
43. See Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 317 (1903) (explaining that the Impeachment
Clause does not “prevent [the] removal [of executive officers] for other causes . . . by the
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Although some founding fathers viewed impeachment as the exclusive
means for removing federal judges, 44 as the historical account here
demonstrates, that was by no means the universal view.
The next several sections provide that historical account. But for
now, because the argument is so unfamiliar to modern readers, I want
to sketch out the basic textual case made by early political actors who
favored removing inferior federal judges by abolishing their courts. 45
The Constitution gives Congress broad discretion “from time to time” to
“ordain and establish” inferior federal courts when they are needed. 46
So, the argument goes, Congress should also have the power to abolish
those courts when they prove to be unnecessary. And if the judges who
staffed those courts are not needed elsewhere in the judiciary, Congress
has no obligation to retain them.
Early political actors also pointed to the language of the Good
Behavior Clause, insisting that the Constitution protects the tenure
and salary of federal judges only “during their Continuance in Office.” 47
Once the office (the judgeship) is eliminated, so is the federal judge. If
this argument seems far-fetched and “off the wall,” as I suspect it does
to many readers, we should keep in mind that there is at least one
modern-day equivalent. There is fairly broad agreement that, in cases
of financial necessity, colleges and universities can terminate tenured
professors by abolishing their positions. 48

President”). One could read Article II to render impeachment the exclusive remedy for any official
whose tenure is articulated in the Constitution—that is, the president, vice president, and federal
judges. See Pfander, supra note 39, at 1229. My point is only that any of these moves requires more
structural inference than commentators typically assume.
44. The Framers did not address the issue during the Constitutional Convention. See Michael
J. Gerhardt, The Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and Its Alternatives, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1, 18
(1989). But some participants in the ratification and other early debates did advocate
impeachment exclusivity. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 828 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep.
William Smith); THE FEDERALIST NO. 79, at 474 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(asserting that other means of removal would be “more liable to abuse than calculated to answer
any good purpose”).
45. Notably, the argument focused on the inferior federal courts; these early officials did not
assert the power to abolish Supreme Court judgeships. See infra Sections I.B, I.C. That is true
even though the tenure and salary protections of Article III seem to apply equally to all federal
courts. These early government officials apparently believed that the Supreme Court had a special
position in the constitutional scheme.
46. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
47. Id. (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during
good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall
not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”).
48. See AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, FINANCIAL EXIGENCY, ACADEMIC GOVERNANCE, AND
RELATED MATTERS (2004), https://www.aaup.org/report/financial-exigency-academic-governanceand-related-matters [https://perma.cc/YRD9-EEMN] (stating that a university may “legitimately
terminate faculty appointments, including appointments with tenure, on grounds of financial
exigency”).

Grove_Galley (Do Not Delete)

2018]

3/7/2018 9:48 AM

JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

477

To be clear, my goal here is not to advocate for the termination
of Article III judges outside the impeachment process. (On the contrary,
I find the notion very troubling.) But I do want to suggest that the
widespread consensus about impeachment exclusivity is not an obvious
inference from the text. This ingrained norm is itself largely a product
of history—the history that created the convention protecting judicial
tenure today.
B. The Precedent of 1802
The election of 1800 was a bitter partisan struggle between the
Federalist Party and the Jeffersonian Republican Party. 49 After the
Jeffersonians prevailed (but before Thomas Jefferson and the new
members of Congress took their seats), the outgoing Federalist
Congress enacted a sweeping reform of the federal judiciary. 50 The
Judiciary Act of 1801 established a new system of federal appellate
courts, thereby creating sixteen Article III judgeships; ended circuit
riding by Supreme Court Justices; and dramatically expanded federal
jurisdiction. 51 The 1801 Act also reduced the future size of the Supreme
Court from six to five members—a move that Jefferson perceived as an
effort to prevent him from filling the next vacancy. 52
Notably, during the debates over the 1801 Act, the Federalists
did not conceal their partisan motivations for enlarging the federal
judiciary. Senator William Bingham, for example, underscored that
“the Importance of filling” the judiciary “with federal characters must
be obvious.” 53 In this spirit, President John Adams hastily made the
appointments, seeking to fill all sixteen new judgeships just before he
left office. 54
Soon after the new Congress assembled, the Jeffersonian
Republicans decided to repeal the 1801 Act. This proposal triggered an
intense constitutional debate. The Federalists who remained in
49. See JOHN FERLING, ADAMS VS. JEFFERSON: THE TUMULTUOUS ELECTION OF 1800, at 143–
56 (2004); GERALD LEONARD, THE INVENTION OF PARTY POLITICS 2, 31–32 (Thomas A. Green &
Hendrik Hartog eds., 2002) (noting the opposing views of the more nationalist Federalists and the
pro–states’ rights Jeffersonians).
50. See Kathryn Turner, Federalist Policy and the Judiciary Act of 1801, 22 WM. & MARY Q.
3, 32 (1965).
51. See Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, §§ 7, 11, 27, 2 Stat. 89, 90–92, 98; see also Turner, supra
note 50, at 21 (summarizing the reforms).
52. See § 3, 2 Stat. at 89; 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES
HISTORY 189 (Beard Books 1999) (1922).
53. Kathryn Turner, The Midnight Judges, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 494, 509 (1961) (emphasis
added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
54. See id. at 495–517.
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Congress insisted that repeal would be patently unconstitutional. The
Constitution said in “plain old English” that federal judges hold their
offices during good behavior, and if they misbehave “they shall be
removed” only “on impeachment.” 55 But the Jeffersonians maintained
that repeal would be consistent with Article III. Congress had broad
power not only to create inferior federal judgeships when they were
needed but also to abolish them when they were “useless and
unnecessary.” 56 These judges, the Jeffersonians urged, were an
unnecessary expense for the new nation, because the judiciary at that
time did not have a large enough caseload to justify sixteen additional
members. 57 Moreover, the Good Behavior Clause prevented Congress
only from removing an Article III judge from an existing office, but not
from abolishing the office itself. 58
The Jeffersonian Republicans did, however, articulate an
important limit on Congress’s power to remove federal judges by
abolishing their courts. The Federalists argued that repeal would set a
precedent for abolishing the offices of Supreme Court Justices as well,
given that all Article III judges enjoyed the same tenure and salary
protections. 59 But the Jeffersonians insisted that the Supreme Court
was created by the Constitution and could not be abolished; and thus
“the judges thereof must . . . continue to hold their offices independent
of the Legislature, and cannot be removed but by impeachment.” 60 That
was a significant concession, given that the Supreme Court at that time
was composed entirely of Federalist sympathizers, and the Federalists
themselves had sought to influence the composition of the Court in the
1801 Act. 61 Yet Republican Senator Joseph Anderson argued that “if the
gentlemen could really persuade some of us” that the repeal would set

55. 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 90 (1802) (statement of Sen. Gouverneur Morris, F-N.Y.).
56. Id. at 829 (statement of Rep. Joseph Nicholson, R-Md.) (“We have no desire to remove
[the judges] and put others in their places, but we wish to abolish a . . . useless and unnecessary
[system, for which] the nation is neither able nor willing to pay.”).
57. See id. at 564 (statement of Rep. John Bacon, R-Mass.) (urging, based on data provided
by President Jefferson, that “the business of [the federal] courts may be transacted equally well
by a less number”); see also WILLIAM SEAL CARPENTER, JUDICIAL TENURE IN THE UNITED STATES
54–55 (1918) (urging that although the Jeffersonians overestimated the costs, they had good
reason to believe the larger judiciary was “an unnecessary expenditure”).
58. See 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 556 (1802) (statement of Rep. Thomas Davis, R-Ky.) (arguing
that there is “a material distinction between removing a judge from office and abolishing the office;
the first implies guilt, the latter that the office is useless”).
59. See id. at 177 (statement of Sen. Aaron Ogden, F-N.J.) (“[I]f the present law passes, it will
be an irresistible precedent . . . to put down the Supreme Court judges.”).
60. Id. at 169–70 (statement of Sen. Joseph Anderson, R-Tenn.).
61. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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a precedent for abolishing Supreme Court judgeships, that “might
prevent the repeal.” 62
After two months of debate, Congress enacted the 1802 Repeal
Act and thus removed the Article III judges. 63 A private litigant (whose
case had been transferred from a now-eliminated federal court to the
1802 system) later challenged the constitutionality of the 1802 repeal. 64
He specifically alleged that Congress could not remove federal judges
by abolishing courts, insisting that “[t]he words during good behaviour
cannot mean during the will of congress.” 65 The Supreme Court rejected
that constitutional challenge in Stuart v. Laird. 66
Admittedly, it is not easy to pin down the holding of Stuart. At
first glance, it appears that the Court did not uphold the removal of the
judges, because it did not specifically comment on that issue; the Court
simply upheld the transfer of cases away from the now-eliminated
inferior federal courts. 67 But the litigant’s challenge to the transfer of
his case was premised on the idea that Congress lacked the authority to
remove the previous judges. 68 Accordingly, by upholding the transfer,
the Supreme Court implicitly approved Congress’s power to remove
Article III judges by abolishing courts. The decision came just one week
62. 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 169 (1802) (statement of Sen. Joseph Anderson, R-Tenn.). The
Supreme Court did not, however, escape this political transition entirely unscathed. After
repealing the 1801 Act, the Jeffersonian Congress delayed the start of the Court’s next term for
fourteen months—until February 1803. See Judiciary Act of 1802, ch. 31, §§ 1, 3, 2 Stat. 156, 157
(omitting the August 1802 session). As the Federalists argued, this change was likely designed to
prevent the Court from considering the constitutionality of the Repeal Act “until the act [had] gone
into full execution, and the excitement of the public mind [was] abated.” 11 ANNALS OF CONG.
1235–36 (1802) (statement of Rep. James Asheton Bayard, F-Del.); see WARREN, supra note 52, at
222. Nevertheless, the Republicans’ declarations about the Supreme Court’s distinct status seemed
to have a lasting effect. Subsequent legislators, who accepted the validity of the 1802 repeal, agreed
that the Justices could be removed only through impeachment. See infra Section I.C.
63. See Repeal Act, ch. 8, §§ 1, 3, 2 Stat. 132, 132 (1802); FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M.
LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 26 n.75, 28 n.79 (Transaction Publishers 2007)
(1928) (noting that the repeal was debated from January 8, 1802, until March 3, 1802).
64. Notably, the judges themselves pondered bringing suit but opted against it. Instead, they
went to Congress, asking for the salaries that they would have earned had they remained on the
bench. The House and Senate, however, declined to provide relief to the judges. See Jed Glickstein,
After Midnight: The Circuit Judges and the Repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801, 24 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 543, 544–45, 558–74 (2012) (discussing these events).
65. Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 304 (1803) (argument of counsel).
66. See id. at 308–09.
67. See id. (upholding both the transfer of cases and the resurrection of circuit riding).
68. See id. at 303:
If the [repeal was] constitutional [such that] the judges were constitutionally removed,
[then] the transfer from the one court to the other was legal. But if [the repeal was]
unconstitutional, then the [previous] court . . . still exists, the judges were not removed,
and the transfer of jurisdiction did not take place.
(argument of counsel).
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after the Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison had proclaimed the
importance of judicial review of federal laws. 69
C. Congressional Power from the 1802 Repeal to the Commerce Court
The Repeal Act of 1802 was controversial even in the early
nineteenth century. Justice Joseph Story argued in his Commentaries
that “if [the] constitutionality [of that Act] can be successfully
vindicated,” that “prostrates in the dust the independence of all inferior
judges . . . and leaves the constitution a miserable and vain delusion.” 70
Nevertheless, throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
many political actors accepted the basic principle established by the
1802 repeal: Congress had the power to remove inferior federal court
judges by abolishing their courts, but could not do the same to Supreme
Court Justices.
1. Removal Power in the Nineteenth Century
In the 1820s and 1830s, Congress considered proposals to
expand the federal judiciary to meet the needs of a growing nation.
When some legislators advocated a circuit court system—reminiscent
of the 1801 scheme—Jacksonian Democrats (political heirs to the
Jeffersonian Republicans) were aghast. 71 They warned that any
attempt to create new judgeships would meet the same fate as the 1801
Act. As Representative (and later President) Martin Van Buren
explained: “To remove [federal judges] . . . by abolishing their Courts”
is a “harsh measure,” but “[t]o keep them in office, receiving salaries
without performing service, is so hostile to the character and genius of
our Government and the sentiments of the People, that public opinion
would not tolerate it.” 72
By contrast, the Jacksonian Democrats did not believe that
Congress could likewise eliminate positions on the Supreme Court. For
69. See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176–78 (1803); Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Marbury and
Judicial Deference: The Shadow of Whittington v. Polk and the Maryland Judiciary Battle, 5 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 58, 100 (2002) (noting that the decision in Stuart was “issued six days after
Marbury”).
70. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1633,
at 476 (3d ed. 1858); see also 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES app. at 361
(1803) (noting that the “interpretation [of the Constitution embodied in the 1802 repeal] seems
calculated to subvert” the principle of judicial independence).
71. See 2 REG. DEB. 558 (1826) (statement of Sen. Thomas Reed, Jacksonian-Miss.)
(describing the 1801 Act as “the most unpopular act of Mr. Adams’ administration” and the 1802
repeal as “the most gracious and acceptable [act] of Mr. Jefferson’s”); see also LEONARD, supra note
49, at 13, 73 (noting the Jacksonians were the “states’ rights” party of this era).
72. 2 REG. DEB. 415 (1826) (statement of Sen. Martin Van Buren, Jacksonian-N.Y.).
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that reason, Senator Levi Woodbury opposed a separate proposal to
increase the size of the Court to ten members (and thereby provide more
Justices to ride circuit). 73 He complained: “[Y]ou never can, by mere
legislation, remove Judges of the Supreme Court from office.” 74
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, many legislators
continued to assume that Congress could remove inferior federal court
judges by abolishing their courts. 75 In 1863, in the midst of the Civil
War, the Republican-controlled Congress did abolish a federal circuit
court for the District of Columbia, and thereby terminated three judges
who served “during good behavior.” 76 Notably, the Republicans’ primary
goal was to get rid of the judges, some of whom were believed to be
Confederate sympathizers. 77
Senator Garrett Davis opposed the measure, arguing that the
court was a “constitutional court” under Article III and that “the judges
[could] be removed only by impeachment.” 78 But Republican legislators
responded that, even if these were Article III judges, Congress could
still remove them by abolishing their court. Although the Supreme
Court was “beyond the reach of legislation,” inferior federal courts were
“the creatures of congressional action . . . Congress ‘from time to time’
may create these inferior courts, and the power that creates them can
abolish them.” 79 Indeed, Senator Ira Harris did not “doubt that
Congress would have the right to abolish all the district courts
throughout the Union, and to substitute some other tribunal in their
place.” 80 Ultimately, Congress not only abolished the existing court (and
73. Id. at 481 (statement of Sen. Levi Woodbury, Jacksonian-N.H.).
74. Id. (describing this as “the most prevalent doctrine on this point”).
75. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. 214–15 (1869) (statement of Sen. Lyman
Trumbull, D-Ill.) (advocating an increase in the number of inferior federal court judges, rather
than an expansion of the Supreme Court to eighteen members, in part for this reason).
76. See District of Columbia Organic Act of 1801, ch. 15, § 3, 2 Stat. 103, 105–06 (creating a
circuit court whose judges “hold their respective offices during good behavior”); Act of March 3,
1863, ch. 91, § 16, 12 Stat. 762, 764–65 (reorganizing the courts in the District of Columbia).
77. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 1139 (1863) (statement of Sen. Henry Wilson, RMass.) (arguing that one judge’s “heart is sweltering with treason”); Cramton, supra note 39, at
1329–30 (the Republicans worried that “one or more of the judges were Confederate
sympathizers”).
78. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 1136 (1863) (statement of Sen. Garrett Davis,
Unionist-Ky.). Other opponents argued that the measure would set a “dangerous precedent” that
would allow future presidents to terminate lower federal court judges with whom they disagreed.
See id. at 1138–39 (statement of Sen. Lazarus Powell, D-Ky.).
79. Id. at 1137 (statement of Sen. Ira Harris, R-N.Y.).
80. Id.; see also Susan Low Bloch & Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Celebrating the 200th Anniversary
of the Federal Courts of the District of Columbia, 90 GEO. L.J. 549, 555 n.24 (2002) (“[A]ll the
discussants [in these debates] assumed that federal courts in the District were Article III courts,
a status not clearly established until 1933.”).
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thereby terminated the federal judges) but also created a new court for
the District of Columbia, which President Abraham Lincoln proceeded
to fill with political supporters. 81
2. The Fight over the Commerce Court
In 1910, Congress created the Commerce Court, a five-member
court staffed by Article III judges, to review decisions of the Interstate
Commerce Commission (“ICC”). 82 From the outset, the court was
controversial. Although conservative Republicans (including President
William Howard Taft) supported the court, 83 Democrats and
progressive Republicans believed that it was beholden to railroads, the
primary target of ICC regulations. 84 (Notably, this image of the
Commerce Court fit with progressives’ general view that the federal
judiciary of that era was biased in favor of big business. 85) Thus, almost
immediately after the creation of the Commerce Court, progressives in
Congress sought to abolish it. 86
During the debates over the abolition of the court, some
progressives insisted that the judges should be terminated as well. This
proposal triggered an intense debate, akin to that in 1802, over the
scope of Congress’s power to remove Article III judges by abolishing a
court. Many legislators insisted that federal judges could be removed
only through the impeachment process. 87 But a number of progressives
responded that Congress could terminate the judges, 88 relying in part

81. See John G. Roberts, Jr., What Makes the D.C. Circuit Different? A Historical View, 92
VA. L. REV. 375, 383 (2006).
82. See Act of June 18, 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-218, 36 Stat. 539, 539–40 (creating the Commerce
Court). Under the Act, the judges would sit on the Commerce Court for five years and then return
to other positions in the federal judiciary.
83. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 63, at 156.
84. See 48 CONG. REC. 7840 (1912) (statement of Sen. Miles Poindexter, R-Wash.) (lamenting
“the unfortunate apparent leanings of the judges of the court in favor of the railroads”).
85. See Frank Thompson, Jr. & Daniel H. Pollitt, Impeachment of Federal Judges: An
Historical Overview, 49 N.C. L. REV. 87, 105 (1970) (noting the “anti-court sentiment of that
period”).
86. See George E. Dix, Death of the Commerce Court: A Study in Institutional Weakness, 8
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 238, 239 (1964).
87. See 50 CONG. REC. 5595 (1913) (statement of Rep. Henry Cooper, R-Wis.) (stating that
Article III judges “cannot be deprived of their offices except by impeachment”); 48 CONG. REC. 8000
(1912) (statement of Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge, R-Mass.).
88. See infra notes 89–91 and accompanying text. Notably, not all progressives took this
position. Some progressives (who were happy to get rid of the Commerce Court itself) balked at
the idea of removing federal judges. See, e.g., 50 CONG. REC. 5413–14 (1912) (statement of Sen.
Thomas James Walsh, D-Mont.) (arguing that the Good Behavior Clause prohibited removal).
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on the precedent established by the 1802 repeal. 89 Congress, the
progressives insisted, had “the power to say what inferior courts we
should have, how many judges should be upon them . . . increasing . . .
[and] decreasing the number if Congress saw fit.”90 The “good behavior”
language in Article III “could not have meant” that “when Congress
created offices that were subsequently found to be useless the hands of
the legislative power were to be tied” into keeping judges on the payroll
“perpetually or, at least, during life.” 91
Notably, much like their nineteenth-century predecessors, these
progressives made a sharp distinction between the inferior federal
courts and the Supreme Court. They denied that Congress had the
power to remove Supreme Court Justices outside the impeachment
process. 92 “[T]he Supreme Court,” they urged, “is a constitutional court,
which puts it in a class by itself.” 93
The bills to abolish the Commerce Court went through a few
rounds in Congress. In the first round, the Senate voted to remove the
judges, while the House of Representatives insisted on retaining them
and transferring them to other federal courts. 94 President Taft then
vetoed the entire bill, because he wanted to retain the Commerce Court
itself. 95 After Democratic President Woodrow Wilson took office in 1913,
progressive legislators once again sought to abolish the Commerce
Court. In this second round, the House voted to remove the judges, but
the Senate insisted on retaining them. 96 The Senate version went to
President Wilson, who signed the measure into law. 97 Accordingly, the
89. See 50 CONG. REC. 5410 (1913) (statement of Sen. Hoke Smith, D-Ga.) (“[E]arly in the
history of the [g]overnment [this] exact view . . . was asserted by Mr. Jefferson and followed by
Congress . . . .”).
90. Id.; 48 CONG. REC. 7999 (1912) (statement of Sen. Albert Baird Cummins, R-Iowa) (“The
Constitution left us free . . . to abolish offices, even though through their abolition a judge . . .
might cease to be an officer of the United States.”); see also WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY 93
(1994) (noting Senator Cummins was a progressive).
91. 48 CONG. REC. 7993 (1912) (statement of Sen. Hoke Smith, D-Ga.); see also 50 CONG. REC.
5592 (1913) (statement of Rep. Charles Bartlett, D-Ga.) (“[T]he tenure of the judge can continue
no longer than the existence of the office . . . .”).
92. See 50 CONG. REC. 5416 (1913) (statement of Sen. Augustus Bacon, D-Ga.) (stating that
the power to abolish an office “can not relate to any judge of the Supreme Court”).
93. Id. at 5412 (statement of Sen. Hoke Smith, D-Ga.).
94. See 48 CONG. REC. 8001 (1912) (the Senate agreed to an amendment to remove the
judges); id. at 8389 (the House rejected the Senate version of the bill).
95. See id. at 11,025–27 (text of President Taft’s veto message).
96. See 50 CONG. REC. 5413, 5442–43 (1913) (showing that the Senate voted to retain the
judges); id. at 4543 (the House voted eighty to forty to remove the judges).
97. See Act of 1913, ch. 32, Pub. L. No. 63-32, 38 Stat. 208, 219 (“Making appropriations to
supply urgent deficiencies in appropriations for the fiscal year nineteen hundred and
thirteen . . . .”) (abolishing the Commerce Court but stating that “[n]othing herein contained shall
be deemed to affect the tenure of any of the judges”).
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Commerce Court was abolished, but the Article III judges were
transferred to other federal courts. 98
D. The Gradual Development of the Modern Consensus
Through the early twentieth century, although the abolition of
federal court judgeships was controversial, it was by no means
considered “ridiculous” or “off the wall.” Indeed, as late as the 1920s,
some legal commentators continued to assume that Congress could use
this method to remove inferior federal judges and thereby “avoid resort
to the impeachment process.” 99 But beginning in the late 1930s, there
was a noticeable change in the views of political actors. The 1802 repeal
and the principle it established were gradually forgotten (or
discredited). By the early twenty-first century, there appeared to be a
broad and bipartisan consensus that impeachment was the only way to
remove a federal judge.
One can see this evolution in the debates over an alternative
mechanism for disciplining judges. From the 1930s through the 1970s,
a group of legislators championed “judicial removal”—that is, allowing
federal judges to remove other federal judges, who were found (after a
hearing) to have violated the “good behavior” requirement of Article III.
Representative Hatton Sumners pushed for judicial removal in the late
1930s and early 1940s. 100 In the 1960s and 1970s, Senators Joseph
Tydings and Sam Nunn led the charge, sponsoring legislation that

98. See Commerce Court, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/timeline/commercecourt (last visited Oct. 4, 2017) [https://perma.cc/5YBY-SWPR] (“The judges of the court continued
to serve on the courts of appeals, with the exception of Robert Archbald, who was impeached and
convicted earlier in 1913.”) Interestingly, one of the judges was not transferred, because he was
impeached and removed from office for misconduct (apparently, bribery). See Thompson & Pollitt,
supra note 85, at 104, 107.
99. W.F. WILLOUGHBY, PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 395–96 (1929) (stating that
the 1802 repeal “definitely established the power of the legislative branch to bring about the
removal of judges [by abolishing judgeships] and thus to avoid resort to the impeachment process,”
although asserting that the method should be used only in “exceptional” cases). Other scholars
were less certain about the constitutionality of this practice but assumed that the issue was
debatable. See CARPENTER, supra note 57, at 95–96, 98 (asserting in 1918 that “in the absence of
judicial decision on the point,” a future Congress could follow “the construction of the Jeffersonian
faction”); Burke Shartel, Federal Judges—Appointment, Supervision, and Removal—Some
Possibilities Under the Constitution, 28 MICH. L. REV. 870, 907 n.102 (1930) (“[W]hether Congress
has power to abolish federal judgeships so as to deprive sitting judges of their places has often
been discussed but never been decided.”).
100. See H.R. REP. NO. 75-814, at 1–2 (1937) (proposing a bill that would allow a three-judge
federal court to adjudicate “good behavior”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 77-921, at 1 (1941) (similar
measure).
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would allow a multimember panel of judges to investigate complaints
and remove federal judges for “misbehavior.” 101
These proposals triggered an intense constitutional debate.
Many members of Congress objected that judicial removal was
unconstitutional because “the only way that we can remove a Federal
judge is through the impeachment process.” 102 But supporters of
judicial removal insisted that impeachment was not exclusive. After all,
they argued, the constitutional text does not say as much. 103 Moreover,
given the size of the modern federal judiciary, the House and Senate
cannot supervise all wrongdoing through the impeachment process. 104
Accordingly, judicial removal was a “necessary” and “proper” means of
ensuring that federal judges engaged in “good behavior.” 105
But what is most important for my purposes is the constitutional
argument that legislators did not make. Throughout these debates,
supporters of judicial removal did not rely on the lengthy history
suggesting that Congress could remove federal judges by abolishing
courts—even though this history would certainly support an argument
against impeachment exclusivity. On the contrary, these legislators
often conceded that impeachment was exclusive in one sense: it was the
only way for the political branches to remove a federal judge. Thus,
Representative Sumners and his supporters insisted that, absent the
Impeachment Clause, “the legislative branch . . . would have had no
right to control” the tenure of federal judges. 106 Likewise, Senators

101. See 120 CONG. REC. 36,065 (1974) (statement of Sen. Samuel Nunn, D-Ga.); 114 CONG.
REC. 4558, 4561–66 (1968) (statement of Sen. Joseph Tydings, D-Md.) (proposing a bill to allow
“the judiciary to deal with judges who . . . have failed to meet the standard of good behavior”).
102. See 124 CONG. REC. 28,312 (1978) (statement of Sen. William Scott, R-Va.); see also The
Independence of Federal Judges: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 115–16 (1970) [hereinafter Independence of Federal Judges
Hearing] (statement of Sen. Samuel Ervin, D-N.C.) (stating that “the only rational conclusion you
can come to” is that impeachment is exclusive); H.R. REP. NO. 77-921, pt. 2, at 1 (1941) (minority
views).
103. See 115 CONG. REC. 14,912 (1969) (memorandum offered by Sen. Joseph Tydings, D-Md.)
(“No language in the Constitution explicitly provides that impeachment is to be an ‘exclusive’
device.”); 87 CONG. REC. 8164 (1941) (statement of Rep. Samuel Hobbs, D-Ala.).
104. See 124 CONG. REC. 28,284–85 (1978) (statement of Sen. Dennis DeConcini, D-Ariz.).
105. See S. REP. NO. 95-1035, at 2–3 (1978); 81 CONG. REC. 6176 (1937) (statement of Rep.
Chauncey Reed, R-Ill.).
106. 87 CONG. REC. 8164–65 (1941) (statement of Rep. Samuel Hobbs, D-Ala.); see 81 CONG.
REC. 6164 (1937) (statement of Rep. Hatton Sumners, D-Tex.) (arguing that because of the
limitations on the political branches, the judiciary is “the only agency of government that can keep
those words [‘good behavior’] from being dead words in the Constitution”).
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Tydings and Nunn urged that the “impeachment process . . . is the only
power of Congress to remove judges.” 107
Moreover, many legislators—both supporters and opponents of
judicial removal—suggested that, since the founding, Congress had
never removed an inferior federal court judge outside the impeachment
process. 108 The comments of Senator Charles Mathias, an opponent of
judicial removal, are especially remarkable. In 1978, he declared that,
given “the frustration of the Jeffersonians with impeachment as a
device to remove Federalist judges,” surely they would have searched
for another removal mechanism. 109 The Jeffersonians’ “failure to notice
an available alternative . . . says volumes about the [Framers’]
interpretation of the impeachment clause and its application to
judges.” 110
The debates over judicial removal suggest that, by the latter part
of the twentieth century, legislators had largely forgotten that the
Jeffersonians removed Article III judges by abolishing their courts.
Throughout these five decades of debate, this early history was
discussed only once—and then largely dismissed. In 1970, the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) mentioned the 1802 repeal in a written
memorandum supporting judicial removal. 111 As then-Assistant
Attorney General William Rehnquist explained in oral testimony before
the Senate Judiciary Committee, the DOJ cited the measure as
evidence that not all Framers viewed impeachment as an exclusive
removal mechanism, but not to suggest that the modern Congress could
(or would) abolish federal judgeships. 112 Indeed, Rehnquist and Senator
107. Judicial Tenure Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach. of
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 28 (1976) (statement of Sen. Samuel Nunn, D-Ga.); 115
CONG. REC. 14,915 (1969) (memorandum offered by Sen. Joseph Tydings, D-Md.) (“[The
Framers] . . . concluded that the machinery of impeachment was the only legislative or executive
intrusion consistent with” judicial independence).
108. See, e.g., 87 CONG. REC. 8153 (1941) (statement of Rep. Clarence Hancock, R-N.Y.)
(suggesting the Sumners bill in 1937 “mark[ed] the first time in 150 years that the exclusiveness
of Impeachment proceedings” was “brought into question”).
109. S. REP. NO. 95-1035, at 73–74 (additional views of Senator Charles Mathias, R-Md.).
110. Id.
111. See Judicial Reform Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Mach. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 87 (1970) [hereinafter Judicial Reform Act
Hearing] (statement of William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Att’y Gen., Department of Justice)
(pointing to the 1802 repeal as an instance “[d]uring the first thirteen years of the Constitution . . .
in which the impeachment provisions . . . were not considered to be . . . exclusive”). Some later DOJ
reports on judicial removal repeated this analysis. See Judicial Tenure Act: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 84–
89 (1977). But in other congressional proceedings, no DOJ official made any oral reference to the
1802 measure, nor did any member of Congress. It does not seem to have been a major factor in
the debates.
112. See Independence of Federal Judges Hearing, supra note 102, at 336 (statement of
William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Att’y Gen., Department of Justice) (“So far as the Circuit Court
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Tydings seemed to look on the events of 1802 with some amusement.
Rehnquist stated playfully, “If Congress were to say that there will be
100 district judges rather than 500 in the country, I suspect that you
might get some flack on that.” 113 Removing federal judges by abolishing
their courts was apparently no longer a serious idea.
Ultimately, Congress opted not to enact a judicial removal
mechanism. The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and
Disability Act of 1980 (“Judicial Discipline Act”) authorizes a judicial
council in each federal circuit to investigate complaints and to
“censur[e] or reprimand[ ]” judges (by, for example, ordering that no
cases be assigned to a judge under investigation), but expressly
provides that “in no circumstances may the council order removal.” 114
As a Senate Judiciary Committee report explained, the Judicial
Discipline Act “respected the position that the removal of federal judges
by any means other than impeachment is arguably unconstitutional.” 115
In subsequent decades, there was a growing consensus among
political actors that impeachment was the sole method of removing
federal judges—foreclosing even judicial removal. Thus, legislators
increasingly assumed that any “proposal for removal of a Federal judge
from office by means other than impeachment would require a
constitutional amendment.” 116 A House Judiciary Committee report in
2002 reflected this consensus, when it declared that the Judicial
Discipline Act “satisfied the constitutional parameters . . . by reserving
removal authority to the House and Senate.” 117
This account helps explain the astonishment with which many
greeted former Speaker Gingrich’s proposal to remove Article III judges
repealor, the only reason I mentioned that . . . is a statement by [one legislator] . . . that
impeachment was not the only ground for removal.”).
113. Judicial Reform Act Hearing, supra note 111, at 92 (statement of Rehnquist); see also id.
at 92 (statement of Sen. Joseph Tydings, D-Md.) (agreeing with Rehnquist’s comment and stating
he “suspect[ed] we would hear a little about it”).
114. Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-458, 94 Stat. 2035, 2037; see 28 U.S.C. § 354(a)(3) (2012); see also Scott E. Gant, Self-Regulation
and an Independent Judiciary, in THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 214–17 (Bruce
Peabody ed., 2011) (describing the complaint and investigative procedures under the law).
115. S. REP. NO. 96-362, at 4 (1979).
116. That was the conclusion of the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal,
which was created by Congress to examine the process for disciplining judges. Report of the
National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Intellectual Prop. and Judicial Admin. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 2 (1993)
(statement of Rep. William Hughes, D-S.C.). Accordingly, legislators proposed constitutional
amendments to authorize judicial removal. See, e.g., Judicial Discipline: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 1 (1986) (statement of
Sen. Orrin Hatch, R-Utah) (discussing two such proposals).
117. H.R. REP. NO. 107-459, at 7 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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by abolishing a court. That idea was not “ridiculous” in the nineteenth
or early twentieth centuries. But beginning in the 1930s, much of that
early history was largely forgotten (or dismissed). Today, there is a firm
convention that the political branches cannot remove a federal judge
outside the impeachment process. Any suggestion to the contrary is
“radical,” “off the wall,” and even “dangerous.” 118
II. COMPLYING WITH FEDERAL COURT ORDERS
After the Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore ended a Florida
recount 119 and effectively ensured that George W. Bush would win the
2000 presidential race, Democratic candidate (and Vice President)
Albert Gore quickly conceded defeat. 120 He declared: “Now the U.S.
Supreme Court has spoken. Let there be no doubt, while I strongly
disagree with the court’s decision, I accept it. I accept the finality of this
outcome.” 121 Likewise, in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks, the Bush Administration did not question its duty to comply
with Supreme Court decisions restricting its power over alleged enemy
combatants. 122
These examples reflect a widespread and bipartisan consensus
that political actors must abide by federal court orders. Although this
norm appears to be strong today (particularly at the federal level), 123
throughout much of our history, prominent federal and state officials
presumed that they could obstruct federal court orders with which they
firmly disagreed. I argue that the current convention requiring
compliance did not clearly emerge until after the civil rights movement
of the 1950s and 1960s.

118. Supra note 31 and accompanying text.
119. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110–11 (2000).
120. See Richard L. Burke & Katharine Q. Seelye, Bush Pledges to Be President for “One
Nation,” Not One Party; Gore, Conceding, Urges Unity, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2000, at A1.
121. In His Remarks, Gore Says He Will Help Bush “Bring America Together,” N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 2000, at A26.
122. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008) (holding that the alleged enemy
combatants detained at Guantanamo Bay were entitled to habeas corpus review); Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 635 (2006) (holding that the President did not have congressional
authorization to convene a military commission to try aliens detained at Guantanamo Bay); Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535 (2004) (holding that due process required an American citizen be
given meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for his detention, even when held as an
enemy combatant).
123. One example (discussed below) is the Trump Administration’s compliance with judicial
orders blocking the President’s travel bans. See infra notes 203–207 and accompanying text.
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A. Constitutional Text and Structure
Article III provides that “[t]he judicial Power of the United
States, shall be vested” in the Supreme Court and inferior federal
courts, and further specifies that this “judicial Power shall extend” to
certain classes of cases and controversies. 124 Many jurists and scholars
assume that this “judicial Power” encompasses the authority to issue
binding judgments in specific cases. 125 Yet other scholars have insisted
that the textual and historical basis for such a claim is unproven. 126
Moreover, several prominent scholars have argued that there
are at least some circumstances in which government officials need not
comply with federal court orders. 127 Gary Lawson and Christopher
Moore contend that presidents need not obey judicial orders that clearly
violate constitutional commands. 128 William Baude urges that Article
III gives federal courts the power to issue binding judgments only when
they have jurisdiction; under this view, political actors may disregard
federal court decrees if the court lacked jurisdiction. 129 Most
aggressively, Michael Paulsen asserts that the president is never

124. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2.
125. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 926–27
(1990) (arguing that the Article III “judicial Power” is “one to render dispositive judgments”); see
also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 259–60, 263–64 (1962) (arguing, in
the context of the civil rights movement, that “specific decrees ordering certain children to be
admitted to certain schools had to be obeyed”); Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution,
65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1008–09 (1965).
126. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Lecture, Executive Power and the Political Constitution, 2007
UTAH L. REV. 1, 17 (“[T]he historical support for the position that presidents must always obey and
enforce judicial judgments is less than wholly unequivocal . . . .”); see also David A. Strauss,
Presidential Interpretation of the Constitution, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 113, 124 (1993) (noting that
scholars have not explained how the Article III “judicial power” is “only the power to render binding
judgments in particular cases”).
127. This scholarship focuses on the president. Accordingly, it also responds to the other major
constitutional argument—that judicial orders are among the “laws” that the president must
faithfully execute under the Take Care Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[H]e shall take care
that the laws be faithfully executed . . . .”). Of course, these scholars may mean that only the
president may refuse to enforce judicial orders. But it is not obvious why state and local officials
would be bound to comply if the federal judicial power does not encompass an authority to issue
binding judgments. In any event, the important point for my purposes is that the text can plausibly
be read to leave the issue open.
128. See Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional
Interpretation, 83 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1319, 1324–25 (1996) (rejecting the argument that “the
President is absolutely bound to enforce court judgments,” while also asserting that the president
does not have an “unlimited power of presidential review of court judgments”).
129. See William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 GEO. L.J. 1807, 1809, 1813–14 (2008). Baude
discusses, but does not attempt to resolve, the difficult question of who decides whether a court
had jurisdiction in a given case. See id. at 1846–48.
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required to comply with or enforce federal court orders that he deems
“contrary to law.” 130
For my purposes, the important point is that the constitutional
text leaves room for disagreement on this issue. Nevertheless, the
current “rule” among political actors is that they must obey every
federal court order—no matter how erroneous, and no matter how far
outside the court’s jurisdiction it may have been. 131 Accordingly,
government officials have filled a gap in the text with a convention that
requires obedience to the federal courts. The account here documents
how long it took for this consensus to develop.
B. The Acceptance of Past Violations
As Richard Fallon has observed, “the historical record reveals
some important cases” where presidents “either refused to obey, or let
it be known that they would refuse to obey, specific judicial
directives.” 132 Likewise, for many years, state and local officials were
often unapologetic about defying federal court orders. Although other
scholars have recognized that these violations occurred, this Article
seeks to go further and document how other political actors reacted to
that defiance. That reaction tells us whether there was a bipartisan
norm (a convention) against violating federal court orders. As discussed
below, for much of our history, there was no such norm. Instead, when
government officials disobeyed—or threatened to disobey—federal
court orders, they were criticized primarily by their political opponents;
fellow partisans, by contrast, defended or even enthusiastically cheered
them on.
1. Federal Officials
During the War of 1812, then-General Andrew Jackson
proclaimed martial law in New Orleans, Louisiana—and kept the city
under martial law even after the British threat had largely

130. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the
Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 221–22 (1994).
131. For example, in 2015, the Obama Administration adhered to a district court order
blocking a key part of its immigration program, despite the Administration’s insistence that the
court’s decision was both wrong on the merits and well outside the court’s jurisdiction. See Texas
v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677–78 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (enjoining the implementation of the
Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (“DAPA”) program,
pursuant to which the executive would decline to remove undocumented immigrants with close
ties to the United States because their children were U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents).
132. Fallon, supra note 126, at 7.
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dissipated. 133 When a state legislator wrote a newspaper piece
criticizing these actions, Jackson reacted by ordering his
imprisonment. 134 The legislator then sought out (and obtained) a writ
of habeas corpus from a federal court judge, and Jackson not only
ignored the writ but jailed the federal judge! 135 Once martial law was
lifted, Jackson was cited—and fined $1000—for contempt of court. 136
But perhaps even more remarkable than these events was the
reaction of other federal officials. Although President James Madison
initially expressed concern about Jackson’s conduct, he declined to
sanction the General (and even led Jackson to believe he had the
President’s support). 137 Moreover, Jackson’s political supporters in
Congress stood by him and blocked efforts to censure him. 138 And in
1844, Congress voted to refund (then-former President) Jackson the
entire fine—with interest. 139 Although some of Jackson’s political
opponents objected, 140 the majority overwhelmingly opted to honor the
133. See Abraham D. Sofaer, Emergency Power and the Hero of New Orleans, 2 CARDOZO L.
REV. 233, 240–41 (1981) (noting that Jackson continued martial law even after the Treaty of
Ghent—the treaty ending the War of 1812—had been signed).
134. Id. at 242.
135. See Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, The President’s Power to Detain “Enemy Combatants”: Modern
Lessons from Mr. Madison’s Forgotten War, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1567, 1612 (2004) (noting that after
the writ of habeas corpus issued, Jackson had both the judge issuing the writ and the attorney
assisting the author with the same arrested).
136. Sofaer, supra note 133, at 248. Jackson did at least pay the fine. Id. at 248–49.
137. Madison’s Secretary of War Alexander Dallas initially sent Jackson letters expressing
Madison’s concerns about both Jackson’s use of martial law and, more specifically, his defiance of
the judge. See DAVID J. BARRON, WAGING WAR: THE CLASH BETWEEN PRESIDENTS AND CONGRESS
95–96 (2016) (explaining that Dallas’s letters suggested that Jackson’s conduct was illegal, even if
justified by military necessity, and that Jackson would have to pay the contempt fine); MATTHEW
WARSHAUER, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE POLITICS OF MARTIAL LAW 41–43 (2006) (discussing
letters from Dallas to Jackson voicing the President’s disapproval). When Jackson personally went
to Washington, D.C., however, Dallas made statements that led Jackson to believe that the
President endorsed all of the General’s conduct in New Orleans. See WARSHAUER, supra, at 43
(noting that Jackson described the meeting by stating that “the administrators of the Govr are
perfectly contented with all my conduct before Neworleans [sic]”); Sofaer, supra note 133, at 249–
50 (asserting that Dallas “assured Jackson” that he had the President’s and Dallas’s support). It
may be that Madison personally disapproved of Jackson’s conduct but believed it would be
politically unwise to sanction the General, whom the public widely viewed as a war hero. See
BARRON, supra, at 95–97 (arguing that Madison was “greatly troubled” by Jackson’s actions but
did not press the matter against the “war hero”); WARSHAUER, supra, at 42–44 (urging that
Madison “fail[ed] to formally investigate Jackson” out of “political expediency”). For my purposes,
the important point is Madison’s inaction (that is, his failure to publicly sanction the General),
which suggests that Jackson’s defiance of a federal court order was not considered “out of bounds.”
138. Sofaer, supra note 133, at 250.
139. Id. at 251–52.
140. See CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 1st Sess. 94 (1843–1844) (statement of Rep. Henry Grider,
Whig-Ky.) (complaining that Jackson had undermined the “invaluable right” of habeas corpus);
see also id. at 119 (statement of Rep. Luther Severance, Whig-Me.) (urging that Jackson lacked
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former general, who had “defied” the order of a “misguided” federal
judge. 141
During the Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln also refused
to obey a judicial order. Notably, much like scholars today, President
Lincoln at times suggested that judicial decisions “must be binding in
any case upon the parties to [the] suit.” 142 But Lincoln’s actions in Ex
parte Merryman143 suggest that he believed this rule admitted of
exceptions. The case involved John Merryman, a Confederate
sympathizer who was detained by the Union Army, and the legal issue
was whether Lincoln could unilaterally suspend the writ of habeas
corpus. 144 Chief Justice Taney (acting as a circuit justice) granted
Merryman’s habeas corpus petition and ordered his release, holding
that only Congress, not the President, had the power to suspend the
writ. 145 Apparently on Lincoln’s order, however, the military refused to
comply and Merryman remained in prison. 146
Lincoln’s Attorney General Edward Bates soon issued an official
opinion addressing the president’s authority to “refus[e] to obey a writ
of habeas corpus” issued by a federal judge. 147 Notably, Bates’ opinion
is somewhat unclear as to what he viewed as the scope of the president’s
authority. The Attorney General at times suggested that the president’s
the power to declare martial law and thus “exceeded his authority in imprisoning” the federal
judge).
141. CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 1st Sess. 92–93 (1843–1844) (statement of Rep. John Dawson,
D-La.) (recognizing that Jackson “defied Judge Hall, and refused to notice his writ of habeas
corpus” but still praising him); see also id. at 118 (statement of Rep. Aaron Brown, D-Tenn.)
(stating that the General had “the most patriotic motive in what he did towards the defence of New
Orleans”); Sofaer, supra note 133, at 251–52 (noting the bill passed with overwhelming support
and that some Senate members viewed the bill as remedying an “injustice to Jackson”).
142. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF
THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 133, 138–39 (1989). Lincoln took this position in speeches
on Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
143. 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487).
144. See id. at 147–48.
145. See id. at 148–49.
146. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous
Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 81, 97–98 (1993) (noting that Merryman was
imprisoned for seven weeks and then transferred to civil authorities). In a recent article, Seth
Tillman insists that Lincoln did not in fact violate a federal court order, because Chief Justice
Taney simply declared that Merryman should be released and did not take the additional step of
ordering his release. See Seth Barrett Tillman, Ex Parte Merryman: Myth, History, and
Scholarship, 224 MIL. L. REV. 481, 492, 495–98 (2016). Whether or not that is technically correct,
as discussed below, Lincoln—through his Attorney General—certainly felt compelled to explain
why a president need not always comply with federal court orders. And legislators assumed that
Lincoln refused to obey a court order. See infra notes 151–153 and accompanying text. Accordingly,
this episode can still tell us a great deal about political attitudes toward compliance with judicial
orders in the nineteenth century.
147. Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 74, 74 (1861).
The Attorney General also discussed the president’s power to suspend habeas corpus. See id. at
74–75.
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power to defy a judicial decree was limited to “exceptional”
circumstances, such as those existing during the Civil War. 148 He
argued that “when [the president] has fought and captured the
insurgent army, and has seized their secret spies and emissaries,” he is
not “bound to bring their bodies before any judge who may send him a
writ of habeas corpus” and “submit to . . . whatever the said judge” shall
determine. 149 Other language, however, suggests that the Attorney
General endorsed a broader “disobedience” principle. 150
But one thing is clear: Lincoln—through his Attorney General—
had publicly declared that he could defy federal judicial orders, at least
under some circumstances. Yet there was no bipartisan outcry in
Congress. Instead, Lincoln was criticized by his political opponents.
Democrats condemned the infringement on Merryman’s liberty and
praised Chief Justice Taney for his “simple and sublime courage . . . in
applying the plain principles of the Constitution.” 151 Some Democrats
also charged that the President “in holding Merryman in confinement
against the decision of the Chief Justice” had “usurp[ed] the judicial
power of the Government.” 152 But Republicans defended Lincoln’s
actions as necessary, at least in a time of crisis, and denounced Taney
for attempting to protect “Merryman’s treason.” 153
2. State and Local Officials
State and local officials also did not assume that they had to obey
all federal court judgments. Indeed, “[f]rom 1789 until 1828, states

148. See id. at 90 (“This power in the President is no part of his ordinary duty in time of peace;
it is temporary and exceptional, and was intended only to meet a pressing emergency.”).
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., id. at 74, 76–77, 85–87 (“If it be true . . . that the President and the judiciary are
co-ordinate departments . . . I do not understand how it can be legally possible for a judge to issue
a command to the President.”).
151. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 48–49 (1861) (statement of Sen. Trusten Polk, DMo.); see also id. at 68 (statement of Sen. Lazarus Powell, D-Ky.) (“There could be no necessity
that would authorize this violation of the Constitution.”). Congress discussed Merryman when
considering whether to authorize Lincoln’s suspension. See Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension as an
Emergency Power, 118 YALE L.J. 600, 638–51 (2009) (recounting those debates).
152. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1861) (statement of Sen. Trusten Polk, D-Mo.)
(“By the action of the President . . . in holding Merryman in confinement against the decision of
the Chief Justice . . . this has extended to a usurpation of the judicial power.”).
153. E.g., CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2070, 2073–74 (1862) (statement of Rep. Samuel
Shellabarger, R-Ohio) (denouncing a proposal “to imprison the President . . . for not exceeding two
years if he shall repeat the conduct of which he has been guilty in the imprisonment of Merryman
and his confederates” and condemning Chief Justice Taney’s ruling).
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routinely defied federal judicial orders.” 154 There were also striking
examples of obstruction thereafter, including two cases from Georgia.
In the early 1830s, the State refused to abide by a Supreme Court order
that it release two missionaries from prison. 155 Even more troubling,
Georgia carried out a death sentence of a Cherokee named Corn Tassel
while his appeal was pending before the Supreme Court. 156 In both
cases, Governor George Gilmer (a Jacksonian Democrat) declared
defiantly: “[O]rders received from the Supreme Court [that interfere
with state court decisions] will be disregarded; and any attempt to
enforce such orders will be resisted with whatever force the laws have
placed at my command.” 157
The response to this disobedience was split along partisan lines.
Northerners and other political opponents publicly condemned Georgia
“for having unjustly and cruelly imprisoned the missionaries” 158 and for
carrying out the “illegal” execution of Corn Tassel. 159 But Jacksonian
Democrats came to the Governor’s defense. Georgia’s legislature, for
example, agreed that the Governor should “disregard any and every
mandate” from the Justices in both cases. 160 Outside the state,
President Andrew Jackson and other Democrats fully supported

154. Mark A. Graber, James Buchanan as Savior? Judicial Power, Political Fragmentation,
and the Failed 1831 Repeal of Section 25, 88 OR. L. REV. 95, 128 (2009).
155. See Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21
STAN. L. REV. 500, 517, 519–24 (1969) (describing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832),
which involved the prosecution of two missionaries under a state law that “prohibited white men
from living in the Cherokee territory without a license from the Governor”); Charles Warren,
Legislative and Judicial Attacks on the Supreme Court of the United States—A History of the
Twenty-Fifth Section of the Judiciary Act, 47 AM. L. REV. 161, 167–73 (1913) (describing how the
Georgia legislature instructed the Governor to disregard any Supreme Court decision at odds with
the State’s determination of law and Georgia’s public outcry over the Supreme Court’s decision).
156. See Burke, supra note 155, at 512–13 (noting the State’s determination to assert its
sovereignty in executing Corn Tassel despite a writ of error issued by the Supreme Court).
157. Georgia and the Cherokees, 39 NILES’ WKLY. REG. 329, 338 (1831) (Tassel case); see also
Wilson Lumpkin, Legislature of Georgia, 41 NILES’ WKLY. REG. 297, 313 (1831) (missionaries case).
158. John Andrew Schulz, Letter from Mr. Schulz, 43 NILES’ WKLY. REG. 129, 140 (1832)
(speech by former Pennsylvania Governor John Schulz); see also Eliphalet Nott et al., Release of
the Missionaries, 44 NILES’ WKLY. REG. 353, 359 (1833) (letter signed by northern politicians
criticizing Georgia’s imprisonment of the missionaries).
159. Mr. Everett’s Speech Concluded, DAILY NAT’L INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 19, 1831 (speech by
Massachusetts Governor Edward Everett).
160. See Georgia and the Cherokees, supra note 157, at 338 (quoting a resolution of the Georgia
House of Representatives regarding the Tassel case); Georgia Legislature, 41 NILES’ WKLY. REG.
321, 335 (1831) (missionaries case).
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Georgia’s defiance in the Tassel case 161 and did not criticize the State’s
treatment of the missionaries. 162
By the 1850s, the political winds had shifted; the federal
judiciary was dominated by pro-slavery Democrats, and anti-slavery
officials in the North now asserted the authority to defy federal judicial
orders. The most prominent case was in Wisconsin. 163 Sherman Booth
was convicted in federal court of violating the Fugitive Slave Act (by
helping a slave escape to freedom); but then a state court granted
Booth’s habeas corpus petition and ordered his release. 164 The Supreme
Court in Ableman v. Booth reversed the state court decision, holding
that the court had no jurisdiction over someone in federal custody, and
castigating the state court for “revers[ing] and annul[ing] the judgment
of the District Court of the United States.” 165 Yet Wisconsin remained
defiant. The state court refused to file the mandate issued by the
Supreme Court, 166 and the Wisconsin legislature adopted resolutions,
urging that states could oppose any “unauthorized acts” taken by the
federal judiciary. 167
This litigation set off a heated debate among federal officials
over the propriety of Wisconsin’s defiance. Once again, the reaction was
divided along party lines. Pro-slavery Democrats, including Georgia
Senator Robert Toombs, described Wisconsin’s actions as “shameful”
and as “the most striking case of reckless disregard of constitutional
161. See Warren, supra note 155, at 167–68 (stating that “other States holding extreme views
of States’ Rights” were “sympath[etic]” with Georgia in the Tassel case); Illustrations of
Jacksonism.—No. 2, DAILY NAT’L J., Sept. 14, 1831 (noting President Andrew Jackson’s views).
162. The scholarly discussion about the missionaries’ case has focused on whether President
Jackson stated, “John Marshall has made his decision: now let him enforce it!” E.g., MARK R.
CHEATHEM, ANDREW JACKSON, SOUTHERNER 157–58 (2013) (“This outburst . . . almost certainly
did not occur.”). But for my purposes, it is more crucial that Jackson did not publicly criticize
Georgia, and even suggested that the missionaries were in the wrong. See Andrew Jackson, The
President and the Missionaries, 43 NILES’ WKLY. REG. 33, 43 (1832) (denying he could enforce the
Supreme Court’s decision and adding, “I do not wish to comment upon [the missionaries’ case] but
I cannot refrain from observing that . . . they are by their injudicious zeal . . . too apt to make
themselves obnoxious to those among whom they are located”). Notably, after Jackson was
reelected in 1832, some Jacksonian Democrats privately pressured the Georgia governor to pardon
the missionaries, because Georgia’s defiance was providing ammunition for the nullification
movement in South Carolina. See Burke, supra note 155, at 530. But that is a far cry from publicly
condemning Georgia’s open defiance of the Supreme Court.
163. A similar case arose in Ohio. See THOMAS D. MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL: THE PERSONAL
LIBERTY LAWS OF THE NORTH 187 (photo. reprint 2010) (1974) (discussing Republican Governor
Salmon Chase’s threat to defy a federal court order enforcing the Fugitive Slave Act).
164. H. Robert Baker, The Fugitive Slave Clause and the Antebellum Constitution, 30 LAW &
HIST. REV. 1133, 1169–70 (2012).
165. 62 U.S. 506, 513–14, 522–24 (1858).
166. Baker, supra note 164, at 1170.
167. Warren, supra note 155, at 184–85 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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obligation which has yet occurred.” 168 But Republicans rushed to
Wisconsin’s defense. 169 Several Republicans pointed out that slave
states had themselves asserted the authority to defy judicial orders; in
the missionaries’ case, for example, Georgia “imprison[ed two
individuals], contrary to a decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States.” 170 New Hampshire Senator John Hale declared: “I think it is a
little unkind, a little out of place, for the State of Georgia to censure the
State of Wisconsin or any other State, for following in the tracks which
she has so plainly and so clearly indicated.” 171
C. The Transition Period: The Civil Rights Movement
Open defiance of the federal courts was not simply a nineteenthcentury phenomenon. Following the Supreme Court’s 1954 decision in
Brown v. Board of Education, 172 “[t]hroughout the South, governors and
gubernatorial candidates called for defiance of court orders.” 173 Several
followed through on this pledge. In 1956, Texas Governor Allan Shivers
obstructed a desegregation order by directing state troops to block black
students from entering Mansfield High School. 174 One year later,
Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus did the same at Central High School
in Little Rock. 175 And, in 1962, Mississippi Governor Ross Barnett
violated a federal court order by blocking the admission of James
Meredith, the University of Mississippi’s first black student. 176

168. CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 892 (1860) (statement of Sen. Robert Toombs, D-Ga.);
id. at 333 (statement of Rep. John Reagan, D-Tex.) (criticizing the state court).
169. CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 121 (1860) (statement of Sen. James Doolittle,
R-Wis.); see also CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 333 (1860) (statement of Rep. John Potter, RWis.) (“The supreme court of Wisconsin needs no defense.”).
170. CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 762–63 (1860) (statement of Sen. John Hale, R-N.H.);
CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., Spec. Sess. 121 (1860) (statement of Sen. James Doolittle, R-Wis.)
(emphasizing Georgia’s defiance in the missionaries’ case and the “life and death” case of Tassel).
171. CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 764 (1860) (statement of Sen. John Hale, R-N.H.).
172. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
173. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 78 (2d ed. 2008).
174. See ROBYN DUFF LADINO, DESEGREGATING TEXAS SCHOOLS: EISENHOWER, SHIVERS, AND
THE CRISIS AT MANSFIELD HIGH 104 (1996).
175. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 326 (2004). Governor Faubus later withdrew the state forces
(when threatened with a contempt citation), but a mob of private individuals continued to prevent
entry to the school, while state officials looked the other way. Id.
176. See CHARLES W. EAGLES, THE PRICE OF DEFIANCE: JAMES MEREDITH AND THE
INTEGRATION OF OLE MISS 283–84 (2009). Barnett was later found in contempt of court. See United
States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 682–83 (1964) (denying a jury trial in the criminal contempt
proceeding).
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Initially, there was no bipartisan criticism of this defiance. 177
Supporters of integration were certainly appalled by the state officials’
conduct, warning that this “idea that the Governor of any State is
immune from the processes of the Federal courts” threatened to
“destroy the Federal Constitution [and] nullify the Civil War.” 178 But
segregationists heaped praise upon these governors. Governor Faubus
became a “regional hero” for his “aggressive defiance of federal
authorities.” 179 Southern politicians also insisted that “Governor
Barnett is entitled to the admiration and respect of all Americans.” 180
To defend his state’s authority, Barnett had “courageously and boldly
pressed himself forward, both as Governor and as an individual, and
obstructed an order of a U.S. Court.” 181
But within a few years, government officials and the general
public became less comfortable with the South’s massive resistance to
desegregation—and with the defiance of federal court orders. We can
see this evolution in President Dwight Eisenhower. Although
Eisenhower never publicly criticized the Brown decision, he apparently
disagreed with it. 182 Perhaps in part for this reason, the President did
nothing in response to state officials’ early defiance of desegregation
orders. Thus, in 1956, when Texas Governor Shivers used state troops
to obstruct a desegregation decree, the President took no action. 183
Indeed, as late as July 1957, President Eisenhower declared that he
177. Notably, during this period, the relevant “partisan” divide was between social
conservatives (conservative Republicans and Southern Democrats) who opposed racial integration
and social progressives from both parties who supported integration. See MORRIS P. FIORINA,
DIVIDED GOVERNMENT 165 (2003); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 268–69, 273 (2007).
178. 108 CONG. REC. 20,818 (1962) (statement of Sen. Jacob Javits, R-N.Y.) (denouncing
Governor Barnett’s behavior as “contumacious”); see also Radio and Television Report to the
Nation on the Situation at the University of Mississippi, 1962 PUB. PAPERS 726, 727 (Sept. 30,
1962) (statement by President John F. Kennedy: “The law which we obey includes the final rulings
of the courts . . . .”); Gov. Leader Sees Faubus Blunder: Says Arkansan ‘Set Back the Cause of
Freedom’—McKeldin in New Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1957, at 8 (noting criticisms of Governor
Orval Faubus).
179. KLARMAN, supra note 175, at 398.
180. 108 CONG. REC. 20,805 (1962) (statement of Sen. James Eastland, D-Miss.); see also
EAGLES, supra note 176, at 283–84 (“State leaders [in Mississippi] nearly unanimously supported
Barnett.”); KLARMAN, supra note 175, at 407 (Alabama’s “entire congressional delegation”
supported Barnett, and a number of prominent state politicians also supported him).
181. 108 CONG. REC. 20,805 (1962) (statement of Sen. James Eastland, D-Miss.); see also id.
at 20,806 (“[T]he southern people, by and large, will not recognize, abide by, or comply with an
illegal court decree . . . .”).
182. See 2 STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, EISENHOWER: THE PRESIDENT 190 (1984) (“Eisenhower
personally wished that the Court had upheld Plessy v. Ferguson, [163 U.S. 537 (1896)].”).
183. See ROSENBERG, supra note 173, at 119 (arguing Eisenhower did not act in Texas for
political reasons: “1956 was an election year, Texas was seen as a crucial state . . . .”).
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could not “imagine any set of circumstances that would ever induce
[him] to send Federal troops . . . into any area to enforce the orders of a
Federal court.” 184 A few months later, when Governor Faubus again
obstructed a federal court order, Eisenhower still did not immediately
act. The federal government stepped in only after a private mob had
arrived to prevent black students from entering Little Rock High
School. 185
But in the aftermath of the Little Rock crisis, Eisenhower took a
firm stand. He insisted that “all Americans” have a “solemn duty . . . to
comply with the final orders of the court” in desegregation and other
cases, regardless of their “agreement or disagreement with [the]
outcome.” 186 Eisenhower maintained this position for the remainder of
his presidency—and even after he left office. Thus, when Mississippi
Governor Barnett prevented James Meredith from entering Ole Miss,
(then-former President) Eisenhower denounced Barnett’s actions as
“absolutely unconscionable and indefensible.” 187
Other political leaders, including those that previously opposed
desegregation orders, later followed suit. As Michael Klarman has
recounted, not long after the Ole Miss incident, moderates throughout
the South began to “call[ ] for . . . compliance with federal court
orders.” 188 Every state ultimately began to implement desegregation
decrees; even Governor Faubus agreed to integrate the schools. 189 The
era in which political actors were applauded for “courageously and
boldly . . . obstruct[ing] an order of a U.S. Court” 190 appeared to be at
an end.
D. The Modern Convention Requiring Compliance
The end of massive resistance seemed to mark a turning point
for the enforcement of federal court orders more broadly. Following the
civil rights era, it became increasingly uncommon for any federal or
state political actor to disobey a federal court decree. Moreover, if an
184. The President’s News Conference of July 17, 1957, 1957 PUB. PAPERS 546 (July 17, 1957)
(Dwight D. Eisenhower).
185. See KLARMAN, supra note 175, at 326.
186. Statement by the President on Compliance with Final Orders of the Courts, 1958 PUB.
PAPERS 631 (Aug. 20, 1958) (Dwight D. Eisenhower).
187. ‘Unconscionable,’ Eisenhower Says of Gov. Barnett’s Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1962, at
23.
188. KLARMAN, supra note 175, at 408.
189. See id. at 400 (noting that “massive resistance” in Arkansas ended in 1959 and Faubus
himself, who continued to politically oppose integration, “ceased interfering with school
desegregation”).
190. 108 CONG. REC. 20,805 (1962) (statement of Sen. James Eastland, D-Miss.).
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official did violate—or threatened to violate—a court order, he faced
criticism even from political supporters. I argue below (in Part IV) that
this norm likely emerged in large part because of the civil rights
movement; subsequent political actors did not want to be equated with
the segregationists who led the massive resistance to Brown. For now,
the Article offers several examples to illustrate the bipartisan norm
that emerged requiring compliance with federal court orders.
1. Compliance by the Federal Executive
The president’s duty to comply with federal court orders became
a major issue in the 1970s. During the Watergate investigation, 191 a
special prosecutor sought tapes of conversations between President
Richard Nixon and administration officials. 192 The President refused to
turn over the tapes, contending that they were protected by executive
privilege. 193 And throughout the litigation, Nixon suggested that he
might not obey a Supreme Court decision directing him to produce the
tapes. 194
The response by legislators was decisive and bipartisan. Both
Democrats and Republicans “repeatedly urged” the President to “abide
by [any] Supreme Court decision.” 195 Legislators of both parties—
including “leading defender[s] of the President”—further warned that,
if Nixon defied a Supreme Court order, he would be impeached. 196 Thus,
even Nixon’s supporters declared that it would be a “disastrous

191. Federal authorities were investigating a break-in at the Democratic National Committee
headquarters at the Watergate office complex. For a helpful discussion, see LOUIS FISHER & NEAL
DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 106–12 (3d ed. 2001). See generally
STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE: THE LAST CRISIS OF RICHARD NIXON (1990).
192. See United States v. Mitchell, 377 F. Supp. 1326, 1328 (D.D.C. 1974) (discussing the
special prosecutor’s subpoena for the President’s tapes).
193. See id. at 1329.
194. See Jules Witcover, Nixon Stand on Court Unclear, WASH. POST, June 4, 1974, at A3.
195. Laurence Stern & Jules Witcover, Delivery Time Is in Doubt, WASH. POST, July 25, 1974,
at A1 (quoting Vice President Gerald Ford); see also John P. MacKenzie, Court Hears Watergate
Tapes Case, WASH. POST, July 9, 1974, at A1 (“Senate leaders [of both parties] cautioned against
presidential defiance of an adverse ruling.”).
196. See Stern & Witcover, supra note 195, at A1 (noting the “overwhelming bipartisan
warnings”). At the time, the House Judiciary Committee was considering impeachment for any
presidential misconduct related to the Watergate scandal. But many of Nixon’s “leading
defender[s]” believed he could successfully fight impeachment—as long as he complied with a
Supreme Court decision. See David S. Broder, Rhodes Warns on Nixon Stand, WASH. POST, June
11, 1974, at A6; Rowland Evans & Robert Novak, A Warning to President Nixon, WASH. POST, July
7, 1974, at B7 (reporting that a “pro-Nixon” Southern Democrat sent the President a “stern
warning . . . the most dangerous thing you can do is defy a ruling from the Supreme Court”).

Grove_Galley (Do Not Delete)

500

3/7/2018 9:48 AM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:2:465

situation” if the President failed to obey a Supreme Court decision, 197
because that was “the one thing he probably couldn’t survive.” 198
Ultimately, the Court issued a unanimous ruling, rejecting
Nixon’s claim of executive privilege, and directing him to produce the
tapes. 199 The President soon announced that although he was
“disappointed in the result,” he “respect[ed] and accept[ed] the Court’s
decision,” and would “take whatever measures are necessary to comply
with that decision in all respects.” 200
Since Nixon, top executive officials have assumed that they must
comply with federal court orders. 201 One of the most instructive
examples is the George W. Bush Administration’s obedience in the
wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks. As we have seen,
historically, federal officials had proved willing to defy judicial orders
in times of national crisis, like the War of 1812 and the Civil War.
Moreover, the Bush Administration made bold claims about the scope
of executive authority in the war on terror—leading some scholars to
worry that the Administration might not comply with a judgment
restricting its power. 202 Yet when the Supreme Court held that
Guantanamo Bay detainees could file federal habeas petitions to
challenge their detentions, President Bush announced: “We’ll abide by
the Court’s decision. That doesn’t mean I have to agree with it.” 203

197. Congressmen of Both Parties Applaud Decision on Tapes, L.A. TIMES, July 24, 1974, at 2.
198. Broder, supra note 196, at A6.
199. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708–14 (1974).
200. Statement Announcing Intention to Comply with Supreme Court Decision Requiring
Production of Presidential Tape Recordings, 1 PUB. PAPERS 606 (July 24, 1974). The President
resigned two weeks later. See FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 191, at 111–12.
201. See, e.g., Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 983–86 (1987)
(Reagan Attorney General Ed Meese strongly criticizes the Supreme Court but states: “Obviously
[a Court ruling] does have binding quality: it binds the parties in a case and also the executive
branch for whatever enforcement is necessary.”). Notably, the phenomenon of “nonacquiescence”
illustrates this principle. Even under this practice, a federal agency must abide by a specific
judicial decree in a case in which it was a party; the agency simply reserves the right not to follow
a court of appeals precedent in other cases (if, for example, the precedent would undermine the
agency’s ability to regulate uniformly throughout the country). For a discussion of
nonacquiescence, see Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal
Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679 (1989).
202. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516–17, 535–36 (2004) (noting, but declining to
rule on, the executive’s assertion that it “possesse[d] plenary authority to detain [enemy
combatants] pursuant to Article II”); Fallon, supra note 126, at 4 (“The immanent logic of [the
Administration’s] position” on unilateral executive power could have implied that “the President
could also, under the Constitution, lawfully refuse to obey a judicial order.”).
203. Nina Totenberg, Trump’s Criticism of Judges out of Line with Past Presidents, NPR: POL.
(Feb. 11, 2017, 6:19 AM), http://www.npr.org/2017/02/11/514587731/trumps-criticism-of-judgesout-of-line-with-past-presidents [https://perma.cc/6X5U-ESFJ] (quoting President Bush and
noting that he refrained from a personal attack on the judges).
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Another powerful example arose when federal district courts
issued nationwide injunctions blocking President Donald Trump’s
“travel bans” (executive orders that suspended the entry of individuals
from certain named countries with predominantly Muslim
populations). 204 The President denounced the court rulings as
“ridiculous,” deriding one Article III member as a “so-called judge” and
complaining that another order was “an unprecedented judicial
overreach.” 205 Yet the Trump Administration nevertheless complied
with the injunctions, promising to challenge the federal court orders
through the ordinary appellate process. 206 The executive’s submission
to the courts, despite the President’s rhetoric, suggests that there is
today a bipartisan consensus (a convention) requiring obedience to
federal court decrees. 207

204. See Alexander Burns, Federal Judge Blocks New Ban on Travel to U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
16, 2017, at A1 (discussing the federal court orders against President Trump’s second travel ban,
which suspended entry from six predominantly Muslim countries, and against the original travel
ban, issued on January 25, 2017, which suspended entry from seven countries).
205. Alex Johnson, Trump’s Second Travel Ban Blocked by Hawaii Judge Derrick Watson,
NBC NEWS (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/federal-judge-hawaii-blockstrump-s-revised-travel-order-n734141 [https://perma.cc/EG24-GVWM]; Amy B. Wang, Trump
Lashes out at ‘So-Called Judge’ Who Temporarily Blocked Travel Ban, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/02/04/trump-lashes-out-at-federal-judgewho-temporarily-blocked-travel-ban/?utm_term=.da84fd335888
[https://perma.cc/35MS-BZ9B]
(quoting President Trump’s tweet: “The opinion of this so-called judge, which essentially takes
law-enforcement away from our country, is ridiculous and will be overturned!” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
206. See Laura Jarrett, Homeland Security Suspends Travel Ban, CNN POL. (Feb. 4, 2017),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/03/politics/federal-judge-temporarily-halts-trump-travel-bannationwide-ag-says/index.html [https://perma.cc/G63F-HADP]. Notably, President Trump
promised to go through the ordinary appellate process in the very same comments that denounced
the federal court orders. See Johnson, supra note 205 (noting that, in a speech describing a court
order against the second travel ban as “an unprecedented judicial overreach,” President Trump
said his administration “would pursue the case all the way to the Supreme Court if necessary”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Wang, supra note 205 (quoting President Trump’s tweet: “The
opinion of this so-called judge, which essentially takes law-enforcement away from our country, is
ridiculous and will be overturned!” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
207. There were reports that some Customs and Border Protection agents on the ground did
not fully comply with early court decrees limiting the effects of the President’s first executive order
(issued on Jan. 27, 2017). See Daniel Marans, Customs and Border Officials Defy Court Order on
Lawful Residents, HUFF. POST (Jan. 29, 2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/dullesairport-feds-violated-court-order_us_588d7274e4b08a14f7e67bcf [https://perma.cc/RRK4-GRZY]
(asserting that federal agents did not permit affected individuals to meet with attorneys). But it
appears that any such noncompliance may have resulted from confusion during the first fortyeight hours after the issuance of the executive order. That seems particularly likely, given the
executive’s compliance with the subsequent orders blocking the travel bans entirely. In any event,
the recent controversy over the travel bans underscores the importance of the convention requiring
compliance with federal court judgments—and raises concerns about what might happen if that
convention changed. See infra Part IV (emphasizing the contingency of conventions).
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2. Modern Compliance by State and Local Officials
Since the civil rights era, open defiance of federal courts by state
and local officials has been rare. Much like their federal counterparts,
these officials seem to assume that they must obey federal court
decrees. For example, in the 1980s, after a federal district court
declared that prayers before public school football games violated the
Establishment Clause, many officials in nearby school districts
denounced the decision and vowed to continue holding pre-game
prayers. 208 But the school officials acknowledged that they would cease
the practice as soon as “they got a direct order to stop.”209
Moreover, if state and local officials do defy court orders, they
will likely face criticism even from fellow partisans. A recent episode
illustrates this point. In the wake of the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision
in Obergefell v. Hodges, which held that States must recognize samesex marriages, 210 a Kentucky clerk (Kim Davis) stopped issuing
marriage licenses altogether—in order to avoid providing them to samesex couples. 211 (Davis alleged that assisting same-sex marriages would
violate her religious beliefs. 212) A federal district court ordered Davis to
issue the licenses, 213 but she refused. The judge found Davis in
contempt and directed that she be jailed until she complied. 214
Although Davis was released after a five-day stay in prison, 215
her disobedience got a good deal of national attention. Perhaps not
surprisingly, the Obama Administration argued that Davis should
comply with the federal court order and issue same-sex marriage
licenses. 216 But most Republican presidential candidates also insisted
that Davis had to obey the court order, even though each one of them

208. See Tracy Thompson, Prayer Ruling Raises Issue of ‘Supreme Law of Land,’ ATLANTA J.CONST., Feb. 8, 1987, at D7.
209. Id.
210. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015).
211. See Miller v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924, 929 (E.D. Ky. 2015).
212. See id.
213. See id. at 944.
214. See Liam Stack & Ashley Southall, Jailed Kentucky Clerk Starts Federal Appeal, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 6, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/07/us/jailed-kentucky-clerk-startsfederal-appeal.html?mcubz=1 [https://perma.cc/R83E-AH3H] (Davis was “jailed for defying a
federal court order . . . .”).
215. David Weigel, Abby Phillip & Sarah Larimer, Kim Davis Released from Jail, Ordered Not
to Interfere with Same-Sex Marriage Licenses, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/09/08/judge-orders-kentucky-clerkkim-davis-released-from-jail/?utm_term=.d801f876ab71 [https://perma.cc/7V3H-WKY4].
216. See Michael Muskal, Kentucky County Oks Marriages, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2015, at A6
(noting that President Obama’s Press Secretary said that Davis should not defy the court’s ruling).
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claimed to oppose same-sex marriage. 217 For example, Senator Lindsey
Graham stated that, although he “ ‘support[ed] traditional marriage’
himself,” Davis should “comply with the law or resign.” 218 Ohio
Governor John Kasich agreed; although he “believe[d] in traditional
marriage . . . the court has ruled.” 219 Likewise, then front-runner (now
President) Trump said that, although he “hate[d] to see [Davis] being
put in jail,” “[w]e’re a nation of laws,” so she had to comply. 220
Some evidence, however, suggests that the bipartisan consensus
on compliance may not be as strong for state and local officials as it is
for federal officials. In the Davis case, two of the sixteen Republican
presidential candidates defended the clerk’s disobedience. Senator Ted
Cruz and former Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee insisted that
Davis should not be required to comply with a federal court order that
violated her faith. 221 Moreover, in 2016, former Arizona Sheriff Joe
Arpaio was convicted of violating a federal district court order, which
restricted his authority to arrest and detain undocumented
immigrants. 222 Although candidate Trump had insisted on compliance
by Davis, President Trump in August 2017 pardoned Sheriff Arpaio—a
move that might be seen as an endorsement of not only the Sheriff’s

217. Some candidates argued that Davis should comply with the court order but also urged
states to exempt government employees with religious objections from issuing marriage licenses.
See, e.g., Jeremy W. Peters, Marco Rubio Says Government Should Respect Kim Davis’s Beliefs,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2015/09/02/marco-rubiosays-government-should-respect-kim-daviss-beliefs/ [https://perma.cc/GWZ2-VB73] (providing the
views of Florida Senator Marco Rubio).
218. James Higdon et al., Ky. Clerk Defies Court Order on Marriage Licenses, WASH. POST,
Sept. 2, 2015, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
219. Stack & Southall, supra note 214 (internal quotation marks omitted).
220. Muskal, supra note 216, at A6.
221. See id. (providing quotations from Mike Huckabee and Senator Ted Cruz condemning
Kim Davis’s arrest). Huckabee further suggested that a citizen need not comply with any federal
court order she believed to be wrong. See Stack & Southall, supra note 214 (quoting Mike Huckabee
as saying that “you obey [a law] if it’s right” (internal quotation marks omitted)). He was
apparently alone in making this claim.
222. Stephen Lemons, Joe Arpaio Guilty on Three Counts of Civil Contempt, Criminal
Contempt Still Possible, PHOENIX NEW TIMES (May 13, 2016), http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/
news/joe-arpaio-guilty-on-three-counts-of-civil-contempt-criminal-contempt-still-possible8293359 [https://perma.cc/T2MR-KBZF]. Notably, Sheriff Arpaio insisted in the criminal contempt
proceeding that he did not intend to violate a federal court order. See Megan Cassidy, Sheriff Joe
Arpaio in Contempt of Federal Court, Judge Rules, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (May 13, 2016),
http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/phoenix/2016/05/13/arpaio-contempt-federal-courtruling/77833232/ [https://perma.cc/WQ5H-3XSF] (“Arpaio . . . admitted to violating the judge’s
orders before the hearings’ start date but repeatedly insisted that it was due to miscommunication
and confusion rather than willful defiance.”).
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aggressive law enforcement tactics but also his noncompliance with a
federal court order. 223
I do not want to exaggerate the significance of these examples.
Notably, President Trump’s pardon was quickly criticized by prominent
Republicans, including House Speaker Paul Ryan and Senator John
McCain. 224 And in the Davis case, virtually all Republican presidential
candidates argued, almost reflexively, that the Kentucky clerk had to
obey the federal court (even though a defense of Davis might have been
popular among evangelical voters). 225 Accordingly, in sharp contrast to
the segregationists of the civil rights era, Davis and Arpaio were not
widely cheered on by their fellow partisans for having “courageously
and boldly pressed . . . forward . . . [to] obstruct[ ] an order of a U.S.
Court.” 226
223. The president need not articulate reasons for a pardon. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1
(granting the president the power to pardon without stating that the president needs to supply
reasons). The press release from the White House suggested that the pardon was primarily
designed to signal approval of Arpaio’s enforcement tactics. See Press Release, The White House:
Office of the Press Sec’y, President Trump Pardons Sheriff Joe Arpaio (Aug. 25, 2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/08/25/president-trump-pardons-sheriff-joearpaio [https://perma.cc/V2ZW-PRFR]:
Throughout his time as Sheriff, Arpaio continued his life’s work of protecting the public
from the scourges of crime and illegal immigration. Sheriff Joe Arpaio is now eightyfive years old, and after more than fifty years of admirable service to our Nation, he is
worthy candidate for a Presidential pardon.
My research suggests that (at least before the pardon) much of the debate over Arpaio focused on
his enforcement tactics, rather than his noncompliance with a federal court order—perhaps
because he asserted that he sought to comply. See supra note 222.
224. See Emily Goldberg, Schumer, Ryan Criticize Trump for Arpaio Pardon, POLITICO (Aug.
26,
2017),
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/08/26/schumer-mccain-trump-arpaio-pardon242065 [https://perma.cc/64TS-M3CB] (noting criticism by Ryan and McCain as well as
Democrats); Maggie Habermanaug, Trump Asked Top Aides Months Ago if Arpaio Case Could Be
Dropped, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/26/
us/politics/political-reaction-trump-pardon-arpaio.html [https://perma.cc/4K6Q-D6AJ] (noting
Republican criticism, although also reporting that at least one Republican congressman agreed
with the pardon, while others “stayed quiet”); Toluse Olorunnipa, Christie Is Latest Republican to
Criticize Trump’s Arpaio Pardon, BLOOMBERG: POL. (Aug. 30, 2017, 7:52 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-30/christie-is-latest-republican-to-criticizetrump-s-arpaio-pardon [https://perma.cc/2MZP-E758] (noting criticism by New Jersey Governor
Chris Christie).
225. See James Higdon & Sandhya Somashekhar, Kentucky Clerk Ordered to Jail for Refusing
to Issue Gay Marriage License, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
national/defiant-kentucky-clerk-could-be-found-in-contempt-thursday/2015/09/03/34e50f08-51af11e5-9812-92d5948a40f8_story.html?utm_term=.7681f46d26b4 [https://perma.cc/W3PP-4UBB]
(suggesting Senator Cruz supported Davis “to appeal to the evangelical Christian base”).
226. 108 CONG. REC. 20,805 (1962) (statement of Sen. James Eastland, D-Miss.). In addition
to the examples noted in the text, there is also the case of former Alabama state court judge Roy
Moore, who in 2003 disregarded a federal court order to remove the Ten Commandments from the
state courthouse, and in 2015 encouraged Alabama officials to violate a federal court order
requiring them to issue same-sex marriage licenses. See Kent Faulk, Alabama Supreme Court
Chief Justice Roy Moore Suspended for Rest of Term, AL.COM (Sept. 30, 2016),
http://www.al.com/news/birmingham/index.ssf/2016/09/alabama_supreme_court_chief_ju.html
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Nevertheless, we should keep in mind that, although state and
local officials have overwhelmingly obeyed federal court orders since the
civil rights era, that practice is not a given. Instead, like other
conventions, this bipartisan norm was politically constructed and is
historically contingent—a point to which I return in Part IV.
III. CONVENTION AGAINST COURT PACKING
There is a strong norm today against “packing” the Supreme
Court—that is, modifying the Court’s size in order to alter the future
course of its decisions. As scholars have recognized, “[n]o serious person,
in either major political party, suggests court packing as a means of
overturning disliked Supreme Court decisions.” 227 That is because, even
when compared with other court-curbing measures, “ ‘[c]ourt packing’
is especially out of bounds.” 228
My goal, as with the conventions discussed in Parts I and II, is
to examine how (and when) this strong bipartisan consensus developed.
Some commentators appear to assume that there was already a
convention against court packing in 1937, when President Franklin
Roosevelt advocated enlarging the Supreme Court. 229 But that seems
[https://perma.cc/W68W-47BY]; Kent Faulk, Roy Moore Timeline: Ten Commandments to Gay
Marriage Stance, AL.COM (May 6, 2016), http://www.al.com/news/birmingham/index.ssf/
2016/05/roy_moore_timeline_ten_command.html
[https://perma.cc/8VG9-7K5V]
[hereinafter
Faulk, Roy Moore Timeline]. In September 2017, Moore became the Republican nominee for a U.S.
Senate seat—an action that could be seen in part as an endorsement of his past defiance of the
federal judiciary. See Jessica Taylor, Roy Moore, Culture Warrior, Will Be Favored to Be the Next
U.S. Senator from Alabama, NPR (Sept. 27, 2017, 9:40 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/09/27/
553856901/roy-moore-s-long-controversial-history-in-alabama-politics
[https://perma.cc/X4NE3ZAT]. But again, the evidence is mixed. The Alabama state judiciary penalized Moore for his
defiance of the federal courts—in 2003, by removing him from the bench, and in 2016, by
suspending him for the remainder of his term—even though state officials sympathized with
Moore’s views on the merits. See Bill Chappell, Ala. Chief Justice Roy Moore Suspended for Rest
of Term over Gay Marriage Stance, NPR (Sept. 30, 2016, 12:53 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/
thetwo-way/2016/09/30/496089488/alabamas-chief-justice-roy-moore-loses-case-over-same-sexmarriage-stance [https://perma.cc/276X-Y4KD] (noting that “[t]he judgment against Moore [by the
state Court of the Judiciary] was unanimous. But the nine-member court also noted that the
decision is based on a review of Moore’s behavior and decisions, not on the justices’ views of the
Supreme Court’s June 2015 ruling that same-sex couples have the right to marry,” and that the
court emphasized that “ ‘some members of this court did not personally agree with’ the U.S.
Supreme Court’s ruling”); Faulk, Roy Moore Timeline, supra. Moreover, Moore ultimately lost the
Senate race. See Alexander Burns & Jonathan Martin, Once a Long Shot, Democrat Doug Jones
Wins Alabama Senate Race, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/12/us/
politics/alabama-senate-race-winner.html [https://perma.cc/247Q-SJAD].
227. Krotoszynski, supra note 3, at 1064.
228. Pozen, supra note 2, at 34.
229. Michael Dorf appears to make this claim, albeit without using the label “convention.” See
Dorf, supra note 3, at 79–81 (“[W]hat Roosevelt had proposed to do was something that just isn’t
done. It violated a customary norm obligatory on Congress . . . .”).
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doubtful. Historical accounts have shown that, although there was
strong opposition to Roosevelt’s plan (some of it from fellow Democrats),
the proposal also had considerable support in Congress and came close
to passage. 230
Instead, I argue that the current norm against court packing
came later. That is likely due in part to the ultimate defeat of
Roosevelt’s effort. 231 But the norm also seems to have emerged as a
result of political rhetoric. Beginning in the late 1950s, government
officials of both parties increasingly treated Roosevelt’s 1937 Courtpacking plan as a negative precedent—and used the label “court
packing” to condemn any judicial reform that they disliked. 232 This
repeated use of court packing as a political epithet, I argue, helps
explain why the practice is off the table today.
A. The Uncertain Teachings of Text and History
In contrast to the court-curbing measures discussed in the
previous parts, many scholars would likely agree that the norm against
court packing cannot easily be derived from the constitutional text,
structure, or history. 233 Article III provides that the “judicial Power of
the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court” but says

230. See infra Section III.B.
231. Cf. Adrian Vermeule, The Atrophy of Constitutional Powers, 32 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
421, 425 (2012) (“[T]he rejection of Roosevelt’s court-packing plan in 1937 . . . is said by many to
have created an unwritten constitutional norm against court-packing.”).
232. Notably, although the focus of this Part is political discourse, this use of “court packing”
as a rhetorical tool is not limited to political actors. For a fascinating account of how the 1937 plan
has also been used as a rhetorical tool in Supreme Court opinions, see Laura A. Cisneros,
Transformative Properties of FDR’s Court-Packing Plan and the Significance of Symbol, 15 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 61 (2012). Scholars have also recently responded to a proposal (by Professor Steve
Calabresi and Shams Hirji) to dramatically expand the lower federal judiciary by denouncing the
suggestion as “court packing.” See, e.g., Richard Primus, More on Court-Packing: The Idaho
Workaround, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 28, 2017), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/11/more-on-courtpacking-idaho-workaround.html [https://perma.cc/QV9B-A42C]; Ilya Somin, The Case Against
Court-Packing, WASH. POST (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2017/11/27/the-case-against-court-packing/?utm_term=.ed8ce843fcea
[https://perma.cc/9MAM-AEQP]. Notably, this Article argues that there is a convention against
packing the Supreme Court—that is, expanding the Court’s size in order to alter the future course
of its decisions. The Article does not examine whether there is a similar convention as to the lower
federal courts.
233. Most scholars who have considered the issue conclude that the constitutional text does
not preclude “court packing.” See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION:
THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 354, 354–55 (2012) (“Even if . . . Congress was
retaliating against what it perceived as Court abuses—say, a string of dubious rulings and judicial
overreaches—the legislature should still prevail.”); Keith E. Whittington, Yet Another
Constitutional Crisis?, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2093, 2134 (2002) (“[T]he Court-packing plan did
not exceed the constitutional powers of the elected branches.”).
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nothing about how many judges should be on that Court. 234 The
Constitution thus seems to leave the matter to Congress, exercising its
authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause. 235
This textual inference is supported by the fact that, throughout
the nineteenth century, Congress modified the size of the Supreme
Court, and often did so in part for partisan reasons. As discussed, the
outgoing Federalist Congress in 1801 reduced the Court’s size from six
to five members. 236 This change did have a neutral explanation; the
Judiciary Act of 1801 ended circuit riding by Supreme Court Justices,
so the Court arguably could get by with a smaller staff. However, the
Federalists were probably also eager to prevent President-elect Thomas
Jefferson from filling the next vacancy. Conversely, when the
Jeffersonian Republicans repealed the 1801 Act, and restored the Court
to six members, they were undoubtedly happy to facilitate a
Jeffersonian appointment.
In the 1860s, Congress made a number of changes to the size of
the Supreme Court—again, apparently in part to influence future
decisions. During the Civil War, the Republican Congress in 1863
increased the Court’s size to ten members, so that President Lincoln
could appoint Justices who favored the Republicans’ agenda of
combatting slavery and preserving the union. 237 But in 1866, soon after
Andrew Johnson assumed office (following the assassination of
Lincoln), Congress reduced the Court’s future membership to seven. 238
According to the conventional wisdom, the Reconstruction Republicans
who controlled Congress in the post–Civil War era did not trust Johnson
to nominate Justices sympathetic to the reconstruction efforts in the
South. 239 By contrast, in 1869, the Republicans were happy to push the
number of Justices back to nine—once fellow Republican (and former
Union army general) President Ulysses S. Grant took the helm. 240
234. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
235. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
236. See supra Section I.B.
237. See Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 100, 12 Stat. 794, 794 (setting the number of Justices on the
Supreme Court at ten); JUSTIN CROWE, BUILDING THE JUDICIARY: LAW, COURTS, AND THE POLITICS
OF INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 143–46 (2012) (asserting that the Republicans increased the size
of the Supreme Court to ten members to advance their antislavery agenda). The size of the
Supreme Court had previously been set at nine. Act of March 3, 1837, ch. 34, 5 Stat. 176, 176.
238. Judiciary Act of 1866, ch. 210, 14 Stat. 209, 209.
239. See WARREN, supra note 52, at 143–45, 223 (stating that the Judiciary Act of 1866 was
passed to deprive President Johnson of the opportunity to fill expected vacancies on the Supreme
Court).
240. See Circuit Judges Act of 1869, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44, 44 (lowering the number of Justices
back to nine); WARREN, supra note 52, at 223 (writing that President Grant filled the new positions
on the Supreme Court); see also CROWE, supra note 237, at 153–59 (noting that the 1866 and 1869
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Accordingly, in the nineteenth century, there was no convention
against modifying the size of the Court for ideological reasons. None of
these changes, of course, created a clear precedent for enlarging the
Supreme Court to fifteen members at one time, as President Roosevelt
would propose to do. But this history does help explain why the
Roosevelt Administration believed that court packing was not only
constitutional but also a politically viable method of influencing the
Supreme Court.
B. The Debates over the 1937 Court-Packing Plan
Other scholars have recounted in detail the debates over
Roosevelt’s 1937 plan. 241 I briefly discuss those debates here—to
underscore that in 1937, many government officials insisted that court
packing was both constitutionally acceptable and a desirable method of
reforming the Supreme Court. Thus, while the 1937 Court-packing
scheme was controversial in its day, the approach was not “out of
bounds.”
The Court-packing plan was a response to Supreme Court
decisions invalidating federal and state efforts to regulate the economy
and improve working conditions. 242 Under the plan, the president could
appoint one additional Justice to the Supreme Court for each Justice
over seventy years of age (who did not retire within six months)—for a
possible total of fifteen members. 243 Although Roosevelt initially
changes are often seen as partisan attempts to manipulate the Court’s size but urging that the
laws had more neutral purposes).
241. For just a few of the accounts, see BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW
PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 217–29 (2009) (describing the fight over the 1937 Court-packing plan); WILLIAM E.
LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF
ROOSEVELT 82–162 (1995) (describing the debate over Roosevelt’s plan to add more Justices to the
Supreme Court); and JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME
COURT 307–529 (2010) (discussing in detail the fight over Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan).
Scholars have also long debated the cause of the Court’s apparent “switch in time,” when it began
upholding social and economic legislation. Compare, e.g., LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER
OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 19 (1996) (arguing that the Court “blinked” in response to the Court-packing
plan), with BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 3–7 (1998) (challenging the view that the Court’s decisions were a
“political response to political pressure”).
242. See Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 618 (1936) (striking down a New
York law establishing a minimum wage for women); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 317
(1936) (invalidating the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542–51 (1935) (holding unconstitutional provisions of the National
Industrial Recovery Act).
243. FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: A
RECOMMENDATION TO REORGANIZE THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, H.R.
DOC. NO. 75-142, at 9–10 (1937).
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claimed that the proposal was designed to improve judicial efficiency, 244
he soon acknowledged that the real purpose was to alter the future
course of the Court’s decisions. 245 In his Fireside Chat on March 9, 1937,
the President urged that “new blood” was needed, because the Supreme
Court was “acting not as a judicial body, but as a policy-making body”
in invalidating federal and state laws. 246 “[W]e must take action to save
the Constitution from the Court and the Court from itself.” 247
Roosevelt’s proposal ignited a lengthy and national debate. From
the outset, there were some prominent supporters of Roosevelt’s plan.
Democratic Senate Majority Leader Joe Robinson led the fight in favor
of court packing, with the enthusiastic support of many other
Democrats, including then-Senator (and later Supreme Court Justice)
Hugo Black. 248 The measure seemed likely to get through the Senate,
and all participants agreed that it would pass the House of
Representatives by a wide margin. 249
The plan also faced considerable opposition, including some from
Roosevelt’s fellow Democrats. 250 This opposition increased after the
Supreme Court in late March 1937 issued West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, which upheld a state minimum wage law for women. 251 The
Court’s apparent “switch in time” signaled that it might also be more
receptive to New Deal programs, even absent a change in
membership. 252 Moreover, in June 1937, the Senate Judiciary
Committee, voting ten to eight, issued a strongly worded report
244. See id. at 1–3 (“[T]he judiciary has often found itself handicapped by insufficient
personnel . . . .”).
245. See Franklin D. Roosevelt, President, Fireside Chat (Mar. 9, 1937),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15381 [https://perma.cc/64KE-NEDN].
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 241, at 135 (“[I]n the first week, numbers of Democratic
Senators announced themselves for the bill . . . .”); SHESOL, supra note 241, at 514 (noting Senator
Black’s enthusiasm for the Court-packing plan).
249. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 241, at 141 (“[D]espite all the antagonism . . . it still
seemed highly likely in the last week of March 1937 that FDR’s proposal would be adopted.”). But
see Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 201, 224–26 (1994) (doubting
that the bill could have overcome a Senate filibuster).
250. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 241, at 131–35 (providing examples of opposition to the
plan, even among Democrats); SHESOL, supra note 241, at 467 (analyzing the impact of a
committee report opposing the Court-packing bill in which seven of the ten-person majority
opposing the bill were Democrats).
251. 300 U.S. 379, 386, 400 (1937).
252. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 241, at 226–27 (“The Court’s apparent change of direction [in
West Coast Hotel and two weeks later in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)]
was a major turning point for the plan, and everyone knew it.”); LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 241,
at 142–43 (arguing that Justice “Roberts’ ‘somersault’ [in the West Coast Hotel case] gravely
damaged the chances of the Court plan”).
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recommending against the plan. 253 The majority of the committee
denounced Roosevelt’s plan as “a needless, futile, and utterly dangerous
abandonment of constitutional principle.” 254
Yet even after the Supreme Court’s apparent “switch” in West
Coast Hotel and other cases, 255 and the issuance of this scathing report,
there was still considerable support in Congress for some type of Courtpacking bill. 256 It was only after additional (lengthy) debates—and the
sudden passing of the bill’s staunch proponent Senate Majority Leader
Robinson—that political support for the measure finally ran out. 257
We can certainly see in these debates the makings of a possible
convention against court packing. There was some bipartisan
opposition to Roosevelt’s plan, and the Senate Judiciary Committee
signaled through its report that its goal was to create a convention
against the practice. The report denounced Roosevelt’s plan as “a
measure which should be so emphatically rejected that its parallel will
never again be presented” to the country. 258 But the report itself was
issued by a fairly narrow margin (10 to 8); and even that scathing report
did not doom the chances for Roosevelt’s scheme in Congress. In 1937,
there was not yet a firm bipartisan consensus against court packing.
C. A Constitutional Amendment to Stop Court Packing
Even by the mid-1950s, many government officials still viewed
court packing as a genuine threat to the Supreme Court. This point is
illustrated by Senator John Butler’s effort to push through a
constitutional amendment fixing the size of the Court at nine. 259 He
made clear that the goal of the amendment was to “forestall future
[Court-packing] attempts” that would “undermine the integrity and
independence of the Supreme Court.” 260

253. See S. REP. NO. 75-711, at 9 (1937) (“Constitutionally, the bill can have no sanction.”);
SHESOL, supra note 241, at 467 (noting that the Senate Committee voted against the plan).
254. S. REP. NO. 75-711, at 23.
255. See supra note 252.
256. It appeared that Congress would authorize the President to appoint four additional
Justices (one for every member over age seventy-five). See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 241, at
147–48 (“[T]he prospects for enacting” this bill “appeared very promising . . . .”).
257. See SHESOL, supra note 241, at 481–89, 497–500 (describing Senator Robinson’s lengthy
speeches in favor of the Court-packing plan and how the Senator’s passing marked the end of the
plan).
258. S. REP. NO. 75-711, at 23.
259. See 99 CONG. REC. 1106 (1953) (statement of Sen. John Butler, R-Md.) (discussing a
proposed resolution “to fortify the independence of the Supreme Court”). The amendment would
have also barred certain restrictions on the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. See infra Section IV.A.1.
260. 100 CONG. REC. 6255–56 (1954) (statement of Sen. John Butler, R-Md.).
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As scholars have observed in the literature on conventions, a
constitutional amendment can be a way of “confirming” a convention
following a breach. For example, the Twenty-Second Amendment
arguably reestablished the rule that U.S. presidents serve only two
terms, after Franklin Roosevelt breached that convention when he ran
for a third and then a fourth term. 261 But supporters of the Butler
Amendment did not suggest that Roosevelt had breached any
preexisting norm by proposing his Court-packing plan. Senator Butler
readily acknowledged that there were nineteenth-century precedents
for what Roosevelt sought to do, particularly during the 1860s. 262 Butler
and his supporters also emphasized the “relatively slim margin” by
which Roosevelt’s plan had failed in 1937, as proof that a future
president could successfully pack the Court. 263 The goal of the
amendment was therefore to close a worrisome “loophole” in the
constitutional structure, not to reestablish a political norm. 264
Senator Butler’s amendment easily mustered the two-thirds
majority needed to make it through the Senate. 265 But the measure was
held up in the House of Representatives; some members were
apparently concerned that “freezing” the Supreme Court’s size would
prevent even beneficial modifications (such as those to account for
changes in the Court’s workload). 266 Nonetheless, the debate over this
constitutional amendment certainly suggests that political actors, even
by the mid-1950s, did not view court packing as “out of bounds.”

261. See U.S. CONST. amend XXII, § 1 (“No person shall be elected to the office of the President
more than twice . . . .”); Jaconelli, supra note 8, at 30, 32–33 (stating that the two-term limit was
“a textbook example of constitutional convention,” and noting that the Twenty-Second Amendment
arguably “put [the convention] on a more secure, legal footing”).
262. See 100 CONG. REC. 6256, 6341–42 (1954) (statement of Sen. John Butler, R-Md.) (stating
that the 1937 plan “does not represent the sole instance” of court packing).
263. 99 CONG. REC. 1106 (1953) (statement of Sen. John Butler, R-Md.); see also 100 CONG.
REC. 6895 (1954) (statement of Sen. Francis Case, R-S.D.) (agreeing that court packing “remained
as a potential threat” absent a constitutional amendment).
264. See 99 CONG. REC. 1106 (1953) (statement of Sen. John Butler, R-Md.) (explaining that
“[t]hese proposed amendments are designed chiefly to plug up th[e] loopholes” present “in the strict
letter of the Constitution”); id. at 1108 (statement of Sen. Russell Long, D-La.) (“Certainly that
[threat of court packing] is one loophole which we should close in order to protect ourselves in the
future.”).
265. See 100 CONG. REC. 6347 (1954) (showing that the Senate voted fifty-eight to nineteen in
favor of the amendment).
266. See C.P. Trussell, Court Amendment Tabled in House: Judiciary Group, 11-8, Kills Bid to
Fix Size at 9 and Retire Justices at 75, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1954, at 11; see also 100 CONG. REC.
10,454 (1954) (statement of Rep. Emanuel Celler, D-N.Y.) (stating that Congress should not “force
upon ourselves a rigidity which can in the future make much mischief”).
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D. Court Packing as a Negative Precedent
One can see a gradual change in political attitudes toward court
packing starting in the late 1950s—just a few years after Senator
Butler’s proposed constitutional amendment. Government officials
repeatedly invoked Roosevelt’s 1937 plan as a negative precedent. We
can see this trend in two different lines of debate. First, opponents of
other court-curbing measures would condemn them as equivalent to
“court packing” (even when those measures had nothing to do with the
size of any federal court). Second, political actors would criticize any
judicial nomination that they disliked as an effort to “pack” a federal
court. Recognizing the rhetorical force of the accusation, supporters of
the court-curbing measure or nominee were at pains to deny the “court
packing” charge. In this way, Roosevelt’s 1937 plan over time became
the paradigmatic example of an illegitimate threat to the judiciary.
1. The Use of “Court Packing” to Condemn Other Court-Curbing Bills
In 1957, Senator William Jenner introduced a bill to eliminate
the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over a range of cases
involving suspected communists. 267 Opponents in Congress denounced
the measure as “court-raiding, and therefore, to be equated with the
court-packing bill of 1937.” 268 “[R]eprisal by the Legislature, whether
done by adding new judges or by taking away jurisdiction, creates a
climate of interference and intimidation in which no court in the nation
can function fairly and fearlessly.” 269 Accordingly, opponents insisted,
the bill should meet the same “well-deserved fate” as President
Roosevelt’s “mortal error.” 270
Senator Jenner, however, called the comparison “specious,”
insisting that “[t]here is no court packing involved in any way in my

267. See Limitation of Appellate Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. to Investigate the Admin. of the Internal Sec. Act & Other Internal Sec. Laws
of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong. 1–2 (1957) [hereinafter Hearing on the Limitation of
Appellate Jurisdiction] (statement of Sen. William Jenner, R-Ind.) (explaining the legislation was
meant to cure the “succession of blows at key points of the legislative structure erected by the
Congress for the protection of the internal security of the United States against the world
Communist conspiracy”).
268. 104 CONG. REC. 18,652 (1958) (statement of Sen. Jacob Javits, R-N.Y.).
269. Emanuel Celler, Letter to the Editor, Jenner Court Bill Opposed: It is Considered an
Attack on the Judiciary’s Independence, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1958, at E8 (letter to the editor by
Rep. Emanuel Celler, D-N.Y., Chairman, House Judiciary Committee).
270. 104 CONG. REC. 18,686 (1958) (statement of Sen. Thomas Hennings, D-Mo.) (“[T]his bill
is reminiscent of” the Court-packing attempt); id. at 18,682 (statement of Sen. Alexander Wiley,
R-Wis.) (comparing the measure to that “great instance[ ] of mortal error”).
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bill.” 271 “[T]he court-packing plan was an effort to influence the Court
so as to bring about a particular kind of decision.” 272 His bill did “not
seek to change the philosophy of the Court in any way” but instead
aimed to establish a “barrier” against “the incursions of the Court into
the legislative field.” 273
Subsequent court-curbing measures likewise brought charges of
“court packing.” 274 For example, in 1968, legislators brought up the
1937 plan to criticize judicial reform proposals in the wake of Miranda
v. Arizona. 275 Opponents declared: “Some 30 years ago . . . a similar
assault was made on the independence and the power of the judiciary
by the President of the United States. . . . That assault was in the guise
of the now infamous ‘Court-packing plan.’ ”276 But supporters disputed
that their reforms “smack[ed] of a Court-packing scheme.” 277 They
insisted: “This is a wholly inaccurate analogy . . . . We seek not to pack
the Court. We seek only equal justice for society as against the criminal
and for a return to the law of the land—the Constitution as
interpreted . . . since the founding . . . .”278 Both sides clearly
understood that, just a few decades after the 1937 plan, “court packing”
was a “perjorative [sic] term.” 279
This trend has continued to the present day, as legislators
sought to strip federal jurisdiction over a range of issues, including

271. Hearing on the Limitation of Appellate Jurisdiction, supra note 267, at 240, 691
(statement of Sen. William Jenner, R-Ind.) (arguing that the Court-packing comparison was “one
of the specious arguments against the bill which has been repeated by various thoughtless
witnesses”).
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 19,814 (1964) (statement of Sen. Wayne Morse, D-Or.) (opposing
an effort by Senator Everett Dirksen, R-Ill., to require delays in reapportionment orders and
arguing that “[t]he Dirksen amendment is another form of a Court-packing proposal”).
275. 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see 114 CONG. REC. 11,740 (1968) (statement of Sen. Joseph Tydings,
D-Md.) (“It is just as necessary to defeat [these court-curbing efforts] for the same reasons it was
necessary to defeat the court-packing plan.”). There were a variety of proposals, including efforts
to restrict federal habeas jurisdiction and the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over cases
involving confessions. The jurisdiction-stripping measures were never enacted. Another provision
did become law: 18 U.S.C. § 3501 provided that a confession would be admissible in federal court
as long as it was voluntary. The Supreme Court later struck that down. See Dickerson v. United
States, 530 U.S. 428, 431–32, 444 (2000).
276. 114 CONG. REC. 11,740 (1968) (statement of Sen. Joseph Tydings, D-Md.).
277. Id. at 13,849 (statement of Sen. John McClellan, D-Ark.) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
278. Id.
279. A Proposal to Divide the Fifth Circuit: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and
Commercial Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 107–08 (1977) (statement of Rep.
Charles Wiggins, R-Cal.) (describing “court packing” as “a perjorative [sic] term”).
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abortion and school prayer. 280 In 2004 and 2006, legislators invoked
Roosevelt’s plan to criticize bills that would have restricted jurisdiction
over challenges to the Defense of Marriage Act and to the use of “under
God” in the Pledge of Allegiance. Opponents condemned both measures
as “nothing more than a modern day version of ‘court packing.’ ” 281 They
asserted:
Just as President Franklin Roosevelt’s efforts to control the outcome of the Supreme Court
by packing it with loyalists was rejected by Congress in the 1930s, thereby preserving the
independence of the federal judiciary, so too must this modern-day effort to show the
courts ‘who is boss’ fail as well. 282

2. “Court Packing” in the Appointments Process
Modern presidents do not propose enlarging the Supreme Court
in order to influence its decisions—in large part, I suspect, because
Roosevelt’s 1937 plan has become “infamous.” 283 Nevertheless,
legislators of both political parties often bring charges of “court packing”
to criticize specific judicial nominations. For example, after President
Ronald Reagan offered Robert Bork for the Supreme Court, thenSenator Joseph Biden declared: “[T]oday, 50 years after Roosevelt
failed, . . . we are once again confronted with a popular President’s
determined attempt to bend the Supreme Court to his political ends.” 284
More recently, in opposing the Samuel Alito nomination, Senator
Patrick Leahy decried what he viewed as an “effort to pack the court
with those who would give [President George W. Bush] unfettered
leeway” on claims of executive power. 285

280. See, e.g., 128 CONG. REC. 2246, 2250–51 (1982) (statement of Sen. Max Baucus, D-Mont.)
(referring to efforts to strip jurisdiction “on the so-called ‘social issues’: abortion, school prayer, and
school busing” as “the most serious threat to judicial independence since President Franklin
Roosevelt tried to pack the Supreme Court in 1937”).
281. H.R. REP. NO. 108-691, at 110 (2004) (Minority Rep.).
282. Id.
283. Supra note 276 and accompanying text.
284. 133 CONG. REC. 20,915 (1987) (statement of Sen. Joseph Biden, D-Del.) (discussing the
Court-packing plan as a historical precedent where the Senate demonstrated “courage” in the face
of a “powerful and popular President who attempted to bend the Court to suit his own ends”); see
also id. at 20,915 (“Let me be clear. I am not for a moment suggesting that President Reagan is
attempting to . . . enact[ ] a constitutional change by enlarging the membership of the Court itself.
But . . . [b]oth had in mind the same result. Both sought to use their power of appointment to shift
the balance of Courts that had repeatedly rejected their social agendas.”); see also Edward Walsh,
POST
(July
24,
1987),
Biden,
Dole
Debate
Bork
Nomination,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1987/07/24/biden-dole-debate-bork-nomination/
c5ce6219-7765-4865-ab98-5b2db0c7e765/?utm_term=.72bf8a6b0547
[https://perma.cc/5SUFGSPK] (noting Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Biden’s comparison of President Reagan
nominating Robert Bork to the U.S. Supreme Court to FDR’s “ ‘court-packing’ plan”).
285. 152 CONG. REC. 51 (2006) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt.).
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A scuffle between President Barack Obama and Republican
legislators vividly underscores the rhetorical force of the court-packing
label. The controversy arose in 2013 when there were three vacant seats
on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, the appellate court that oversees
most federal agencies. 286 When President Obama sought to fill the
vacancies, Senate Republicans charged that Democrats were
“attempting to pack the court . . . in order to stack it in the
administration’s favor.” 287 Several legislators also introduced bills—one
entitled the “Stop Court-Packing Act”—that would have reduced the
size of the D.C. Circuit to eight judges, so that the President could not
fill the vacancies. 288
Democrats were quick to respond. President Obama denied that
he was “somehow engaging in . . . ‘court-packing.’ ” 289 He stated: “I
didn’t create these seats. . . . These are open seats. And the Constitution
demands that I nominate qualified individuals to fill” them. 290 Senator
Leahy insisted that “[n]o student of history can honestly say that
nominating candidates to existing vacancies is court-packing.” 291 (He
apparently forgot that he himself had made precisely that claim with
respect to Justice Alito. 292) Senator Leahy further sought to flip the
Roosevelt precedent against his opponents. Referring to the proposals
to reduce the size of the D.C. Circuit, he argued: “This effort to
manipulate the size of an important court in order to achieve political
goals is simply wrong. Just as President Roosevelt’s court-packing

286. See Jennifer Bendery, Republicans Charge Obama with Court-Packing for Trying to Fill
Empty Seats, HUFFINGTON POST (May 28, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/28/
obama-court-packing_n_3347961.html [https://perma.cc/E6WA-PUV7] (detailing the context in
which the “court-packing” controversy arose).
287. 159 CONG. REC. S7944–45 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 2013) (statement of Sen. John Cornyn, RTex.); see also Confirmation Hearings on Federal Judges: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary Part 1, 113th Cong. 95–96 (2013) (statement of Sen. Ted Cruz, R-Tex.) (“[A]ny effort to
pack the Court . . . should be decried.”).
288. H.R. 2239, 113th Cong. (2013), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr2239/text
[https://perma.cc/4JUW-SW4W] (introduced by Rep. Tom Cotton, R-Ark.); see also Bendery, supra
note 286 (noting similar bills).
289. Remarks on the Nominations of Patricia A. Millett, Cornelia T.L. “Nina” Pillard, and
Robert L. Wilkins to Be Judges on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 388, 2–3 (June 4, 2013) (“[S]ome Republicans recently have
suggested that by nominating these three individuals, I’m somehow engaging in—and I’m quoting
here—in ‘court-packing.’ [Laughter]”).
290. Id. at 3.
291. 159 CONG. REC. S7706–07 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 2013) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, DVt.).
292. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
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scheme was rejected in 1937 . . . the Senate should reject this attempt
to politicize the D.C. Circuit.” 293
Ultimately, this controversy led the Senate Democratic majority
to exercise the “nuclear option” and modify the filibuster rule, so that
lower federal court judges could be confirmed by majority vote. 294
Republicans dubbed this rule change part of the overall effort to “pack”
the federal courts. 295 And after taking over as majority party, Senate
Republicans continued to cite this “court-packing” episode to justify
blocking other nominations—including that of Merrick Garland to fill
the Supreme Court seat left open when Justice Antonin Scalia passed
away. 296 In discussing the stalemate over Garland, Senator Lindsay
Graham commented that he had warned Democrats that “changing the
rules in the Senate to pack the court [would] come back to haunt
them.” 297
This court-packing theme continued into the Trump
Administration. Soon after President Trump took office, he nominated
Judge Neil Gorsuch to fill the open seat on the Supreme Court. When
Democrats sought to filibuster the nomination, the Republican majority
abolished the filibuster for Supreme Court judgeships as well, enabling
the new nominee to be confirmed by majority vote. 298 Senator John
Cornyn justified the rule change in part by referring back to the
Democrats’ effort to “pack the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals” with
judges “that would rubberstamp President Obama’s administrative
293. Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary Part 4, 113th Cong. 1240 (2013) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt.).
294. See 159 CONG. REC. S8417–18 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 2013) (statement of President pro
tempore Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt.) (“Under the precedent set by the Senate today . . . the
threshold for cloture on nominations, not including those to the Supreme Court of the United
States, is now a majority.”).
295. See id. at S8443–44 (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions, R-Ala.) (“[T]he President . . . wants
to pack [the D.C. Circuit] because he thinks he can impact regulatory matters for years to come.”).
296. See Ted Barrett, Democrats Complain About Blockade of Garland, Lower Court
Nominations, CNN: POL., http://www.cnn.com/2016/04/11/politics/merrick-garland-supremecourt-blockade/index.html (last updated Apr. 11, 2016, 8:55 PM) [https://perma.cc/TW5W-7AF8]
(discussing the Republican Senate’s attempts to block Merrick Garland’s appointment to the
Supreme Court); Jonathan Bernstein, The End of the Filibuster, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2013, at
A17 (discussing Republican Senate members’ attempts to block appointments to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit).
297. GOP Insists Obama Leave Seat Open, DENVER POST (Feb. 14, 2016),
http://www.denverpost.com/2016/02/14/gop-insists-obama-leave-supreme-court-seat-open/
[https://perma.cc/Q8TG-BW2M].
298. See Ed O’Keefe & Sean Sullivan, Senate Republicans Go ‘Nuclear,’ Pave the Way for
Gorsuch
Confirmation
to
Supreme
Court,
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
6,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/senate-poised-for-historic-clash-over-supreme-courtnominee-neil-gorsuch/2017/04/06/40295376-1aba-11e7-855e-4824bbb5d748_story.html?utm
_term=.7b2a9084ee46 [https://perma.cc/PBM4-CM8G] (discussing the Republican majority’s
alteration of filibuster rules for Justice Gorsuch’s appointment).
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actions.” 299 Now, Senator Cornyn declared, “we are coming full
circle.” 300
As these debates illustrate, legislators of both political parties
clearly treat the 1937 Court-packing plan as a negative precedent. That
is why no political actor today wishes to be associated with it, while
many seem eager to pin that label on their opponents. This repeated
use of Roosevelt’s 1937 plan as a negative precedent has helped
establish and reinforce the firm convention against court packing today.
IV. THE CONTINGENCY OF OUR CONVENTIONS
This Article demonstrates that much of the judicial
independence that we take for granted today depends on convention.
That is, even when the constitutional text does not explicitly protect the
judiciary from a court-curbing measure, a political norm has filled the
gap. That helps explain why federal judges do not generally fear
removal outside the impeachment process, or that political actors will
ignore or obstruct their rulings, and why the Supreme Court need not
be concerned about another Court-packing attempt.
But it is crucial to recognize the historically contingent nature
of these conventions. We can see that when we compare these “political
rules” to other practices that are not likewise off the table. Most
significantly, there is no bipartisan norm against taking away the
federal courts’ jurisdiction. Building on prior work, I provide an
overview of the different political history of Congress’s power over
federal jurisdiction. I use this example as a jumping-off point to
consider why only certain forms of court curbing are out of bounds. I
argue that the current conventions of judicial independence depend in
part on narratives crafted by our political and legal culture.
Accordingly, if those narratives change over time, so might the scope
and the nature of the protections that are taken as a given by federal
judges today.
A. The Lack of a Convention Against Jurisdiction Stripping
The Constitution sends mixed messages about the scope of
Congress’s power over federal jurisdiction. Article III at first seems to
299. 163 CONG. REC. S2185 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 2017) (statement of Sen. John Cornyn, R-Tex.)
(“It was a naked power grab. It was to pack the DC Circuit Court of Appeals . . . in order to have
judges confirmed by 51 Democratic votes that would rubberstamp President Obama’s
administrative actions during his administration. And sadly, it worked. They did just that.”).
300. Id. (“So in a way, we are coming full circle . . . .”).
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guarantee some level of jurisdiction, providing that the federal courts’
“judicial Power shall extend to all Cases” arising under federal law, and
that the Supreme Court “shall have appellate Jurisdiction” over such
federal question cases. 301 But Article III then suggests that Congress
has considerable discretion over federal jurisdiction, declaring that the
Supreme Court’s appellate review power is subject to “such Exceptions,
and . . . such Regulations as the Congress shall make,” and leaving it
up to Congress to decide whether to create any inferior federal courts
at all. 302
There is a long-standing debate over how best to read these
provisions, but most scholars would (at a minimum) likely agree that
the constitutional text and structure can plausibly be read to allow
some types of jurisdiction-stripping measures. 303 Accordingly, one
might expect this area to be one—much like judicial tenure, compliance
with federal court orders, and court packing—in which government
officials would settle on a “rule” to protect the federal courts. That is,
political actors could develop a convention to fill in the gap left by the
constitutional structure.
That, however, has not happened. Today, there is no broad
bipartisan norm barring any kind of jurisdiction-stripping measure,
even those aimed at the Supreme Court. 304 But it is not clear why that
301. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
302. Id. §§ 1, 2.
303. Indeed, one dominant position in the academy is that Article III places virtually no limits
on Congress’s authority. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW 18–19 (1981)
(arguing that “Congress has wide and deep-going power over the courts’ jurisdiction”); John
Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and the Text of Article
III, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 204 (1997) (defending the position that, based on the Constitution’s
text, “Congress’s authority is substantial”). And even theories that articulate limits on
congressional power generally give Congress some room to maneuver. For example, several
scholars argue that some federal court must hear constitutional or other federal cases; under these
theories, Congress could take jurisdiction away from another federal court. See Akhil Reed Amar,
A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L.
REV. 205, 209, 240–46 (1985) (federal claims); Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980
Term—Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction
of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 66 (1981) (constitutional claims). Other theories
demand Supreme Court review over certain classes of cases but would give Congress leeway as to
the mechanism of review, and broad discretion over lower federal courts. See JAMES E. PFANDER,
ONE SUPREME COURT: SUPREMACY, INFERIORITY, AND THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES
25, 34–38 (2009) (emphasizing the Supreme Court’s role in overseeing its judicial inferiors through
direct appeal or through the use of supervisory writs); Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The
Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to
Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1016–43, 1044 (2007) (arguing that Congress must allow
the Supreme Court to review all federal claims but may transfer federal cases from the Court’s
appellate to its original jurisdiction).
304. Although some members of Congress have balked at the idea of restricting Supreme Court
review, most officials are happy to endorse all jurisdiction-stripping proposals of their fellow
partisans. See Grove, supra note 17, at 900–16, 920–22, 935–39 (detailing debates between
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is the case. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
congressional restrictions on federal jurisdiction were not clearly more
(or less) controversial than other possible court-curbing measures. Yet
in the mid-twentieth century, as other methods were deemed “off the
table,” jurisdiction stripping remained “on the table.” In this Section, I
provide an overview of that political history. The next sections consider
why one court-curbing method took a different path.
1. The Early Political History of Court-Curbing Measures
For much of our history, government officials did not treat
certain court-curbing measures as categorically different from any
other. For example, the Republicans who controlled the federal
government during the Civil War and Reconstruction turned to a
variety of methods to prevent the federal judiciary from undermining
their efforts to combat slavery and reunite the country. 305 As we have
seen, the Republican Congress abolished the federal court in the
District of Columbia in order to get rid of judges who were believed to
be Confederate sympathizers. 306 Republicans also supported President
Lincoln’s decision to leave John Merryman in prison, despite Chief
Justice Taney’s order, and cheered on Wisconsin’s defiance of federal
court enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act. 307 The Republicans further
modified the size of the Supreme Court to promote their political agenda
(or, at a minimum, to prevent the Court from interfering with that
agenda). 308
Perhaps not surprisingly, the Republicans were also willing to
restrict federal jurisdiction. The issue arose most prominently during
Reconstruction when William McCardle (who was detained by federal
military authorities in Mississippi) filed a habeas corpus petition
challenging the constitutionality of the reconstruction laws. 309
Congressional Republicans were alarmed; even President Lincoln’s
appointees on the Supreme Court might doubt the legality of military
Democrats and Republicans on various jurisdiction-stripping efforts, and providing appendix
demonstrating that political actors support bills proposed by their fellow partisans).
305. Notably, the Republican Congress of the 1860s also strengthened federal judicial power
in important ways—by expanding jurisdiction over civil rights and habeas claims brought by free
blacks and northern sympathizers. See William M. Wiecek, The Reconstruction of Federal Judicial
Power, 1863–1875, 13 AM J. LEGAL HIST. 333 (1969). My point is simply that when the Republicans
attacked the courts, they did not seem to treat different court-curbing measures differently.
306. See supra Section I.C.1.
307. See supra Section II.B.
308. See supra Section III.A.
309. See William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex parte McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 229,
236–38 (1973) (describing William McCardle’s challenge to the reconstruction laws).
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control over a large segment of the country. Accordingly, while the
McCardle case was pending before the Court, several legislators
introduced a bill to restrict the Court’s appellate jurisdiction over
habeas cases. 310
Democrats denounced this measure as motivated “merely by a
desire to prevent the Supreme Court” from “declar[ing] the
reconstruction laws unconstitutional and void” in McCardle. 311 Many
Republicans essentially admitted as much, but they argued that it was
appropriate—indeed, crucial—to prevent the Court from getting
involved in inherently political matters. 312 And although President
Andrew Johnson sought to block the jurisdiction-stripping measure
with his veto pen, 313 the Republicans had sufficient majorities in the
House and Senate to override the President’s veto and enact the law. 314
The Supreme Court then quickly acquiesced, dismissing McCardle’s
appeal in light of this newly established limit on its appellate
jurisdiction. 315 Although scholars today debate how best to read
McCardle (because the statute at issue left in place an alternative
avenue for Supreme Court review), 316 the opinion did suggest that
Congress has broad power to restrict the Court’s appellate
jurisdiction. 317
By the early twentieth century, the political winds had shifted,
and now progressives were concerned about what they perceived as a
pro-business (and anti-regulation) federal judiciary. 318 Accordingly,

310. See id. at 239.
311. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2167 (1868) (statement of Rep. George Woodward,
D-Pa.); id. at 2127 (statement of Sen. Charles Buckalew, D-Pa.) (“[T]his jurisdiction is to be
withdrawn . . . to preserve the reconstruction system enacted by Congress.”).
312. See id. at 2061 (statement of Rep. James Wilson, R-Iowa) (“Most assuredly it was my
intention to take away the jurisdiction given by the act of 1867 reaching the McCardle case[.]”).
313. See id. at 2094 (quoting the veto message).
314. See Repeal Act of 1868, ch. 34, 15 Stat. 44; Grove, supra note 17, at 924.
315. Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 515 (1869).
316. As the Court later explained in Ex parte Yerger, it could still review lower court decisions
denying habeas relief, because Congress had left in place its jurisdiction to hear original habeas
petitions under the Judiciary Act of 1789. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 105–06 (1869).
317. See McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 515 (“We are not at liberty to inquire into the motives
of the legislature. We can only examine into its power under the Constitution; and the power to
make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of this court is given by express words.”). Compare,
e.g., Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated
Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 905 (1984) (“[T]he bulk of the McCardle opinion
speaks very broadly and does not seem to turn on the availability of an alternative route of
appellate review.”), with James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court’s Power
to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1433, 1501 (2000) (noting that McCardle
“emphasi[zed] the availability of . . . an alternative source of inferior court review”).
318. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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they advocated a variety of court-curbing measures. 319 For example,
many progressives from 1910 through 1913 were eager not only to
abolish the Commerce Court itself but also to remove the Article III
judges who staffed that court. 320 These court-curbing efforts intensified
in the 1930s, after the Supreme Court struck down a series of highprofile New Deal programs. 321 Many progressives called for restrictions
on the Court’s jurisdiction, insisting that McCardle supported broad
congressional control. 322 But other federal officials—including some
Democratic legislators and Roosevelt Administration officials—doubted
that Congress had the power to cut off Supreme Court review of
constitutional claims. 323 Accordingly, as President Roosevelt explained
a few years after the failure of his 1937 plan, he chose court packing
because of its “undoubted constitutionality; and [because] it seemed . . .
to have the best chance of passing both Houses of the Congress most
quickly.” 324
Indeed, as late as the mid-1950s, many political actors viewed
jurisdiction stripping and court packing as equivalent threats to the
Supreme Court. This point is illustrated by Senator Butler’s
amendment, which sought not only to fix the size of the Supreme Court
at nine members (and thus prevent future packing) but also to
guarantee the Court’s appellate jurisdiction over constitutional
claims. 325 As Butler explained, his goal was to prevent any future
Congress from repeating the “abhorrent” conduct of the Reconstruction

319. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Exceptions Clause as a Structural Safeguard, 113 COLUM. L.
REV. 929, 960–62 (2013) (discussing bills aimed at Supreme Court review); Grove, supra note 17,
at 890–99 (discussing efforts to restrict inferior federal court jurisdiction over business cases).
320. See supra Section I.C.2.
321. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 241, at 102 (“ ‘The years 1935-1937,’ Michael Nelson has
noted, ‘saw more Court-curbing bills introduced in Congress than in any other three-year (or
thirty-five year) period in history.’ ” (quoting Michael Nelson, The President and the Court:
Reinterpreting the Court-Packing Episode of 1937, 103 POL. SCI. Q. 267, 273 (1988))).
322. See, e.g., 80 CONG. REC. 1097 (1936) (statement of Rep. Oliver Cross, D-Tex.) (proposing
a bill to strip federal jurisdiction “to hold an act of Congress unconstitutional”); 79 CONG. REC.
10,404 (1935) (statement of Rep. David John Lewis, D-Md.) (“[C]ertain exceptions and regulations
are plainly indicated as desirable.”).
323. See 80 CONG. REC. 1101 (1936) (statement of Rep. Edward Cox, D-Ga.) (“[I]nferior courts
being the creatures of the Congress, the Congress has the right to fix their jurisdiction, but not so
with the Supreme Court.”); id. (statement of Rep. John Hollister, R-Ohio) (asserting that it is
unlikely Congress has the power to remove the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction specifically given in
the Constitution); Tara Leigh Grove, The Article II Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 112 COLUM.
L. REV. 250, 269–74 (2012) (describing the Roosevelt Administration’s opposition to jurisdiction
stripping).
324. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, The Fight Goes On, COLLIER’S WKLY., Sept. 20, 1941, at 16,
37.
325. 99 CONG. REC. 1106 (1953) (statement of Sen. John Butler, R-Md.).
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Republicans in the McCardle era. 326 Restrictions on Supreme Court
jurisdiction were, Butler insisted, “as great a potential threat to the
independence of the judiciary as any plan for packing the membership
of the Court.” 327
2. The Different Path of Jurisdiction Stripping
As this Article has recounted, the political acceptance of various
court-curbing measures changed dramatically beginning in the midtwentieth century. From the late 1930s on, government officials
gradually forgot that Congress had any way of removing federal judges
outside the impeachment process. 328 Starting in the late 1950s, political
actors increasingly treated Roosevelt’s 1937 Court-packing plan as a
negative precedent that should never be replicated. 329 And in the wake
of the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s, government
officials, particularly at the federal level, seemed to assume that they
must comply with all federal court orders. 330
No such evolution, however, occurred with respect to Congress’s
power to restrict federal jurisdiction. Instead, jurisdiction stripping
continued to be an acceptable mechanism for curbing the federal courts.
We can see this phenomenon in the debates over Senator Jenner’s 1957
bill, which would have cut off Supreme Court review of certain cases
involving suspected communists. 331 Just three years after declaring
that every “citizen should have the right to have his case heard by the
highest court of the land,” 332 Senator John Butler co-sponsored a version
of this jurisdiction-stripping bill. 333 Butler acknowledged the about-face

326. 100 CONG. REC. 6258 (1954) (statement of Sen. John Butler, R-Md.).
327. Id.
328. See supra Section I.D.
329. See supra Section III.D.
330. See supra Section II.D.
331. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
332. 100 CONG. REC. 6344–45 (1954) (statement of Sen. John Butler, R-Md.).
333. The new “Jenner-Butler” bill sought to remove the Court’s appellate jurisdiction over
state bar admissions. See 104 CONG. REC. 18,647 (1958) (statement of Sen. John Butler, R-Md.).
The proposal was aimed at Court decisions examining state refusals to admit suspected
communists. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 273–74 (1957) (reversing the state court’s
finding that Konigsberg lacked the requisite moral character for the state bar despite no other
evidence of unlawful or immoral actions). Notably, the NAACP was strongly opposed to the
elimination of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction in this area. The organization was concerned that
state courts would use that freedom from Supreme Court supervision to bar civil rights attorneys
from practicing law in their states. See Hearing on the Limitation of Appellate Jurisdiction, supra
note 267, at 491–92 (statement of Clarence Mitchell, Director of the Washington Bureau of the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People).
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and offered only this explanation: he had “learned from experience” that
at times it was important to limit Supreme Court review. 334
Notably, during the debates over the Jenner-Butler bill, some
legislators sought to argue (as Senator Butler had three years before)
that restricting the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction was just as
disgraceful as court packing. Thus, progressives urged that “this bill is
reminiscent of two previous and ill-advised attacks on the Supreme
Court”—the 1937 Court-packing plan and the 1868 law at issue in
McCardle. 335 Senator Thomas Hennings admonished: “I do not believe
this Senate desires to join the ranks of the Reconstruction Senate of
1868 and 1869.” 336
Some supporters of the Jenner-Butler bill were clearly
uncomfortable with this charge and sought to distance themselves from
that “single Civil War habeas corpus case.” 337 But Senators Jenner and
Butler did not shy away from the McCardle precedent. Although Butler
had previously referred to McCardle as an “abhorrent” and
“irresponsibl[e]” moment in history, 338 he now cited the case as proof
that “Congress does have power to limit [the Supreme Court’s]
appellate jurisdiction by exceptions and regulations.” 339 And although
Senator Jenner decried the court-packing comparison to his bill as
“specious,” he found McCardle instructive, because the Supreme Court
had validated a restriction on its appellate review power. 340
(Ultimately, the Jenner-Butler bill lost in the Senate by a narrow
vote. 341)
In subsequent decades, social conservatives sought to eliminate
both Supreme Court and inferior federal court jurisdiction over a range
of constitutional issues, including abortion, religion, criminal
procedure, desegregation, and same-sex marriage. 342 Moreover, from
the late 1970s on, these legislators also seemed happy to rely on (what
they now characterized as) the “landmark case” of Ex parte McCardle

334. 104 CONG. REC. 18,668 (1958) (statement of Sen. John Butler, R-Md.).
335. Id. at 18,686 (statement of Sen. Thomas Hennings, D-Mo.); id. at 18,682 (statement of
Sen. Alexander Wiley, R-Wis.).
336. Id. at 18,686 (statement of Sen. Thomas Hennings, D-Mo.).
337. Id. at 18,679 (statement of Sen. James Eastland, D-Miss.).
338. 100 CONG. REC. 6258 (1954) (statement of Sen. John Butler, R-Md.).
339. 104 CONG. REC. 18,652 (1958) (statement of Sen. John Butler, R-Md.).
340. Hearing on the Limitation of Appellate Jurisdiction, supra note 267, at 691–92 (statement
of Sen. William Jenner, R-Ind.) (“[T]he Supreme Court . . . held the bill to be constitutional.”).
341. See 104 CONG. REC. 18,687 (1958) (conveying that the Senate defeated the measure by a
vote of forty-nine to forty-one).
342. See Grove, supra note 17, at 900–16, 935–39.
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to support restrictions on Supreme Court review. 343 Social
conservatives apparently no longer saw any need to distance
themselves from that “single Civil War habeas corpus case.” 344
Although social progressives vehemently fought these measures
(and most ultimately failed), a number of bills made it through at least
one chamber of Congress. The Senate, for example, in the late 1970s
and early 1980s approved bills that would have cut off federal
jurisdiction over school prayer cases or limited judicial authority to
order busing in desegregation cases. 345 More recently, in 2004 and 2006,
the House of Representatives voted to curtail all federal jurisdiction
over constitutional challenges to the Defense of Marriage Act and to the
use of “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance. 346 And in 2006, Congress
enacted the Military Commissions Act, which significantly restricted
federal jurisdiction over cases involving suspected enemy combatants
in the war on terror. 347
In prior work, I have argued that structural and political
safeguards built into our constitutional scheme help explain the
repeated failure of most jurisdiction-stripping proposals. One important
factor is the bicameralism and presentment process of Article I, which
effectively creates a supermajority requirement for every piece of
legislation—and thereby allows political minorities to “veto” legislation.
As I have documented, political supporters of the judiciary (such as the
social progressives in the late twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries) have often successfully used these procedures to block
jurisdiction-stripping measures. 348 Furthermore, the executive branch
has also opposed many jurisdiction-stripping bills, in large part (I
argue) because of its distinct institutional incentives. 349

343. E.g., 152 CONG. REC. H5409 (daily ed. July 19, 2006) (statement of Rep. Steve King, RIowa) (referring to Ex parte McCardle as a “landmark case”); 125 CONG. REC. 7637–38 (1979)
(statement of Sen. Gordon Humphrey, R-N.H.) (referring to the “well-known case of Ex parte
McCardle”).
344. 104 CONG. REC. 18,679 (1958) (statement of Sen. James Eastland, D-Miss.).
345. See Grove, supra note 17, at 900–10 (describing the Senate’s approval of these measures).
346. See id. at 911–16, 938–39 (describing the House’s approval of these measures).
347. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600. The Supreme
Court struck down the Act, insofar as it barred habeas claims by detainees at Guantanamo Bay.
See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 792 (2008). But the Court’s decision did not address the
rights of detainees held outside Guantanamo, nor the right of any detainee to challenge his
“conditions of confinement.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2012); Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 792 (declining
to “discuss the reach of the writ with respect to claims of unlawful conditions of treatment or
confinement”).
348. See Grove, supra note 17, at 871–73, 900–916.
349. See Grove, supra note 323, at 252–55, 268–86, 312–14 (focusing in part on the incentives
of the Department of Justice, whose primary job is to litigate in federal court).
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These structural and political safeguards help prevent the
enactment of most jurisdiction-stripping bills. But these political
hurdles pale in comparison to the protection offered by conventions. For
one thing, as the 2006 Military Commissions Act illustrates, these
structural safeguards do not always work. Moreover, as political
scientist Tom Clark has documented, judicial independence may be
threatened simply when a court-curbing measure is seriously
considered by Congress, even if the measure ultimately fails. 350 In the
face of genuine threats, federal judges may feel less free to issue
“unpopular” decisions. For example, in the wake of the Jenner-Butler
bill, the Supreme Court pulled back on the procedural protections for
suspected communists, even though the bill was defeated in the
Senate. 351 Many scholars believe that the Court was attempting to ward
off additional attacks. 352
Accordingly, the protection for judicial independence would be
far stronger if there were a convention leading officials not even to
propose, much less seriously consider, jurisdiction-stripping bills. It
seems doubtful that Newt Gingrich’s 2011 suggestion that Congress
abolish the Ninth Circuit caused any great ripple of fear on that court
(or any other lower federal court). Today, that idea is “ridiculous” and
“off the wall” to progressives and conservatives alike. Jurisdiction
stripping, by contrast, may be difficult, but it is not “out of bounds.” 353
350. See TOM S. CLARK, THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 15–16, 193 (2011) (arguing,
based on a statistical analysis of judicial reactions to legislative proposals to curb the Supreme
Court from 1877–2008, that “when Court-curbing bills are introduced in Congress, the justices will
exercise self-restraint by attenuating their use of judicial review to invalidate federal legislation,”
and that this reaction “is not driven simply by a judicial fear that the legislation will be enacted
but rather by an interpretation of those bills as indicators of waning public support for the Court”);
Tom S. Clark, The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy, 53 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 971, 972 (2009) (“Court curbing in Congress may affect judicial decision making independent
of any threat of enactment . . . because it can be a credible signal about waning judicial legitimacy”
with the public.); see also WALTER F. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT 64 (1962) (arguing that,
historically, the Justices have been “acutely aware of the attacks against their decisions, and . . .
willing to make concessions when they felt that danger had become too threatening,” though also
noting that the “appointing process” may lead to changes in judicial decisionmaking).
351. See Neal Devins, Should the Supreme Court Fear Congress?, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1337, 1343
(2006) (arguing that after Congress came “as Chief Justice Warren put it— ‘dangerously close’ to
enacting [the Jenner bill] . . . [t]he Court relented” (quoting EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL
WARREN 313 (1977))); see also C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, CONGRESS VERSUS THE SUPREME COURT,
1957–1960, at 121 (1961) (stating that the Court’s “retreat” reduced the political momentum for
additional court-curbing efforts); Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The
History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 196 (2002) (noting that
the “Supreme Court tempered its prior positions in a series of decisions that might be called a
second ‘switch in time,’ at least creating the appearance that it was backing away from the earlier
controversial decisions”).
352. See supra note 351.
353. Cf., e.g., Pozen, supra note 2, at 34 (“ ‘[C]ourt packing’ is especially out of bounds.”).
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B. Possible Explanations?
This historical account raises the question why there is no
convention against jurisdiction stripping. That is, why did only certain
forms of court-curbing come to be seen as “out of bounds” around the
mid-twentieth century? After considering some alternative
explanations, I argue that the narratives crafted by our legal culture
help explain the relatively acceptable status of congressional
restrictions on federal jurisdiction.
We can certainly imagine some reasons for the abrupt about-face
of the 1950s Senate on Congress’s power over the Supreme Court’s
appellate jurisdiction. Just three years after approving a constitutional
amendment that would guarantee the Court “appellate jurisdiction,
both as to law and fact, ‘in all cases arising under this Constitution,’ ” 354
the Senate nearly voted to abolish part of that very jurisdiction in the
1957 Jenner-Butler bill. 355 One likely important intervening factor was
Brown v. Board of Education; the Brown decision came down just six
days after the Senate voted in favor of the amendment. 356 Another
factor was the series of decisions issued by the Supreme Court between
1954 and 1957 that seemed to protect the procedural rights of suspected
communists. 357 The anti-communist and pro-segregation blocks in the
Senate came together in 1957 to support limits on Supreme Court
review. 358
The Warren Court decisions of the 1950s may explain the change
in positions of the many Senators who supported both the 1954
amendment and the 1957 jurisdiction-stripping bill. But a focus solely
354. 100 CONG. REC. 5718 (1954) (statement of Sen. John Butler, R-Md.).
355. See 104 CONG. REC. 18,687 (1958) (the Senate defeated the measure by a vote of fortynine to forty-one).
356. See 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (issued May 17, 1954); 100 CONG. REC. 6347 (1954) (on May 11,
1954, the Senate voted fifty-eight to nineteen in favor of the amendment).
357. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 213–15 (1957) (holding that, when an
individual was asked whether or not he knew if named persons were members of the Communist
Party, he could not be compelled to “make such a determination with so little guidance”); Yates v.
United States, 354 U.S. 298, 312 (1957) (“[S]ince the Communist Party came into being in 1945,
and the indictment was not returned until 1951, the three-year statute of limitations had run on
the ‘organizing’ charge, and required the withdrawal of that part of the indictment from the jury’s
consideration.”); Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 672 (1957) (“[S]ince the Government which
prosecutes an accused also has the duty to see that justice is done, it is unconscionable to allow it
to undertake prosecution and then invoke its governmental privileges to deprive the accused of
anything which might be material to his defense.”).
358. Twenty-seven senators, including Senators Butler and Jenner, favored both the
amendment and the 1957 bill. All were Republicans or Southern Democrats. See 104 CONG. REC.
18,687 (1958); 100 CONG. REC. 6347 (1954); see also Devins, supra note 351, at 1343–44 (noting
that “[s]outhern lawmakers join[ed] forces with anti-Communist lawmakers” to support the
Jenner-Butler bill).
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on Supreme Court decisions does not explain the long-term difference
in attitude toward jurisdiction stripping. After all, legislators who
opposed the progressive rulings of the Warren Court in the 1950s and
1960s might have used a variety of mechanisms to attack the courts.
Indeed, until the early 1960s, segregationists did advocate another
court-curbing measure to block the implementation of Brown:
obstructing judicial orders. Yet even segregationists gave up on this
method after the early 1960s; and social conservatives did not widely
champion this or other court-curbing methods examined here
(abolishing judgeships or court packing) to block the wave of progressive
federal court rulings on abortion, 359 prayer, 360 or criminal procedure. 361
Instead, social conservatives seemed to accept the conventions barring
these other approaches.
Nor, as I have tried to suggest throughout, do the constitutional
text and structure clearly explain the distinctive status of jurisdiction
stripping. 362 Some readers may insist (despite the history I have
recounted) that the text rules out abolishing judgeships or violating
federal court orders. But prominent scholars have argued that the text
does not mandate obedience to every federal court decree. And the text
and structure plainly do not distinguish court packing from jurisdiction
stripping; after all, to my knowledge, every commentator to consider the
issue has concluded that court packing is permitted by the text. 363 There
must be some other reason these methods are politically “off the table,”
while jurisdiction stripping remains very much “on the table.”

359. One law professor did call for court packing in the wake of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973). See John P. Roche, A Tory Prof. Wants to Pack the Court, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 4, 1973, at A8.
But my research suggests that there were no similar calls by political actors.
360. Cf. Alison Gash & Angelo Gonzales, School Prayer, in PUBLIC OPINION AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 62, 63–64 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2008) (discussing how
officials in Alabama denounced the Supreme Court’s school prayer decisions but obeyed a specific
order to stop).
361. Cf. supra note 275 and accompanying text (discussing proposed responses to Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), which did not include abolishing judgeships, obstructing court
orders, or court packing).
362. Nor can the difference be explained by the Supreme Court’s decision in McCardle. For
starters, that decision is subject to multiple interpretations; some prominent scholars argue that
McCardle does not grant Congress plenary power over the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. See supra
note 317 and accompanying text. Moreover, for many decades after that 1869 case, political actors
did not treat jurisdiction stripping as distinct from the other court-curbing methods discussed in
this Article.
363. See supra Sections II.A, III.A.
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C. Constructing Narratives
I argue that our legal and political culture has constructed
narratives that help explain why certain court-curbing measures are
out of bounds, while jurisdiction stripping remains a relatively
acceptable means of attacking the federal judiciary. 364 But before I get
into specifics, I should explain my approach to identifying those
narratives. I consulted legislative history (much of which I have already
documented), newspaper articles, and law school casebooks from 1895
to 1980. 365 Notably, I looked at casebooks—both because they reflect
364. Other scholars have recognized the importance of narratives—“stock stories”—in our
constitutional culture. See J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law,
111 HARV. L. REV. 963, 987 (1998) (noting that these “stories are both descriptive and prescriptive:
they not only frame our sense of what has happened and how events will unfold in the future, but
also explain how those events should unfold”).
365. I examined thirty-nine casebooks published between 1895 and 1980. That includes all
twelve leading federal courts casebooks from that period and twenty-seven of the leading
constitutional law casebooks. I focused on the time period from 1895 to 1980, because that covered
the era prior to the establishment of the conventions discussed in this Article, as well as the period
in which (and soon after) those conventions were established. I endeavored to look at the leading
casebooks from the time period (such as James Bradley Thayer’s influential constitutional law
casebook), as well as some less well-known texts (such as Oliver Field’s constitutional law
casebook). Once I saw recurring trends in the casebooks, it seemed likely that I had examined a
sufficient number of texts. The federal courts casebooks are: GEORGE W. RIGHTMIRE, CASES AND
READINGS ON THE JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS (1917); CARL C.
WHEATON, CASES ON FEDERAL PROCEDURE (1921); HAROLD R. MEDINA, CASES ON FEDERAL
JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE (1926); FELIX FRANKFURTER & WILBER G. KATZ, CASES AND OTHER
AUTHORITIES ON FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE (1931); ARMISTEAD M. DOBIE, CASES ON
FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE (1935); FELIX FRANKFURTER & HARRY SHULMAN, CASES
AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE (rev. ed. 1937); ARMISTEAD
M. DOBIE & MASON LADD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
(1940); CHARLES T. MCCORMICK & JAMES H. CHADBOURN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL
COURTS (1946); CHARLES T. MCCORMICK & JAMES H. CHADBOURN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
FEDERAL COURTS (2d ed. 1950); RAY FORRESTER, DOBIE AND LADD’S CASES AND MATERIALS ON
FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE (2d. ed. 1950); HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (1953); PAUL M. BATOR, PAUL J.
MISHKIN, DAVID L. SHAPIRO & HERBERT WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1973).
I consulted the following constitutional law texts: JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, CASES ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1895); CARL EVANS BOYD, CASES ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d
ed. 1907); JAMES P. HALL, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1926); WALTER F. DODD, CASES
AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1932); HENRY ROTTSCHAEFER, CASES ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1932); ARCHIBALD B. THROCKMORTON, LAWRENCE B. EVANS: CASES ON
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1933); OLIVER P. FIELD, A SELECTION OF CASES AND
AUTHORITIES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1936); WALTER F. DODD, CASES AND OTHER
AUTHORITIES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1937); NOEL T. DOWLING, CASES ON AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1937); CHARLES G. FENWICK & LAWRENCE B. EVANS, CASES ON AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (4th ed. 1938); WALTER F. DODD, CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1941); NOEL T. DOWLING, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed.
1941); NOEL T. DOWLING, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1946); HENRY ROTTSCHAEFER,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (rev. ed. 1948); JOHN P. FRANK, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1950); NOEL T. DOWLING, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(4th ed. 1950); JOHN P. FRANK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1952);

Grove_Galley (Do Not Delete)

2018]

3/7/2018 9:48 AM

JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

529

what many academics have deemed to be the “essence” of a given field,
and because that is the medium through which legal academics reach
the largest body of future lawyers (many of whom go on to be
government officials). 366 These materials do suggest that jurisdiction
stripping was treated very differently from other court-curbing
measures beginning around the mid-twentieth century.
1. Narratives that Protect Judicial Independence
a. Judicial Tenure
As the debate over judicial removal illustrates, our political
culture has largely forgotten the history surrounding Congress’s power
to remove federal judges by abolishing their courts. 367 That is likely in
part because our legal culture for many years overlooked (or
discredited) that history. This narrative—a mixture of omission and
disdain—helps explain why the idea of abolishing judgeships is today
“off the wall.”
In my survey of casebooks, none included Stuart v. Laird, the
1803 case in which the Supreme Court approved the abolition of sixteen
federal judgeships in the 1802 Repeal Act. 368 For many years, law school
texts also failed to mention the Judiciary Act of 1801 or the 1802
repeal. 369 That changed around the early 1960s, when this history was

PAUL G. KAUPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (1954); PAUL A. FREUND, ARTHUR
E. SUTHERLAND, MARK DEWOLFE HOWE & ERNEST J. BROWN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND
OTHER PROBLEMS (1954); NOEL T. DOWLING, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5th ed. 1954);
CHARLES G. FENWICK & LAWRENCE B. EVANS, CASES ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (7th ed.
1957); NOEL T. DOWLING, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (6th ed. 1959); PAUL A. FREUND,
ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, MARK DEWOLFE HOWE & ERNEST J. BROWN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
CASES AND OTHER PROBLEMS (2d ed. 1961); NOEL T. DOWLING & GERALD GUNTHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (7th ed. 1965); GERALD GUNTHER & NOEL T.
DOWLING, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (8th ed. 1970); GERALD GUNTHER,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (9th ed. 1975); GERALD GUNTHER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (10th ed. 1980).
366. Cf. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 364, at 1011 (“The selection of cases and materials in
casebooks . . . both reflects and perpetuates particular . . . understandings of legal issues. . . . [The
materials] can direct our attention toward certain problems . . . and away from others, or cause us
to see certain situations as paradigmatic and others as secondary or inconsequential. . . .”).
367. See supra Section I.D.
368. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 308–09 (1803); supra notes 65–69 and accompanying text
(discussing Stuart). Notably, although some more recent casebooks do mention Stuart, the decision
is still obscure today. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 8–9 (2007).
369. Felix Frankfurter’s casebook contains a brief reference in the appendix to the 1801 and
1802 Acts, pointing out that Congress expanded federal jurisdiction in 1801 and repealed it in
1802. The casebook does not mention the abolition of judgeships. FELIX FRANKFURTER & WILBER
G. KATZ, CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE 733–34
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incorporated into the background story of Marbury v. Madison. 370 That
case, of course, involved William Marbury’s original suit in the Supreme
Court to obtain a commission (for justice of the peace) from President
Thomas Jefferson’s Secretary of State James Madison. 371
The common narrative is that Chief Justice Marshall faced a
dilemma: if the Court ordered the Jefferson Administration to act, it
might ignore the order—or attack the judiciary in other ways. Marshall
escaped this dilemma by declaring unconstitutional the federal
statutory provision that appeared to give the Court jurisdiction over the
case. 372 Accordingly, from the 1960s on, the Marbury opinion was often
praised as a “brilliant” political maneuver—one that both proclaimed
the authority of the Supreme Court (to review the constitutionality of
federal legislation), yet also avoided a direct confrontation with
Jefferson (because the Court did not order Madison to do anything). 373
The 1802 repeal was part of the “political background” of Marbury,
because the repeal was an example of the kind of danger that Marshall
skillfully avoided with his savvy opinion. 374
Because every casebook omitted Stuart, readers had no way of
knowing that the Marshall Court, six days after Marbury, approved the
(1931); FELIX FRANKFURTER & HARRY SHULMAN, CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON FEDERAL
JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE 785–86 (rev. ed. 1937).
370. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 153–54 (1803); see, e.g., NOEL T. DOWLING & GERALD GUNTHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 42–44 (7th ed. 1965) (discussing the 1802 repeal in
“Note: The Historical Setting of the Marbury Case”); see also Prakash & Smith, supra note 39, at
123–24 (noting that even today, “most students of constitutional law recall” these events “from
studying Marbury”). Two federal courts texts published around this time briefly mention the
repeal in a historical note on congressional jurisdictional reforms. See PAUL M. BATOR, PAUL J.
MISHKIN, DAVID L. SHAPIRO & HERBERT WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 36–37 (2d ed. 1973); HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 42 (1953).
371. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 153–54. Notably, Marbury was not one of the “midnight
judges” appointed to an Article III court.
372. See id. at 176–78. I do not seek here to enter the debate over whether Marbury correctly
interpreted the relevant provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789. For a summary of the debate (and
an argument that Chief Justice Marshall’s construction was likely correct), see James E. Pfander,
Marbury, Original Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court’s Supervisory Powers, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
1515, 1515–19 (2001).
373. See, e.g., DOWLING & GUNTHER, supra note 370, at 43–44 (noting the view that Marshall’s
opinion was “a masterwork of indirection, a brilliant example of Marshall’s capacity to sidestep
danger while seeming to court it” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting ROBERT G.
MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 40 (1960))). This narrative endures today. See
STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 15–16 (2011) (emphasizing
how Marshall “brilliantly escaped the dilemma”); Michael W. McConnell, The Story of Marbury v.
Madison: Making Defeat Look Like Victory, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 1, 19–21, 28–31
(Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004) (“Marshall’s solution to this dilemma was strategically brilliant . . . .”).
374. See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER & NOEL T. DOWLING, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 13 (8th ed. 1970) (discussing the 1802 repeal as well as the attempted
impeachment of Justice Samuel Chase and asserting that, following these events, “[t]he JeffersonMarshall dispute continued, but the Court had survived the most critical stage”).
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removal of judges in the 1802 repeal. That 1802 statute was also
presented as an isolated event; none of the casebooks I reviewed
mentioned the 1863 abolition of the D.C. circuit court, the debates over
the Commerce Court, or any other evidence suggesting that the
abolition of courts was once a real (if controversial) court-curbing
method. The comments of Professor Alexander Bickel in 1970 during
the legislative debates over judicial removal reflect this narrative.
When the 1802 repeal briefly came up during those debates, 375 he
suggested that the repeal was from the outset “seen, as the Alien
Sedition Act was soon seen, as a mistake.” 376 After all, the repeal was
“probably unconstitutional and highly politically motivated” and thus
“the kind of practice that was not good and ought not to be followed.” 377
b. Complying with Federal Court Orders
The convention requiring compliance with federal court orders
seems to have emerged soon after the civil rights movement of the 1950s
and 1960s. In contrast to the convention against abolishing federal
judgeships, this norm did not develop because political actors forgot
about the power to violate federal court orders. On the contrary, the
massive resistance to desegregation decrees still looms large in our
collective memory. 378
This paradigm likely helped to establish (and helps to reinforce)
the convention ensuring compliance with federal court orders. Although
Brown was controversial in its day, it has over time become “canonical.”
Any constitutional decision (or theory) can hope to gain acceptance only

375. See supra notes 111–113 and accompanying text.
376. Independence of Federal Judges Hearing, supra note 102, at 335–36 (statement of
Alexander Bickel).
377. Id. (“[S]ometimes the early practice is a good basis upon which to rest a constitutional
construction, and sometimes is not.”).
378. That is reflected in part by a search of newspaper articles. A search from the civil rights
era to the present revealed many references to Governor Faubus and the Little Rock incident. (By
contrast, a search of articles from 1890 to the present revealed essentially nothing about
Merryman and very little about the fugitive slave controversy. See infra note 381.) Casebooks do
not contain a section on defiance of federal court orders. But the issue comes up in constitutional
law casebooks in discussions of Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), a case that arose out of the
Little Rock incident. Gerald Gunther’s influential casebook, for example, questioned the Court’s
assertions in Cooper of judicial supremacy. But the casebook assumed that the officials, at a
minimum, were required to abide by a federal court order. See GERALD GUNTHER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 25–26, 32–33 & n.* (10th ed. 1980); see also BATOR ET AL.,
supra note 370, at 455–60 (discussing state resistance to Brown).
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if it affirms the correctness of Brown. 379 Conversely, the massive
resistance of segregationists is now viewed as one of the most
disgraceful moments in American history. Figures like Governor
Faubus, who openly obstructed federal desegregation orders, have been
transformed from “regional hero[es]” into historical villains. 380
By contrast, my review of legislative history, casebooks, and
newspaper articles suggests that other examples of defiance—such as
Merryman and the (arguably heroic) actions of the abolitionists in the
fugitive slave controversies—have been largely forgotten. 381 That was
particularly true in the mid-twentieth century, when this convention
was established. For example, one might have expected Lincoln’s
actions in Merryman to come up during the “Nixon tapes” controversy
in the 1970s. But I found only one clear reference—by Senator Ted
Kennedy—and he claimed (surprisingly) that Lincoln complied with
Chief Justice Taney’s order. 382
As long as historical figures like Faubus remain the paradigm,
and other examples are less well known, open defiance of federal court
orders seems likely to remain “off the wall.” Modern political actors do
not want to be equated with the segregationists who sought to obstruct
Brown.
c. Convention Against Court Packing
The narrative surrounding Roosevelt’s 1937 Court-packing plan
is nicely captured by the political rhetoric discussed earlier. Roosevelt’s
plan has, since the late 1950s, been viewed as an illegitimate threat to
judicial independence. Accordingly, opponents of a given judicial reform
attempt to compare it to “the now infamous ‘Court-packing plan,’ ” 383
379. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 364, at 1018; Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV.
L. REV. 379, 381 (2011) (“[T]he constitutional canon” is “the set of decisions whose correctness
participants in constitutional argument must always assume. Brown . . . is the classic example.”).
380. See supra Section II.C.
381. A search of newspaper articles from 1890 to the present revealed no references to the
Merryman incident. There were also no references to the fugitive slave controversy until 2013;
those references still did not focus on the resistance to a federal court order. Merryman has also
almost never been discussed in congressional debates since the mid-twentieth century, and it does
not appear that the executive branch has invoked it in any published Office of Legal Counsel
opinions. As an illustration of the lack of attention to the case, some of the textbooks in my review
went so far as to suggest that no president had ever violated a federal court order. See, e.g.,
DOWLING & GUNTHER, supra note 370, at 26–31 (stating, after discussing conflicts between various
presidents (including Lincoln) and the judiciary, that “[a]ll of these [presidential] positions fell
short of direct conflict with a court order” and failing to mention Merryman).
382. See 119 CONG. REC. 29,546 (1973) (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy, D-Mass.)
(“[S]hortly after Taney’s opinion was issued in the case and forwarded to President Lincoln,
Merryman was actually released. So, in fact, the order was obeyed.”).
383. 114 CONG. REC. 11,740 (1968) (statement of Sen. Joseph Tydings, D-Md.).
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while supporters deny that their reform “smacks of a Court-packing
scheme.” 384 In short, “court packing” has become a “pejorative term” in
our constitutional culture. 385
This narrative helps explain why “[n]o serious person, in either
major political party, suggests court packing as a means of overturning
disliked Supreme Court decisions.” 386 Although legal academics
(through their casebook coverage) do not appear to have created this
narrative, that coverage has also not pushed against this story. With
one exception, the federal courts and constitutional law casebooks in my
survey did not mention “court packing” as a possible court-curbing
method. 387 And no law school text mentioned that most academics view
court packing as a constitutionally permissible means of congressional
control. Instead, the 1937 plan was presented as a piece of history—the
“constitutional crisis” that may have prompted the Supreme Court’s
change in direction on the scope of federal regulatory power. 388 As we
shall see, this narrative contrasts dramatically with that surrounding
jurisdiction stripping starting in the mid-twentieth century.
2. A Narrative of Congressional Control
As I have documented, political actors for many years did not
treat jurisdiction stripping as categorically different from any other
court-curbing measure. But that changed starting around the late
1950s. Even as a bipartisan consensus developed against other courtcurbing methods, congressional restrictions on federal jurisdiction were
still viewed as a viable option. And McCardle was gradually
transformed from an “abhorrent” precedent to “black-letter” law. 389
Although there are likely multiple explanations for this transformation,
I argue that one important factor was the academic narrative
384. Id. at 13,849 (statement of Sen. John McClellan, D-Ark.) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
385. See supra Section III.D.
386. Krotoszynski, supra note 3, at 1064.
387. The one exception was Paul Kauper, whose constitutional law casebook briefly referred
to the Court-packing plan in a short discussion of congressional control over the federal judiciary.
See PAUL G. KAUPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 117–23 (1954).
388. See, e.g., PAUL A. FREUND, ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, MARK DEWOLFE HOWE & ERNEST J.
BROWN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND OTHER PROBLEMS 243–45 (2d ed. 1961) (discussing the
plan in the midst of Court decisions on federal power); JOHN P. FRANK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 446–49, 535–44 (2d ed. 1952) (describing “[t]he court fight of 1937” as “the
most spectacular event of our constitutional history”).
389. 152 CONG. REC. 15,067 (2006) (statement of Rep. Steve King, R-Iowa) (“[T]he landmark
case is Ex parte McCardle . . . .”); see also id. (statement of Rep. Mike Pence, R-Ind.) (“It is black
letter law in the Constitution . . . that this body, this Congress, shall have the authority to set the
jurisdiction of the courts.”).
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surrounding congressional control over federal jurisdiction. In the midtwentieth century, prominent legal academics advanced the view that
broad congressional control could be a good thing for our constitutional
democracy.
a. The Gradual Development of the Narrative
For many years, from 1895 to 1930, federal courts and
constitutional law casebooks rarely mentioned Congress’s power over
federal jurisdiction. Most omitted Ex parte McCardle entirely. 390
Perhaps the most notable omission was that of James Bradley Thayer,
one of the most influential constitutional thinkers of his day, whose
1895 constitutional law casebook was the legal standard in the field for
years. 391 Thayer left out McCardle, even though his casebook included
lengthy excerpts of other Reconstruction-era cases in which the
litigants challenged the constitutionality of the reconstruction laws. 392
McCardle was, it seems, on its way to becoming as obscure as Stuart v.
Laird.
The first legal academic to dust off McCardle was Felix
Frankfurter. Frankfurter’s 1931 federal courts casebook included
McCardle as a principal case and (in sharp contrast to his predecessors)
emphasized Congress’s control over inferior federal court
jurisdiction. 393 But even after the publication of this influential
casebook, other texts discussed jurisdiction stripping only
sporadically. 394
The issue gained more prominence with the 1953 publication of
Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal
System (“Hart and Wechsler”). That casebook, which quickly became

390. One early casebook mentioned McCardle briefly in footnotes. See JAMES P. HALL, CASES
178 n.2, 1323 n.1 (2d ed. 1926). The remainder omitted it.
391. See generally JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1895); see also
Telford Taylor, Book Review: American Constitutional Law, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1209, 1211 (1979)
(noting that Thayer’s “work enjoyed a virtual monopoly of the casebook field until 1913” (reviewing
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978))).
392. See THAYER, supra note 391, at 196–206 (including Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.)
50 (1868), and Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867), as principal cases).
393. See FRANKFURTER & KATZ, supra note 369, at 582–86 (including McCardle); id. at 246–
48, 540, 595–607 (highlighting control over inferior federal court jurisdiction).
394. Compare, e.g., WALTER F. DODD, CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 130–33 (3d ed. 1941) (including McCardle), with RAY FORRESTER, DOBIE AND LADD’S CASES
AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE 869 (2d. ed. 1950) (omitting
McCardle); see also CHARLES T. MCCORMICK & JAMES H. CHADBOURN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
FEDERAL COURTS 793–98 (2d ed. 1950) (including McCardle although the 1946 edition did not).
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
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the “definitive text on the subject of federal jurisdiction,” 395 firmly
endorsed broad congressional control over inferior federal court
jurisdiction and treated McCardle as a principal case. 396 But one can
see in this 1953 edition some continuing discomfort with McCardle. The
casebook contained a lengthy excerpt of Henry Hart’s Dialogue, in
which he doubted that McCardle should be read “for all it might be
worth,” and suggested instead that Congress had an obligation to leave
in place sufficient jurisdiction for the Court to exercise its “essential
role . . . in the constitutional plan.” 397
In the 1970s, beginning with the publication of the second
edition of Hart and Wechsler in 1973, law school texts went further and
offered an affirmative case for broad congressional control over both
Supreme Court and inferior federal court jurisdiction. 398 This
affirmative case had two basic components. First, congressional power
to restrict federal jurisdiction could be a good way to keep in check an
unelected and unaccountable federal judiciary. That is, “attempts to
restrict jurisdiction” could “[i]n some circumstances . . . be an
appropriate and important way for the political branches to register
disagreement with the Court and to channel and focus such contrary
opinions in a way that will come to the Court’s attention.” 399 The second,
and related, claim was that “the legitimacy of judicial review” could be
“enormously buttressed by the continuing existence of Congressional
power to curtail jurisdiction.” 400
According to this narrative, the Supreme Court was not
vulnerable to a sustained attack, because Congress was unlikely to
enact a jurisdiction-stripping bill. Congress would, after all, generally
opt to leave Court review in place to provide a uniform resolution of
federal questions. 401 This narrative thus presented broad congressional
395. Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 HARV. L. REV. 688, 689–90 (1989) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Philip B. Kurland, The Federal Courts and the Federal System, 67 HARV.
L. REV. 906, 907 (1954)).
396. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 370, at 288–302 (presenting McCardle and stating
that the framers of the First Judiciary Act rejected the view that Article III casts an obligation on
Congress to endow the federal courts with the full scope of the federal judicial power).
397. Id. at 312–13 (quoting Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction
of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1365 (1953)).
398. See BATOR ET AL., supra note 370, at 309–10, 313–15, 360–65 (discussing inferior federal
court jurisdiction); id. at 363–64 (discussing Supreme Court jurisdiction); GERALD GUNTHER,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 55 (9th ed. 1975) (noting “that it may be
‘politically healthy’ that ‘the limits of congressional power have never been completely clarified’ ”
(quoting HART & WECHSLER, supra note 370, at 363)).
399. BATOR ET AL., supra note 370, at 363; GUNTHER & DOWLING, supra note 374, at 52–53.
400. BATOR ET AL., supra note 370, at 364; GUNTHER & DOWLING, supra note 374, at 52–53.
401. See BATOR ET AL., supra note 370, at 363–64.

Grove_Galley (Do Not Delete)

536

3/7/2018 9:48 AM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:2:465

control over federal jurisdiction as the best of both worlds. The elected
branches could express concerns about Supreme Court jurisprudence
by proposing jurisdiction-stripping bills, while the Court was likely safe
from any serious attack. Meanwhile, broad congressional control over
federal jurisdiction would enhance the legitimacy of judicial review. In
sum, “rather than being a threat to judicial independence,”
congressional control over federal jurisdiction could be “one of its most
important (though subtle) bulwarks.” 402
b. Evaluating the Narrative 403
This congressional control narrative has had tremendous
influence in our legal culture. 404 Perhaps for that reason, this narrative
has also impacted political debates over jurisdiction stripping. For
example, a 2004 House report defended one such proposal in part by
reciting the academic claim that broad congressional control “may be

402. Id. at 364; GUNTHER, supra note 398, at 55 (“[A] congressional power over appellate
jurisdiction [may be] a source of strength rather than weakness for the Supreme Court.”).
403. It is not clear why legal academics crafted this affirmative case for Congress’s power over
federal jurisdiction. This narrative does seem to be in keeping with the legal process movement,
which had great influence in the field of federal courts in the mid-twentieth century. See Amar,
supra note 395, at 690–91, 700–02 (emphasizing how Hart and Wechsler were influenced by, and
contributed to the influence of, legal process theory (reviewing PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (3d ed. 1988))); Michael Wells,
Behind the Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process Tradition in the Law of Federal Courts,
71 B.U. L. REV. 609, 623–24 (1991) (noting that the legal process framework was “accepted for
nearly forty years by scholars and judges as a starting point of analysis of federal courts issues”).
At a time when some scholars questioned the legitimacy of judicial review, legal process scholars
argued that the federal courts’ authority could be both constrained and legitimated through
procedure. That is, jurisdictional rules, like standing and ripeness, would determine when judges
were authorized to make constitutional pronouncements. See KALMAN, supra note 241, at 30–31,
41–42 (observing that “[p]rocess theorists were . . . obsessed with procedural issues [and] with
limiting the role of the federal courts,” particularly in the exercise of judicial review); GARY MINDA,
POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY’S END 24 (1995)
(explaining the view that process values could be used to restrain the subjective preferences of
legal decisionmakers). Along the same lines, congressional statutes conferring jurisdiction could
signal the political branches’ acquiescence in judicial review—particularly if Congress had broad
power to restrict jurisdiction. Accordingly, the legal process movement may help explain why
academics in the 1970s were drawn to the congressional control model. What is more difficult to
determine is why those same academics did not also articulate an affirmative narrative for the
other court-curbing methods discussed in this Article. A full analysis of that question is beyond
the scope of this Article.
404. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, 96 VA. L. REV. 1043,
1086 (2010) (“I take seriously Charles Black’s remark that Congress’s power to withdraw the
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction is ‘the rock on which rests the legitimacy of the judicial
work in a democracy’ . . . .” (quoting Charles L. Black, Jr., The Presidency and Congress, 32 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 841, 846 (1975))).
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essential to making the institution of judicial review tolerable in a
democratic society.” 405
My goal is not to directly challenge this affirmative case for
congressional control over federal jurisdiction. (I have myself expressed
sympathy with this position in past work. 406) Rather, I seek to point out
that many of the very same policy arguments could be made about any
of the court-curbing measures I have detailed in this Article.
Consider the first argument for the congressional control model.
A threat to abolish federal judgeships, disobey court orders, or pack the
Supreme Court could also be a “way for the political branches to register
disagreement” with the federal judiciary, so that officials’ “contrary
opinions” on legal issues “will come to the [courts’] attention.” 407 After
all, many progressive legislators sought to remove Commerce Court
judges because of their pro-railroad decisions. 408 Likewise, abolitionists
in the 1850s, and later segregationists in the 1950s, sought to “register
disagreement” with federal court decisions by obstructing—or
threatening to obstruct—judicial orders. 409 And this basic argument
was made by the Roosevelt Administration in support of its 1937 Courtpacking plan. In testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
then-Assistant Attorney General (and later Justice) Robert Jackson
asserted that “[o]ur forebears” enabled Congress to alter the size of the
Supreme Court as a means of “check[ing] judicial abuses and
usurpations.” 410
The second argument for the congressional control model could
also apply to these other court-curbing methods. The very “legitimacy
of judicial review” might be “enormously buttressed by the continuing
405. H.R. REP. NO. 108-691, at 24 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (relying on
“leading Harvard Law School Federal jurisdiction scholar Paul Bator” (quoting Constitutional
Restraints Upon the Judiciary: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 55 (1981) (statement of Paul M. Bator, Professor of Law, Harvard
University))); see also Supreme Court: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 202 (1968) (statement of Paul J. Mishkin, Professor of
Law, University of Pennsylvania) (“[A]n attempt to restrict jurisdiction . . . is an appropriate check
as a means of focusing or channeling contrary opinion in a way that will bring it to the attention
of the Court.”). Notably, the 2004 House Report quoted Professor Paul Bator without mentioning
his serious reservations about eliminating the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction. See
Constitutional Restraints Upon the Judiciary, supra, at 36.
406. See Grove, supra note 17, at 928–29.
407. Cf. BATOR ET AL., supra note 370, at 363.
408. See supra Section I.C.2 (discussing the debates over abolishing the Commerce Court).
409. See supra Sections II.B.2–C (discussing state and local governments’ defiance of federal
court orders).
410. Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary, Part 1: Hearing on S. 1392 Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 75th Cong. 38 (1937) [hereinafter Hearing on Reorganization] (statement of
Robert H. Jackson, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States).
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existence” of a congressional power to abolish judgeships, pack the
Supreme Court, or by an executive authority to disregard federal court
orders. 411 One need not worry that such an attack on the federal
judiciary would happen often. After all, even before there was a firm
convention against these court-curbing methods, Congress rarely
removed judges outside the impeachment process; the judges on the
Commerce Court were ultimately moved to other positions in the
federal judiciary. 412 Most state and federal officials also obeyed federal
court decrees, and Congress on only a few occasions altered the size of
the Supreme Court. 413 Accordingly, we could have the best of both
worlds: the political branches would not often enact legislation
sanctioning the judiciary, nor in fact disobey federal court orders; yet
their power to do so could be “the rock on which rests the legitimacy of
the judicial work in a democracy.” 414
I suspect that many readers are highly skeptical of these
arguments. But that is precisely my point. In our current legal and
political culture, it is absurd to discuss removing federal judges,
disobeying federal court orders, or court packing in this way. We do not
view these methods as “appropriate . . . way[s] for the political branches
to register disagreement” with the federal judiciary. 415 But it is not logic
alone that clearly distinguishes these court-curbing methods from a
congressional power to take away federal jurisdiction. Instead, our legal
and political culture has chosen to treat these practices as “out of
bounds.” And that choice, I argue, provides tremendous protection for
judicial independence.
D. The (Overlooked) Fragility of Judicial Independence
Since the mid-twentieth century, government officials have
established conventions that protect judicial tenure, ensure compliance
with federal court orders, and prohibit attempts to “pack” the Supreme
Court. These conventions, I argue, are reinforced by narratives that
help us either to overlook these court-curbing methods or to treat them
with disdain. But as illustrated by the example of congressional control
over federal jurisdiction, these conventions are historically contingent
and, thus, subject to change. I argue here that there may be reasons
411. Cf. BATOR ET AL., supra note 370, at 364.
412. See supra Section I.C.2.
413. See supra Section III.A (detailing Congress’s juggling of the Court’s membership three
times during the 1860s).
414. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Presidency and Congress, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 841, 846
(1975).
415. Cf. BATOR ET AL., supra note 370, at 363 (emphasis added).
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today to worry about a change in these protections for judicial
independence. But first I address a preliminary question about the
relationship between “conventions” and “law.”
1. “Conventions” Versus “Law”
Some readers may assert that at least some of the protections I
have identified are not simply conventions (that is, “unwritten rules of
political behavior” 416) but binding rules of law. Many commentators
appear to make that assumption about judicial tenure. A number of
scholars have insisted that the Good Behavior Clause of Article III
simply means that federal judges are entitled to life tenure and can be
removed only through the impeachment process. 417 Many
commentators also assert that the Article III “judicial Power” plainly
encompasses the authority to issue binding rulings in specific cases. 418
To address this concern, I need to discuss an important
difference between “conventions” (defined in this Article as widespread
bipartisan norms) 419 and “legal rules.” At the outset, let me be clear that
I do not seek here to offer a detailed jurisprudential theory of either
“convention” or “law”; such an undertaking would be well outside the
scope of this project. But I believe we can identify some important
distinctions between “conventions” (as defined here) and “legal rules,”
simply by relying on well-accepted norms of legal practice.
Lawyers, judges, and scholars who practice (or write about) law
accept that there is room for reasonable disagreement about many
questions. That is, even if we are convinced that we have the “right”
answer to a given legal question, 420 we recognize that others may
legitimately disagree. (This, of course, is why we are not troubled by the
416. Vermeule, Conventions in Court, supra note 6, at 288.
417. See supra Section I.A.
418. See supra Section II.A.
419. As discussed, commentators do not (yet) agree on a single definition of “convention.” I
have defined “convention” as a widespread bipartisan norm in order to make the concept
analytically useful for this historical survey. See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text
(explaining the definition as used in this Article). The lack of a single definition in either British
or American scholarship would seem to present challenges for anyone in search of a sharp
jurisprudential line between “law” and “convention.” Interestingly, however, British theorists
often assert that constitutional “conventions” are not “law.” See Joseph Jaconelli, The Proper Roles
for Constitutional Conventions, 38 DUBLIN U. L.J. 363, 371 (2015) (noting that the “orthodox
approach” in British theory is that “there is a clear divide between laws and constitutional
conventions”). As noted in the text, I do not seek to tackle this larger jurisprudential question.
420. For present purposes, I put to one side the debate over whether any given legal question
should be deemed to have a single “right answer.” The leading advocate of the one-right-answer
thesis was, of course, Ronald Dworkin. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 266–71 (1986)
(advocating the one-right-answer thesis although discussing criticisms).
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existence of dissenting opinions in judicial decisions.) The debate over
jurisdiction stripping illustrates this point. Some scholars and political
actors have argued forcefully that the text, structure, and history of
Article III clearly place no limits on Congress’s power to restrict federal
jurisdiction; others argue just as forcefully that the same text,
structure, and history clearly do limit Congress’s power. 421 That is,
commentators have a reasonable disagreement over this legal question.
As I have demonstrated, at one point, political actors and
scholars also had reasonable disagreements about the Good Behavior
Clause of Article III. 422 That is, some argued forcefully that the
Constitution clearly allows Congress to remove lower federal court
judges by abolishing their courts, while others argued just as forcefully
that “good behavior” means life tenure, absent impeachment. Each of
these competing positions was considered legitimate, even as one side
viewed its position as “right” and the other as “wrong.” That is why, as
late as 1930, legal scholar Burke Shartel could say (as an aside in a
footnote), “The question whether Congress has power to abolish federal
judgeships so as to deprive sitting judges of their places has often been
discussed but never been decided.” 423
Today, however, the idea that Congress could “abolish federal
judgeships so as to deprive sitting judges of their places” is patently
absurd. But that, I argue, is not because of the “law.” Instead, it is
because of a convention. That is, political actors of both parties have
deemed such an argument to be “ridiculous” and “off the wall.” The same
is true of the rules prohibiting defiance of federal court orders and court
packing. However one reads the text, structure, and history of Article
III, those practices have been deemed out of bounds. There is (currently)
no room for reasonable disagreement.
In this way, a convention functions as a super-protection for
judicial independence—a protection that works over and above legal
rules. This idea explains how the three court-curbing measures
described here—abolishing judgeships, defiance of court orders, and
court packing—can all be deemed equally off the table, even though
many of us may read the “law” differently. As discussed, many scholars
421. Compare, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Text, Structure, and Common Sense in the Interpretation
of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1633, 1637 (1990) (arguing that “the inescapable implication of
the text is that Congress possesses broad power to curb the jurisdiction of both the lower courts
and the Supreme Court”), with, e.g., Laurence Claus, The One Court That Congress Cannot Take
Away: Singularity, Supremacy, and Article III, 96 GEO. L.J. 59, 64 (2007) (urging that “Congress
can never . . . remove from the Supreme Court the ability to have ultimate judgment of Article III
matters”); see also Grove, supra note 17, at 890–916 (recounting debates among political actors
over jurisdiction-stripping measures).
422. See supra Sections I.A–C.
423. Shartel, supra note 99, at 907 n.102.
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believe the constitutional text prohibits firing federal judges outside the
impeachment process or defying court orders, but allows court packing.
The conventions barring each of these practices—and, thus, protecting
judicial independence—supplement any legal interpretations.
That is not to say that conventions have no relationship to the
law. On the contrary, conventions may over time interact with, and
impact, our understanding of legal rules. Indeed, I suspect that the
conventions I have identified have influenced the way in which
scholars, judges, and political actors today interpret Article III. That is,
scholars likely assume that the Good Behavior Clause means life
tenure, and that the “judicial Power” requires obedience to judgments,
in part because of our political practices since the mid-twentieth
century. Moreover, these understandings may in fact be the best
reading of the Constitution; that is, one can argue persuasively that it
is not only unconventional but illegal to remove Article III judges
outside the impeachment process or to violate federal court orders. This
analysis thus links up with important work by Curtis Bradley, Trevor
Morrison, and Neil Siegel, who argue that government practices
followed over a long period of time may place a “gloss” on constitutional
meaning. 424 This work also connects with British scholarship on how
conventions may “crystallize” into legal rules. 425
But as the court packing example shows, such crystallization is
not necessary. There can be a strong convention against a court-curbing
measure, even if the legal community thinks the measure would be
“legal.” Indeed, far more scholars accept the legality of court packing
than jurisdiction stripping. Yet the “packing” method is the one that is
today “out of bounds.” Accordingly, conventions may offer a superprotection for judicial independence, regardless of our interpretation of
the “law.”
424. See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of
Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012); Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, After Recess: Historical
Practice, Textual Ambiguity, and Constitutional Adverse Possession, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 21, 24–
25 (explaining “the basic idea of historical gloss, which is that long-standing practices . . .
acquiesced in by the other political branch should be given weight” by courts and political actors
in separation of powers disputes); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasizing that experience may “gloss” constitutional
meaning). In a somewhat similar vein, Caleb Nelson and William Baude have suggested that
political practice can “liquidate” (that is, settle) the meaning of “contestable” constitutional
provisions. See William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122 YALE L.J.
1738, 1811–12 (2013); Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
519, 521–22, 527–29 (2003). However, it may be that only early political practice can result in such
“liquidation.” If so, the practices discussed in this Article (which date from the mid-twentieth
century) would not qualify.
425. For excellent work on how British conventions may crystallize into laws, see N.W. Barber,
Laws and Constitutional Conventions, 125 LAW Q. REV. 294, 294 (2009).
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2. The Contingency of Conventions
I have argued that the conventions of judicial independence
depend in part on the narratives crafted by our legal and political
culture. Those narratives lead us to treat some court-curbing measures
with disdain, while others appear to be more legitimate. Notably, this
argument also suggests that if the narratives were to change (perhaps
in response to changes in our political culture), we might see very
different protections for the federal judiciary.
Such modifications could go in either direction. Currently, there
is an appealing narrative in favor of broad congressional control over
federal jurisdiction: that such control provides legitimacy for judicial
review. If that narrative changed, so might political attitudes toward
jurisdiction stripping. For example, if government officials once again
viewed McCardle as an “abhorrent” and “irresponsibl[e]” precedent, 426
there might be far fewer congressional attempts to curb the Supreme
Court’s appellate jurisdiction.
Conversely, practices that are out of bounds today could in the
future be deemed more acceptable. The 1937 Court-packing plan, for
example, is now viewed by political actors of both parties as a “mortal
error” that Congress should not repeat. 427 But that is not the only story
one can tell about court packing. If this court-curbing measure were
viewed (as the Roosevelt Administration argued in 1937) as an
important means of “check[ing] judicial abuses and usurpations,” 428 a
plan to modify the size of the Court might no longer be out of bounds.
Along the same lines, if the paradigm for violating federal court orders
became the abolitionists of the 1850s, rather than the segregationists
of the 1950s, our collective attitude toward such defiance might be very
different.
Notably, the protections for judicial independence may be
subject to change, even if the conventions appear to have crystallized
into legal rules. After all, even legal rules are subject to modification
over time. That would seem to be particularly true of legal rules that
depend on the historical practice of the political branches. That is, if the
Good Behavior Clause is understood as guaranteeing “life tenure”
because of the conduct of government officials, the Clause might be

426. 100 CONG. REC. 6258 (1954) (statement of Sen. John Butler, R-Md.).
427. See supra Section III.D.
428. Hearing on Reorganization, supra note 410.
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viewed quite differently if proposals like that of Newt Gingrich became
more common, or were not quickly dismissed as “off the wall.” 429
To be clear, I do not want to overstate the susceptibility of
conventions to future modification. Although politicians can always
“propose a change of convention,” they will not succeed unless there is
fairly broad agreement that the previous convention is wrong or
outmoded. 430 Moreover, the three conventions identified here—
protecting judicial tenure, complying with court orders, and barring
court packing—have enjoyed a large degree of stability since the midtwentieth century.
But there are reasons today to worry about a change in the
protections for judicial independence. In an era of increasing party
polarization, 431 government officials in both parties have recently
proven willing to depart from long-standing norms in order to fulfill
short-term partisan gains. As discussed, in response to the scuffle over
three D.C. Circuit nominations, a Democratic-controlled Senate in 2013
abolished the filibuster for lower federal court appointments. 432 And
partially in response to the exercise of that “nuclear option,” a
Republican-controlled Senate in 2016 refused to hold hearings on a
Supreme Court nominee, and then in 2017 ended the filibuster for
Supreme Court judgeships to ensure the confirmation of their preferred
choice.
Although one can debate the constitutionality and wisdom of the
filibuster rule, 433 for my purposes, the important point is that the rule

429. Cf. JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST
WORLD 119 (2011) (arguing that the process of “attempting to move arguments from off-the-wall
to on-the-wall is the process of constitutional development in America”).
430. MARSHALL, supra note 8, at 216–17 (“[Conventions] cannot be changed unilaterally and
must be complied with . . . until changed by agreement.”).
431. See Mark D. Brewer, The Rise of Partisanship and the Expansion of Partisan Conflict
Within the American Electorate, 58 POL. RES. Q. 219, 219–20 (2005) (noting that although
partisanship declined throughout the 1950s and 1960s, “[b]y the end of the 1980s, partisanship in
Congress had risen dramatically and has remained at a high level ever since”).
432. See supra Section III.D.2.
433. The rule still applies to legislation. Under Rule 22, a cloture motion to end debate requires
three-fifths of the Senate (sixty votes). C. Lawrence Evans, Politics of Congressional Reform, in
THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH 490, 510 (Paul J. Quirk & Sarah A. Binder eds., 2005). For a small
sample of the scholarly debate over the filibuster, see Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Senate: Out of
Order?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1041, 1041 (2011) (arguing that the supermajoritarian effects of the
filibuster have pernicious effects on the Senate’s functionality); Josh Chafetz, The
Unconstitutionality of the Filibuster, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1003, 1015 (2011) (arguing that Article I
implicitly requires that “a determined and focused legislative majority . . . be able to get its way in
a reasonable amount of time”); Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 181, 181 (1997) (showing how “the nature and effects of filibusters have changed significantly
as the Senate has grown larger and busier”); see also Dan T. Coenen, The Filibuster and the
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was itself a convention. 434 Indeed, in 2005, a bipartisan majority of the
Senate opted to preserve the filibuster for judicial nominations—even
in the face of (another) bitter partisan fight—because “[t]he convention
permitting filibusters had become sufficiently entrenched that
politicians of both parties shied away from changing it.” 435 Yet a decade
later, both parties (when they were in the majority) opted to dispense
with the practice in order to fulfill short-term gains. These episodes
raise the question whether government officials will continue to adhere
to other bipartisan norms, including those that currently safeguard the
judiciary—especially if federal court rulings prove to be an obstacle to
the officials’ short-term goals. 436
The contingent nature of judicial independence is not often
appreciated by our legal culture. Instead, we generally treat it as a
given that the tenure of federal judges will be respected; that political
actors will comply with federal court orders; and that no one will
seriously consider packing the Supreme Court. As I have tried to
demonstrate, however, these features of our constitutional scheme are
not self-evident truths. These conventions of judicial independence have
been built over time, and could be deconstructed—or, alternatively,
expanded—if we alter the way in which we think and talk about the
federal judicial power.
CONCLUSION
Much of the judicial independence that we take for granted
today is not simply guaranteed by our constitutional text and structure.
This Article documents how political actors have over time built
Framing: Why the Cloture Rule is Unconstitutional and What to Do About It, 55 B.C. L. REV. 39,
40–41, 64–70 (2014) (summarizing some of the debate and arguing that the current rule is invalid).
434. Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 427–28
(2007); see Vermeule, Agency Independence, supra note 6, at 1188 (describing the filibuster rule as
a Senate convention).
435. Young, supra note 434, at 427–28 (noting that when Senate Democrats filibustered some
of President George W. Bush’s nominees, “a significant number of Republicans who disapproved
of the filibusters were nonetheless unwilling to vote to change the Senate’s rules”); see also Richard
Morin & Dan Balz, Filibuster Rule Change Opposed, WASH. POST (Apr. 26, 2005),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2004/10/26/AR2005032201677.html
[https://perma.cc/LF5B-XQD9] (noting that at that time, “a strong majority of Americans oppose[d]
changing the rules”).
436. Some commentators have questioned whether the Trump Administration will continue
to adhere to adverse federal court orders. See Aaron Blake, What Happens If Trump Decides to
Ignore a Judge’s Ruling?, WASH. POST (Feb. 5, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2017/02/05/constitutional-crisis-what-happens-if-trump-decides-to-ignore-a-judge/?utm
_term=.439e288b492f [https://perma.cc/XP8V-GGYF] (suggesting that noncompliance with a
federal court order blocking the travel ban is “not out of the question”); Totenberg, supra note 203
(noting that others are concerned that Trump may eventually “refuse to comply” with a court
order).
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conventions that prohibit the removal of federal judges outside the
impeachment process; the obstruction of federal court orders; and
packing the Supreme Court. These conventions serve as superprotections for judicial independence—protections that work over and
above legal rules. In that way—at least for those who view these
conventions as normatively appealing (as I suspect many do)—the story
offered here is one of triumph. But the goal of this Article is also to
sound a note of caution. What we currently view as utterly “out of
bounds” could change, depending on historical developments as well as
the political and legal discourse about the Article III judicial power.

